Abstract
“A lot of strange things go on in the name of phenomenology.” (Van de Pitte 1988, 33)
The present essay was written early in 1992, but was never published at that time; while the text retains substantially the same form, the notes were drafted much more recently. Both the original subtitle (“How to do phenomenological research without falling into foundationalism, essentialism, or irreparable immanence and the metaphysics of presence”) and the secondary literature cited reflect certain aspects of Husserl-reception in the United States during the 1980s. I have made no systematic attempt either to update the bibliographical references or to integrate my own later reflections on phenomenological method, but have added a number of references to volumes of Husserliana that only appeared after this essay was initially drafted. Its place in the present collection can be explained by mentioning that the original bibliography included a reference to an unpublished manuscript by Lester Embree (an early version of Embree 2003/2006) that he kindly shared with me on the occasion of the 1989 SPEP meeting in Pittsburgh.
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Notes
- 1.
All citations in this form refer to Husserliana, cited by volume/page number(s); quotations are from standard English translations where available. The Husserliana Materialien series is cited using the abbreviation HM, followed by volume/page number(s).
- 2.
Cf. also Waldenfels 1992, 17; 19-1/22; 3-1/135; HM4/73f.
- 3.
See Ströker 1997, 32; cf. Kersten 1989, 21f.
- 4.
Here I am setting aside certain disputes in the literature concerning the difference between “epochē” and “reduction” – see, e.g., Spiegelberg 1973/1981; Petit 1973; Spiegelberg 1974.
- 5.
Cf. also, e.g., 25/61; 34/441ff. This approach to critique of presuppositions emphasizes that the “other side” of the “principle of freedom from presuppositions” is the “principle of all principles” expressed in Ideen I – namely, “that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there” (3-1/51; cf., e.g., 1/54, and see also Reiner 1959, 139ff.; Laskey 1984, 91ff.). A further deepening of the critique of presuppositions occurs when we take into account historically sedimented apperceptive styles, retrieving them from their anonymity and seeing how they have shaped what we have taken for granted – see, e.g., 34/303, 363, 397ff. Perhaps the most radical philosophical form that Husserl’s critique of presuppositions takes identifies the pregivenness of the world as, so to speak, the prejudice of all prejudices (see, e.g., 34/151, 303), while we as experiencers function, so to speak, as the (phenomenologically justified) presupposition of all presuppositions (see, e.g., 17/282f., 34/429). In this way, “radical freedom from presuppositions” requires inquiring back into our own streaming life of action and affection as “where” presuppositions exercise their efficacy in the first place (see, e.g., HM8/41).
- 6.
The difficulty that Husserl faces here is that of “inhibiting” a performance that has hitherto never been “consciously” or “explicitly” carried out; we have simply taken it as a “trivial matter of course” that things exist “in themselves” and that we merely come along and grasp them in this or that way (24/153), and this is why the attempt to alter the general “thesis” or “positing” of the natural attitude is so radical (see 3-1/61f.): we cannot immediately refrain from something utterly unthematic, but must first reveal it before we can alter or clarify it (cf. also 34/148ff., 464, 466, 486).
- 7.
See Boehm 1959/1968 for a careful account of the various senses of the terms “immanence” and “transcendence” in Husserl’s texts, and cf. also Seebohm 1989b, 350, 365; Behnke 2004, 21f.
- 8.
As Seebohm (1989b, 370, 376f.; 1992, 161, 163, 166) indicates, these sorts of critiques can be met by adopting a strictly epistemic (rather than ontological) understanding of the reduction.
- 9.
See, e.g., 24/227 n. 1 for an example of a passage where Husserl explicitly recognizes the plurivocity of the concept; cf. 24/407 n. 1.
- 10.
See, e.g., Seebohm 1989a; 1989b, 359ff.; 1992, 161ff.
- 11.
See, e.g., Ströker 1978 (= 1997, 45–81), and cf. Sokolowski 1974, 18ff., 108f., for some helpful distinctions and remarks. Note also that the issue of recourse to that which is itself-given must be separated from the issue of using free imaginative variation in eidetic-phenomenological research, where the actually perceived fountain receives the status of one possibility among others (see, e.g., 9/74).
- 12.
On the metaphor of “cashing in” or “redeeming” an empty “promissory note” for the fulfilling evidence, see, e.g., 2/62; 25/32; 20-1/322; 11/22.
- 13.
On pitfalls connected with the term “intuitive,” cf. Behnke 2004, 23f.
- 14.
See, e.g., Landgrebe 1963, 147 (= 1981, 136); cf. Funke 1966/1987, passim, on the implications of this distinction in general.
- 15.
Cf. Larrabee 1990, 195, where phenomenology as a whole is taken as the correlate of phenomenologizing.
- 16.
Thus experience is not something like a window – “an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness” (17/239) – but functions as a streaming nexus of sense-constituting performances whose ongoing style and whose sedimented history are precisely what constitutive investigations are to bring to light (17/240ff., 251f.).
- 17.
See, e.g., Funke 1966, 195, 206f. (= 1987, 144, 151).
- 18.
See 13/246, and cf., e.g., 4/219f.; 11/148ff., 166ff., 272; 34/191, 487; HM8/35f., 47, 52, 183ff., 197, 318ff., 350f.; Cairns 1976, 40, 53, 88.
- 19.
See also Seebohm 1989b, 376f., and 1992, 163, on the difference between epistemic and genetic priority.
- 20.
I have placed these words in quotation marks to acknowledge a resonance with the epigraph to E. M. Forster’s 1910 novel, Howards End: ‘Only connect …’. Cf. also Funke 1966, 90f. (= 1987, 67f.).
- 21.
Here I should emphasize once again that I am not proposing an interpretation that will accurately reflect the way the term “constitution” has actually been used (by Husserl or by anyone else) in each and every passage in which it occurs. Instead, I am suggesting that constitutive analysis – as tracing-out of correlations – is indeed a key tool in phenomenological research, yet working in this way need not entail the historically related, but separable, decision to apply what is revealed in such research to traditional philosophical problems (e.g., the search for a foundational “primacy” that would serve as some sort of ontological ground or “guarantee”).
- 22.
See Mohanty 1980; 1989, 144. Mohanty’s suggestion is confirmed in some of Husserl’s B I 5 manuscripts; see, e.g., 34/317, 453, and cf. xxxvi, 153ff., 240ff. (esp. 246).
- 23.
See 6/72, 152, 371ff.
- 24.
For more nuances, see Mohanty 1959. On the “exemplicating” move that takes something or other as an “example of …” rather than considering it in its own right, see Zaner 1973b, 31ff., 38ff.; 1978, 6ff., 13f., and cf., e.g., HM4/175, 189. Here I am setting aside the various controversies concerning the difference between “eidos” and “type” – see, e.g., Schutz 1959/1966, but cf. also Behnke 2004, 25ff.
- 25.
Cf., e.g., Waldenfels 1980, 13, 82. Note that here too, as with “constitution,” I am proposing a correlational understanding of a phenomenological “working notion” such that eidetic-phenomenological structures are correlates of eidetic-phenomenological investigation and are only given for an appropriately “eingestellt” consciousness – i.e., one that has adopted the appropriate attitude, interest, focus, etc., and is thus not operating within the attitude proper to ontological “essentialism” at all. Cf. also Laskey 1984, 99f.
- 26.
In this way a critical phenomenology “does not detach itself from historical developments; rather, it finds its peculiar field of work within the historical horizons” – Funke 1966, 109 (= 1987, 81).
- 27.
See, e.g., Seebohm 1989b, 364, 374; cf. 1992, 161f.
- 28.
Cf. Waldenfels 1989, 23 n. 7 (= 1990, 96 n. 6).
- 29.
Waldenfels 1975, 70 (= 1980, 85).
- 30.
See Waldenfels 1985, 140f.; 1987, 144f. (= 1996, 90f.); 1989, 20ff. (= 1990, 92ff.).
- 31.
Reeder 2010, 28; cf. 71, 84 n. 2. See also, e.g., 34/169f. on the contrast between the primal streaming – the continual upwelling of an ever-new now – and the acquisition of a “settled” past, persisting as identical, remaining what it was no matter how many times I return to it and examine it (cf. HM8/30f., 44f., 84, 90ff., 95f., 395).
- 32.
Cf., e.g., Waldenfels 1992, 61. What is at stake here is not simply the genetic priority of the natural attitude over the phenomenological attitude (see, e.g., 8/475; 34/175, 461f., and see also n. 21 above), but whether or not the project of phenomenological description per se must always and everywhere be directed to what has already been “settled,” to the abiding, the “fixed.”
- 33.
See, e.g., 11/passim on the entire issue of a determinate world whose future course is somehow decided, in itself, in advance, vs. the ineluctable presumptivity of perception and its continual anticipations; on the general theme of the project of knowing and its dependence on an “integrating” consciousness whose correlates are abiding transtemporal unities/identities available for explication, further determination, etc., see Behnke 2009, 210ff.
- 34.
See the extensive material available at www.focusing.org; cf. A. Zirión’s essay below.
- 35.
See, e.g., Behnke 2009. Here it is not possible to discuss the ways in which the specific areas of research one takes up shape the way in which one appropriates and interprets “phenomenology” in general.
- 36.
Waldenfels 1975, 75 (=1980, 89), and cf. also Behnke 1999; 2004, 32ff.
- 37.
See, e.g., 19-1/22f. (cf. 18/11; Cairns 1976, 27; Reeder 2010, 51, 59), where it is a question of new phenomenological clarifications transforming the way in which we understand our original phenomenological analyses (and cf. 38/4); see also 6/59, where – in the context of reconstructing Galileo’s mathematization of nature – it is a question of moving back and forth between present-day science on the one hand and its origins and development on the other, with clarification of each of these contributing to elucidating the other (cf. also HM8/357). For further zig-zags (e.g., between lived experience and the draft of a description-in-progress, or between theory and practice), see Behnke 1999.
- 38.
See, e.g., 24/387 on the necessity of interrupting one’s current phenomenological work in order to get clear and its sense on method before returning to the work itself; note, however, that any such methodological reflection presupposes the actual experience of putting the method in play (see, e.g., HM8/7).
- 39.
Here one thinks of the poignant anecdote (related in Spiegelberg 1982, 149 n. 2) of Husserl as a child wholly caught up in sharpening a pocket-knife to an ever keener edge while the blade itself got smaller and smaller.
- 40.
Cf., e.g., 24/445ff.; 8/195f., 203; 27/54f., 185, 207, 220f., 238, 240ff.; 6/15ff., 269ff., 334.
- 41.
See not only the title of the Ideen, but also 19-1/6f.; 25/63f.; 35/311.
- 42.
See Larrabee 1990, 201ff.
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Behnke, E.A. (2010). Working Notions: A Meditation on Husserlian Phenomenological Practice. In: Nenon, T., Blosser, P. (eds) Advancing Phenomenology. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 62. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9286-1_4
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