Abstract
This chapter examines the way in which the Yogyakarta Kraton celebrates one of the most important Muslim holy days, Mawlid al-Nabi, which commemorates the birth of the prophet Muhammad. The central component of the Mawlid is the recitation of texts expressing respect and love for the Prophet Muhammad and his family.
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Notes
- 1.
G. von Grunebaum, Muhanmadan Festivals. New York: Henry Schumann, 1952, pp. 73–76, N. Kaptein, Muhammad’s Birthday Festival: Early history in the Central Muslim Lands and Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th Century. Leiden: Brill, 1993 and A. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 146–147.
- 2.
Despite the fact that it is officially condemned as unbelief by the Saudi government and public Mawlid celebrations banned, many Saudi Muslims observe it in private.
- 3.
F. Denny, “Islamic Ritual: Perspectives and Theories.” in R. Martin (ed.) Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985, pp. 63–77.
- 4.
M. Memon, Ibn Tamya’s Struggle Against Popular Religion with an Annotated Translation of his Kitab Iqtida as-sirat al Mustaquim Mukhalafat a Shab al Jahim (Book of the Necessity of the Straight Path Against the People of Hell.) The Hague, Mouton, 1976 and S. ul-Islam, “Ibn Taymiyyah on the Mawlid” http://www.thenoblequran.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=BDH06&articleID=BDH060002&articlePages=1
- 5.
On questions concerning the status of the Mawlid in Islamic law see: A. Schussman, “The Legitimacy and Nature of Mawid al-Nabi: (Analysis of a Fatwa)”. Islamic Law and Society, vol. 5(2), 1998, pp. 214–234.
- 6.
See for example, The Permissibility of Celebrating the Meelad un Nabi (saw) in Refutation to the Fatwa of Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baaz of Saudi Arabia, Compiled by the Imam Raza Academy of South Africa, http://www.sunnah.org/publication/salafi/mawlid_refute.htm In Dubai, bin Baaz’s writings are banned, in part because of his condemnation of the Mawlid. http://www.sunnah.org/ibadaat/mawlid_dubai.htm
- 7.
T. Hanim, Pesantren dan Tradisi Mawlid: Telaah Atas Kritik Terhadap Tradisi Membaca Kitab Mawlid di Pesantren, 2009, http://www.sunnah.or g/ibadaat/tradisi_mawlid.htm
- 8.
http://musadiqmarhaban.wordpress.com/2008/03/21/muhammadiyah-pun-merayakan-maulid-nabi-saw/ A. Adham, “Maulid Nabi di Mu’allimaat Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta”, Kabar Indonesia, March 31, 2008, http://www.kabarindonesia.com/berita.php?pil=13&jd=Maulid+Nabi+di+Mu%92allimaat+Muhammadiyah+Yogyakarta&dn=20080331192835 It is clear that all parties to this debate can find support for their positions in the textual corpus of universalist Islam. They differ on questions of hermeneutics, or how these texts should be interpreted and acted upon.
- 9.
Others include the Garebeg Syawal and Besar which celebrate Idul Fitri, the feast at the conclusion of the fasting month of Ramdan and Idul Adha, the Feast of Sacrifice, held in conjunction with the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca; the Labuhan, which celebrates the Sultan’s birthday and which offerings are made to the guardian spirits of the four directions; Siraman Pusaka conducted of the 1st day of the Javanese year in which kraton pusaka are ritually bathed and blssed water distributed. For a comprehensive account of these rituals see, Sayumi, Upacara Ritual di Kraton Yogyakarta. Refleksi Mithologi dalam Budaya Jawa. Yogyakarta: Kepel Press, 2008.
- 10.
The reasons why it was renewed at this time is not clear. Some say that it was simply because “the time was right” others that it was an attempt to restore social and religious harmony in the Sultanate in the wake of the violence of 1965–1966. The violence was not nearly as intense in Yogyakarta as it was in other parts of Java, including Surakarta. According to many, this was because the Sultan worked to prevent it both politically and by putting his spiritual powers to use. Even so an unknown number of actual and suspected Communists were killed. The anti-communist campaign was based in the Kauman. Many of the victims were from other kampung in the central part of the city, some of them from areas located within the kraton walls. Many understand the Garebeg Malud of this era as slametan intended to heal the trauma of 1965 and particular to rebuild ties between the kejawen and santri populations. The fact that the Sultanate also undertook a program of mosque construction the stated purpose of which was to rehabilitate former “Communists” so that it “would not be necessary to kill them” at this time supports this interpretation. Some compare the period between 1942 and 1970 when there were no public Malud celebrations with the mythological account of the Majapahit-Demak inter-regnum during which state ceremonies were abandoned discussed later in this chapter. Others say that the reestablishment of the Garebeg was what is now referred to as “public diplomacy” because the Queen of the Netherlands attended. Viewed from Yogyakarta this was a state visit which redefined relationships between the Sultanate and the former colonial power, because for the first, and only, time Dutch and Javanese monarchs shared a ceremonial stage as equals. It is possible that all of these interpretations are correct. It is significant to note that I did not encounter suggestions of connections between the reestablishment of the Malud and the mass killings of 1965 and 1966 until after the fall of the New Order in 1998. Still others are of the opinion that state ceremonies were reinstituted to attract foreign and domestic tourists.
- 11.
E. Schieffelin, “Performance and the Cultural Construction of Reality,” American Ethnologist, vol. 12(4), pp. 707–724, S. Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- 12.
Op. cit., pp. 123–168.
- 13.
Tambiah states that the meanings of indexical symbols are inferred by the observer. The notion of inference links semiotics with the cognitive approach to symbolism advocated by Sperber (D. Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Lehman (F.K. Lehman,“Cognition and Computation: On Being Sufficiently Abstract.” Directions in Cognitive Anthropology. Ed. J. Dougherty. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986.) Lehman has written that symbolic thought is based on the computation of meaning by interpreting individuals. Ritual and other symbolic systems do not communicate anything other than a set of “objects” which motivate observers to create meaning for them. The distinction between symbol, index, and icon turns on the degree of similarity between two objects. An iconic relationship is one in which two objects are physically isomorphic, an indexical relationship one in which they share salient pragmatic characteristics, and a true symbolic (in the Piercian sense) relationship is one based on the interaction of abstract properties. The notion of computation of meaning is essential to the analysis of the Garebeg Ma1ud because many of the exact, literal meanings of objects used in the ritual depend on the types of meanings computed by thousands of observers.
- 14.
See Chapter 6 for an example of how Islamist attempts to attach indexical symbols to the fasting of month of Ramadan in 2008 misfired.
- 15.
The theory of the “Perfect Man” (al-insan al-kamil) is closely associated with the great medieval Spanish mystic philospher Ibn al ‘Arabi (1165–1240). See Schimmel op. cit., pp. 263–286). ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jili (d. ca. 1408) who wrote in the tradition of Ibn ‘Arabi, produced the classic work on the Perfect Man, which is studied in Javenese pesantren and exists in an interlinear Arabic/Javanese edition. A thorough analysis of al-Jili’s AI-Insan al-Kamil is found in R. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921, pp. 77–142.
- 16.
See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the role of this concept in New Order legitimation strategies.
- 17.
The idea of the Kalifah (Caliph) and the Caliphate as a governmental institution have long been among the most intensely contested concepts in Islamic political thought. For general discussions see of the Caliphate see: M. Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008; A. Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought. New York: Routledge, 2001; H. Bodman, “Caliphate” in M. Eliade (ed) The Encyclopedia of Religion. New York: Macmillan, vol. 3, pp. 21–24. In God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Patricia Crone and Marin Hinds have shown there is a fundamental tension between personalistic and textual authority in the Islamic tradition which dates to the period immediately following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The Caliphs who followed Muhammad as leaders of the Muslim community claimed to the “representative of Allah on earth,” and as such to be legitimate sources of Islamic law and social norms in much the same way the Prophet Muhammad was. While the authority of first four “Rightly Guided” (Rahidun) Caliph is accepted by most Sunni scholars, that of subsequent Caliphs is disputed. Some ulama have maintained that no legal authority was vested in later Caliphs and that the text of the Qur’an and Hadith – as interpreted by the ulama – are the only legitimate sources of religious and legal guidance for contemporary Muslims. In “Quis Custodiet Custodes: Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government, Studia Islamica, 5, pp. 125–148, 1956, Anne Lambton argues that all varieties of traditional Islamic political thought are theocratic, but that the Caliphal and text centered traditions developed in relative isolation from one another, and that in the early centuries of Islam juridical theory became increasingly removed from political reality. By the fifth century A.H. the theory that all rulers were “shadows of Allah on earth,” directly appointed by him and responsible to him alone, was common throughout the Muslim world. The Caliphal tradition provides the basis for Islamic theories of kingship, including that of Java where rulers adopted titles including Kalifutallah (J. The Caliph of Allah) and Sunan – a Javanese variant of the Arabic term sunnah referring to the religious and social practice of a legitimate Islamic authority – among whom are numbered all of Allah’s Prophets and Caliphs, including those of Java. It was not until the rise of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century and modernist reformism in the nineteenth that the shari’ah centered discourse of the ulama regained a central position in Islamic political discourse. Javanese Muslims associated with Nahdlatul Ulama accept the authority of the Rashidun Caliphs as legally binding. Muhammadiyah and other modernist organizations consider only the religious practice of the Prophet Muhammad to be authoritive.
The Kalifah concept does not figure significantly in Indonesian or Yogyakarta nationalism, but is an important element of contemporary Indonesian Islamist discourse. The last generally recognized claimants to the title Kalifah were the Ottoman Sultans. The office was abolished by the republican regime of the “Young Turks” in 1924. Some utopian Islamist organizations look to the re-establishment of the Caliphate as the key to solving all of the problems of the Muslim world. Of these Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is among the most vocal. HTI is the Indonesian branch of Hizb al Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) which was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al Din al Nabhani (1909–1977). Al Nabhani studied at al Azhar in Cairo and was subsequently a religious teacher and judge in Palestine. He founded the organization when he and a group of associates split from the Muslim Brotherhood. Their primary goal was to restore what they considered to be an authentic Islamic way of life to the Muslim community and to purge it of the vestiges of colonialism, westernization and secularism. They hoped to achieve these goals and to restore the glory of Islam by the re-establishment of the universal Caliphate. Hizb al Tahrir is now a global organization headquartered in London. It maintains web sites in numerous European and Islamic languages. It is increasing visible and active in Indonesia, one of the few Muslim countries in which it operates legally. Hizb al Tahrir web sites can be located at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/
- 18.
See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the ways in which this aspect of royal authority is problematized in the context of democracy.
- 19.
At least until the fall of the New Order in 1998 these concepts were also applied to the Indonesian presidency. Both Soekarno and Suharto are widely believed to have to have come to power through the grace of God and to have ruled until their moral failings led him to withdraw the mandate. The extent to which this grafting of traditional concepts of authority onto “modern” political offices still applies in an era where presidents are democratically elected remains unclear.
- 20.
“Servant/ Lord” terminology dates at least to the sixteenth century. See G. Drewes, The Admonitions of Seh Bari: A Sixteenth Century Javanese Text Attributed to the Saint of Bonan. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, p. 57. It is common in eighteenth and nineteenth century texts and contemporary religious discourse. The core meaning of kawula is “servant” or “subject” of the king. It is reasonable to suggest that the use of gusti for both “lord” in the sense of the Sultan and in the sense of God is a product of a theory of kingship based on mystical union and that the double meaning of the phrase “Union of Servant and Lord” is an example of manipulation of the multivocal, evocative power of symbols.
- 21.
Union is momentary because nafsu (“Javanese from Arabic nafs, passions”) are material elements of the body and cannot be destroyed. Permanent union may be attained only after death. Contemporary Javanese mystics state that momentary union has important social consequences. One who has attained this state is eternally tranquil. Such a person is detached from the world, yet continues to live in it, serving as a source of blessing (berkat) and tranquility (slamet) for others.
- 22.
With respect to the state the Sultan occupies a role very similar to that of the qutb (“pole”), a God-appointed human who is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of saints and reigns as guardian and spiritual director of the world. See Schimmel, op. cit., p. 200.
- 23.
On the social and political dimensions of the theory of the Union of Servant and Lord see S. Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Centuries. Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project. Ithaca: Cornell University, p. 26.
- 24.
S. Soebardi, The Book of Cabolek. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 67–68.
- 25.
Ibid., p
- 26.
Ibid., pp. 99–100.
- 27.
See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of this concept.
- 28.
See Chapter 2. In this respect the powers of the Sultan resemble those of dukun.
- 29.
It is also believed that many of the dewa were converted to Islam either before or after death.
- 30.
Schimmel, op. cit., pp. 186–187
- 31.
These same myths explain the origin of the slametan. They were also quoted in Chapter 2. They are repeated here because they are equally essential to the argument presented in this chapter.
- 32.
Sunan Kalijaga was one of the legendary Wali Sanga, (nine saints) believed to have played central roles in the establishment of Islam as the religion of Java. He is associated with the construction of the Grand Mosque of Demak, which is the architectural model for that of Yogyakarta. Myths concerning the construction of the Demak mosque mention Sunana Kalijaga as having fixed the kiblat or direction of prayer and by so doing oriented Java towards Mecca and Islam. It is said that after the mosque was constructed it refused to orient itself towards Mecca and spun in circles. Sunan Kaligaga, is said to have fixed the direction of the kiblat by holding one hand to the canter pillar of the mosque and by reaching out with the other and touching the Kabah in Mecca. This myth bends Java towards Mecca and Universalist Islam While Sunan Kalijaga used the wayang and other elements of Kebudayaan Jawa as tools for Dakwah he is also said to have played a central role in the wars that led to the conquest and destruction of Majapahit, the last of the Hindu Javanese states. Geertz, describes Sunan Kalijaga as exemplifying the syncretic “classical style” of Javanese Islam. He seriously understates the importance of Universalist and Essentialist Islam in legends concerning Sunan Kalijaga and the other wali. See C. Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 and Woodward, 1989, op. cit., for a critique of this view. On the Wali Songo see also, A, Bashah, Wali Songo dengan Perkembanngan Islam di Nusantara (The Nine Saints and the Spread of Islam in Indonesia). Selangor Malaysia: Pustaka Al Hijaz, 1993 and D. Rinkes, Nine Saints of Java. Kuala Lumpur Malaysia: Malaysia Sociological Research Institute, 1996.
- 33.
Sila is to sit with folded legs, a position commonly used for meditation.
- 34.
The following account is based on the comparison of the colonial Garebeg Malud and the performances I witnessed in 1979, 1989, 2008 and 2009. Graebeg of the colonial era are described in I. Groneman, De Garebegs te Ngajogyakarta. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1895 and S. Tirtokoesoemo, The Garebegs in the Sultanaat Jogjakarta. Jogjakarta: H. Bunning., 1935.
- 35.
While this motif is characteristic of Shia’h Islam, there is no evidence that Shi’ah thinking has played a significant role in the development of Javanese Islam. The traditional of venerating the family of the Prophet Muhammad is shared by Sunni and Shi’ah Muslims. What differentiate the two is the Shi’ah belief in a series of divinely guided Imam among whom Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet was the first. Javanese and other Indonesians of Arabic descent (Habib) are particularly devoted to Ali, from whom many claim descent, but clearly distinguish themselves from Shi’ah. They are particularly insistent about rejecting the Shi’ah theory of divinely inspired Imam.
- 36.
Gambling is now illegal, but still occurs.
- 37.
Sayyid, here this means Arab descendents of the Prophet Muhammad. Many Javanese, including those of the Mataram dynasty and many Kyai families claim descent from the Prophet through his grandson Hasan. Most Habib claim descent from his other grandson Hussein. Because Javanese kinship is bilateral, many will recognizes descent from the Prophet through genealogical links of either gender. Habib, like other Arabs, recognize only patrilineal descent. It is for this reason that they strongly disapprove of their daughters marrying outside the community, because the children of such unions are not, by their reckoning Sayyid.
- 38.
I would like to thank K.P.H. Poerwokoesoemo for sharing it with me.
- 39.
For a more detailed discussion of this procession see Chapter 3
- 40.
These are golden figures of a goose, the white feathers of which represent purity; a deer representing quickness; a cock representing bravery; a peacock representing the Sultan’s function as cleanser of souls; a gunpowder box representing benevolence; and a lantern symbolizing the belief that the Sultan gives light to his subjects in times of darkness. Several informants stated that these regalia were not pusaka, but rather a form of visual dhikr to aid the Sultan in his quest for mystical union.
- 41.
Gunungan are also carried from government offices to mosques in other parts of Java to celebrate the Malud and in haul which commemorate the deaths of saints. Some Javanese Muslims describe the Garebeg Malud as a haul for the Prophet Muhammad. Since the collapse of the New Order in 1998 the use of Gunungan in Malud celebrations in rural Java has increased significantly. These gunungan resemble those constructed by the Yogyakarta and Surakarta kraton in a general sense. They usually include local agricultural products that are not used in kraton gunnungan including cabbages and carrots. Because this is a new, and still developing, ritual tradition the composition varies considerably from year to year.
- 42.
See Chapter 3.
- 43.
On the gunungan see Tirtokoesoemo op. cit., pp. 76–23. The group of gunungan are analogous with offerings presented at ordinary slametan. gunungan kakang resembles the yellow rice cone which is the most important offering. The trays take the place of the small offerings which surround it. The umbrella shaped gunungan are appropriate for a royal slametan because umbrellas are important regalia and status markers.
- 44.
Unlike the others, Gunnungan Bromo is returned to the kraton intact after it is carried to the mosque on the morning of the Garebeg Malud. It is then presented to abdi dalem who scramble to grab pieces as it is torn to shreds in exactly the same way that the others are in the courtyard of the Grand Mosque.
- 45.
Buku Gambar Prajurit Kraton Ngayogyakarta Adiningrat Yogyakarta Kraton Manuscript D39 YMK/W-363. Reproduced in D. Marihandono and H. Juwono, Sultan Hamengku Buwono II. Pembel Tradisi dan Kekuasaan Jawa. Yogyakarta: Banjar Aji Production, 2008, pp. 241–257.
- 46.
Ricklefs, op. cit., pp. 133, 146–147, 274, 335) has shown that the Garebeg of the eighteenth century were also arenas for elite political competition precisely because all of the contending factions were required to appear at court. The Sultan’s troops were, at that time, more than symbols. They provided security and posed a clear threat to real and potential rebels and to the Dutch. Given the size of the crowds security is still a concern. It is provided by the Yogyakarta provincial police force. In the late 1970s the police were clearly Indonesian. Today this is far less clear. There is still a police presence, but there are also kraton security guards. They are assisted by students from Muhammadiyah secondary schools who lock arms to hold back the often surging crowds.
- 47.
C. Geertz, Negara The Theatre Stare in Nineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- 48.
Tirtokoesoemo, op. cit., p. 58.
- 49.
This is a clear example of the way in which indexical symbols may misfire. In the eighteenth century Yogyakarta’s contempt for the Dutch was stated very clearly. In 1783 a Dutch captain was stabbed by a Javanese officer. The resident was tricked into formally requesting clemency for the offender. The Sultan complied and as a token of “friendship” invited the resident to a fight between a tiger and a buffalo. As Ricklefs (1974:275) points out, the buffalo is a symbol of Java and the tiger represents the Dutch. Buffaloes always kill tigers in these contests.
- 50.
Muhammadiyah, was founded within the palace walls in Yogyakarta in 1912. Most of the ulama affiliated with the kraton, including the present Penghulu, are members of this organization. When I asked him about his role in the Garebeg Malud, the Penghulu stated that it a duty assigned by the Sultan and a part of Javanese culture. He continued by saying that such celebrations were not part of the “true Islam.”
- 51.
While they are not included in the Garebeg, shalawatan performances (recitations or Arabic texts praising the Prophet Muhammad) are now sponsored by and held in the kraton. In May of 2010 a performance that featured both Arabic and traditional Javanese variants was held in the pagelaran to commemorate the 263rd anniversary of the construction of the kraton (on the Islamic calendar), It featured the wildly popular Hadrami-Javanese performer Habib Syech Assegaf and attracted thousands of devoted fans, most of them young people. These performances are widely understood as efforts to “bring Islam back to the kraton” and to forge ties between conservative Muslims from the pesantren tradition, the Indonesian Arab community and the palace. This is the most remarkable development in Javanese Islam that I have witnessed in 30 years.
- 52.
Green is also, of course, the sacred color of Islam, closely associated with the Holy Prophet, with whom all Sufi spiritual lineages begin.
- 53.
Officially, non-Muslims may not live within the old city of Yogyakarta, i.e., the area within the palace walls. I was able to live there in 1979 only with the explicit permission of Sultan Hamengkubuwana!X
- 54.
Hamengkubuwana IX spent far more time in Jakarta than in Yogyakarta. He was sometimes criticized for paying more attention to national politics than local affairs.
- 55.
This was to change dramatically in the coming decade as is explained in Chapter 7. I have left this section of this chapter unchanged to better reflect the dramatic nature of this change.
- 56.
On the roles of Sufi movements in the Indonesian Islamic revival of the 1980s see J. Howell, “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 60, 2001, pp. 701–729 and on more recent developments her subsequent article, “Repackaging Sufism in Urban Indonesia,” ISIM Review, vol. 19, 2007, pp. 22–23
- 57.
On NU’s understanding of religion-state relations focusing on the views of former president Abudrrahman Wahid see M. Woodward, “ Islam, Pluralism and Democracy by Abdurrahman Wahid”, COMPOS Journal, ASU Consortium for Strategic Communications 2007 http://www.comops.org/article/113.pdf
- 58.
This assessment of the Javanese Indonesia Islamic revival of the 1980s was written in 1990 and was clearly overly optimistic. It is now clear that only the iron fist of the New Order security forces limited the growth of Islamist movements. They began to appear almost as soon as the New Order collapsed in 1998 and today (2010) figure significantly in electoral and cultural politics. On the changing role of the Pesantren in Indonesian education see R. Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad. Negotiating Identity and Modernity in Muslim Java. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. There is now a substantial literature on Islamist politics in contemporary Indonesia to which I have made modest contributions. Detailed discussion of these movements in beyond the scope of this volume. See M. Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, vol. 10(2), 2002, pp. 117–154 for a general overview and Z. Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003; G. Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005; N. Hassan, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post New Order Indonesia” in: K. Nathan and M. Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century. Singapore: ISEAS, 2005, pp. 301–324; M. Lim, Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet. Washington: East-West Center, 2005 and M. Woodward, M. Woodward, “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia,” Asian Security, vol. 4(1), 2008, pp. 41–60 and “Contesting Wahhabi Colonialism in Yogyakarta,” COMOPS Journal: Analysis, Commentary and News from the World of Strategic Communications, November, 2008 http://comops.org/journal/2008/11/06/resisting-wahhabi-colonialism-in-yogyakarta/
- 59.
The Grand Mosque does not have a minaret.
- 60.
The Garuda is the golden sun bird of Hindu mythology and the steed of the god Visnu. The Garuda motif is very common in traditional Javanese and contemporary Indonesian iconography, in the puppet theater (wayang), and classical dance on the national coat of arms, and as the name and symbol of Indonesia’s national airline.
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Woodward, M. (2011). The Garebeg Malud: Veneration of the Prophet as Imperial Ritual. In: Java, Indonesia and Islam. Muslims in Global Societies Series, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0056-7_5
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