Abstract
Medical practice is characterized by verbal constructions. The ordinary language approach deals with what the healthcare workers and patients actually say. The paradigm of language games is positioned against formal logic, which as an abstraction has no relevance neither for our lives nor medical practice/thinking. Anamnesis is dealt with as presentation of the self. The self is seen to be a verbal picture we create for ourselves, a biography, a story of our lives, not something we are born with. We may also say that insofar as the physician uses language, the various linguistic selves of the patient are treated depending on the extent of the language used. From the ordinary language philosophy point of view, the language in and of medicine is examined, fallacies are presented and the metaphorical method introduced for analysis of concepts and settings.
Language should be studied by studying language, not by algebraic symbolic logic.
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Maier, B., Shibles†, W.A. (2011). Medical Language: The Ordinary Language Approach. In: The Philosophy and Practice of Medicine and Bioethics. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8867-3_18
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