

Group Signatures from Lattices: Simpler, Tighter, Shorter, Ring-Based

San Ling^(✉), Khoa Nguyen, and Huaxiong Wang

Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
{lingsan,khoantt,hxwang}@ntu.edu.sg

Abstract. We introduce a lattice-based group signature scheme that provides several noticeable improvements over the contemporary ones: simpler construction, weaker hardness assumptions, and shorter sizes of keys and signatures. Moreover, our scheme can be transformed into the ring setting, resulting in a scheme based on ideal lattices, in which the public key and signature both have bit-size $\tilde{O}(n \cdot \log N)$, for security parameter n , and for group of N users. Towards our goal, we construct a new lattice-based cryptographic tool: a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of a valid message-signature pair for Boyen’s signature scheme (Boyen, PKC’10), which potentially can be used as the building block to design various privacy-enhancing cryptographic constructions.

1 Introduction

Group signatures [CvH91] have been an active research topic in public-key cryptography. Such schemes allow users of a group to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the whole group (*anonymity*). On the other hand, in cases of disputes, there is a tracing mechanism which can link a given signature to the identity of the misbehaving user (*traceability*). These two appealing features allow group signatures to find applications in various real-life scenarios, such as digital right management, anonymous online communications, e-commerce systems, and much more. On the theoretical front, designing secure and efficient group signature schemes is interesting and challenging, since those advanced constructions usually require a sophisticated combination of carefully chosen cryptographic ingredients: digital signatures, encryptions, and zero-knowledge protocols. Over the last two decades, numerous group signature schemes have been proposed (e.g., [CS97, ACJT00, BMW03, BBS04, BS04, Gro07, LPY12]).

In recent years, lattice-based cryptography, possessing nice features such as provable security under worst-case hardness assumptions, conjectured resistance against quantum computers and asymptotic efficiency, has become one of the most trendy research directions, especially after the emergence of fully-homomorphic encryption schemes from lattices, pioneered by Gentry [Gen09]. Along with other primitives, lattice-based group signatures has received noticeable attention. Prior to our work, several schemes were proposed, each of

which has its own strengths and weaknesses. The first group signature from lattices was introduced by Gordon et al. [GKV10]. While their scheme is of great theoretical interest, its public key and signature have sizes $N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$, for security parameter n , and for group of N users. In terms of efficiency, this is a noticeable disadvantage when the group is large, e.g., group of all employees of a big company. Camenisch et al. [CNR12] later proposed lattice-based anonymous attribute tokens system - a generalization of group signature. Their scheme supports CCA-anonymity, a stronger security requirement than the relaxed notion CPA-anonymity achieved by [GKV10], but the signature size is still linear in N . The linear-size barrier was finally overcome by Laguillaumie et al. [LLLS13], who designed a scheme featuring public key and signature sizes $\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$. Yet, their scheme requires large parameters (e.g., $q = \log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^8)$), and its anonymity and traceability properties have to rely on the hardness of $\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^8)}$ and $\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^{7.5})}$, respectively. Thus, the scheme produces significant overheads in terms of hardness assumptions, considering the fact that it is constructed based on Boyen's signature [Boy10] and the Dual-Regev encryption [GPV08] which rely on much weaker assumptions. Recently, Langlois et al. [LLNW14] introduced a lattice-based group signature scheme with verifier-local revocation, that also achieves logarithmic signature size. However, their scheme only satisfies a weak security model suggested by Boneh et al. [BBS04]. As in the schemes from [GKV10, CNR12, LLLS13], we consider the currently strongest model for static groups provided by Bellare et al. [BMW03].

The present state of lattice-based group signatures raises several interesting open questions. One of them is whether it is possible to design a scheme in the BMW model that simultaneously achieves signature size $\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$ and weak hardness assumptions. Another open question, pointed out in [LLLS13], is to construct group signatures based on the ring variants of the Small Integer Solutions (SIS) and Learning with Errors (LWE) problems. This would make a noticeable step towards practice, since in those schemes, the public key size can be as small as $\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$. Furthermore, we remark that the design approach of [GKV10, CNR12, LLLS13] are relatively complex. First, in all of these schemes, the encryption layer (needed for enabling traceability) has to be initialized in accordance with the signature layer (used for key generation), which, to some extent, limits the choice of encryption mechanisms. In addition, the encryption layer requires the costly generation of at least $\mathcal{O}(\log N)$ matrices in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, and the signer has to encrypt at least $\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$ bits, which leads to a growth in public key and signature sizes. Moreover, these schemes have to employ involved zero-knowledge protocols to prove the well-formedness of the obtained ciphertexts: in [GKV10, CNR12], the main protocols are obtained by OR-ing N proofs, while in [LLLS13], $\log N + 2$ different proofs are needed. This somewhat unsatisfactory situation highlights the challenge of simplifying the design of lattice-based group signatures.

Our Contributions and Summary of Our Techniques

In this work, we reply positively to all the open questions discussed above. Specifically, we introduce a lattice-based group signature scheme in the random oracle model (in Section 4), which simultaneously achieves the following features:

- The public key and signature have sizes $\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$ and $\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$, respectively ¹. In comparison with [LLLS13], the key is around 4 times smaller, and the signature contains a shorter ciphertext.
- The scheme relies on relatively weak hardness assumptions: it is CCA-anonymous and traceable if $\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)}$ is hard in the worst-case. In contrast to [LLLS13], the scheme produces no overhead in terms of security: its anonymity and traceability properties rely exactly on the hardness assumptions of the underlying encryption scheme and signature scheme, respectively.

Furthermore, our scheme can be transformed into the ring setting, resulting in a scheme based on ideal lattices (in Section 5), in which the key and signature both have size $\tilde{O}(n \cdot \log N)$. In Table 1, we summarize the features of our two schemes in comparison with the existing ones.

Table 1. Comparison among lattice-based group signature schemes, for security parameter n , and groups of N users. The [GKV10] scheme and our scheme in Section 5 only satisfy the CPA-anonymity notion, while the schemes from [CNR12] and [LLLS13], and our scheme in Section 4 support the stronger notion CCA-anonymity.

Scheme	[GKV10]	[CNR12]	[LLLS13]	Section 4	Section 5
Signature size	$N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$	$N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$	$\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$	$\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$	$\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$
Public key size	$N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$	$N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$	$\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$	$\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)$	$\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n)$
Anonymity assumption	$\text{SIVP}_{\tilde{O}(n^2)}$	$\text{SIVP}_{\tilde{O}(n^2)}$	$\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^8)}$	$\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)}$	$\text{SVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^{3.5})}^\infty$
Traceability assumption	$\text{SIVP}_{\tilde{O}(n^{1.5})}$	$\text{SIVP}_{\tilde{O}(n^2)}$	$\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^{7.5})}$	$\text{SIVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)}$	$\text{SVP}_{\log N \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)}^\infty$

Another contribution of this work is that our schemes are obtained via a simple design approach. We rely on Boyen’s signature scheme [Boy10], and consider group of $N = 2^\ell$ users, where each user is identified by a string $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, as in [LLLS13]. Yet, in our scheme, the user’s secret key is simply a Boyen signature $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^{2m}$ on d (in [LLLS13], it is a matrix in $\mathbb{Z}^{2m \times 2m}$ - which is $2m = \tilde{O}(n)$ times longer). To sign a message on behalf of the group, the user first encrypts his identity d to obtain a ciphertext \mathbf{c} , and then generates a zero-knowledge argument to prove that he possesses a valid message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) for

¹ It was noted by Bellare et al. [BMW03], that the dependency of keys and signatures sizes on $\log N$ is unavoidable for group signature schemes in their model.

Boyen’s signature scheme, and that \mathbf{c} is a correct encryption of d . The protocol then is repeated to make the soundness error negligibly small, and then is made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The group signature is simply the pair (\mathbf{c}, Π) , where Π is the obtained non-interactive argument. To verify a signature, one checks Π , and to open it, the group manager decrypts \mathbf{c} . We remark that in our design, the signer has to encrypt only $\ell = \log N$ bits. Furthermore, the underlying encryption scheme is totally independent of the underlying standard signature (i.e., Boyen’s signature in this case). This provides us a flexible choice of encryption schemes.

1. In the scheme in Section 4, to achieve CCA-anonymity, we rely on a CCA-secure encryption scheme, obtained by the standard technique of combining a one-time signature scheme and an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [BCHK07]. In particular, we employ the IBE scheme by Gentry et al. [GPV08] to gain efficiency in the random oracle model.
2. In the ring-based scheme in Section 5, since our main goal is efficiency, we employ the CPA-secure encryption scheme from [LPR13], for which the public key and ciphertext consist of only 2 ring elements.

In the process, we introduce a new lattice-based cryptographic tool: a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of a valid message-signature pair for Boyen’s signature scheme. We remark that previous protocols in lattice-based cryptography (e.g., [MV03][Lyu08][LNSW13]) only allow to prove in zero-knowledge the possession of a signature on a *publicly given* message. The challenging part is to hide *both* the signature and message from the verifier, which we overcome by a non-trivial technique described in Section 3. We believe that our new protocol is of independent interest. Indeed, apart from group signatures, such protocols are essential for designing various privacy-enhancing constructions, such as anonymous credentials [CL01], compact e-cash [CHL05], policy-based signatures [BF14], and much more.

Comparison to Related Work. In a concurrent and independent work, Nguyen, Zhang and Zhang [NZZ15], based on a new zero-knowledge protocol corresponding to a simple identity-encoding function, also obtain a simpler lattice-based group signature than [GKV10, LLLS13]. In [NZZ15], the public key and signature sizes are shorter by a $\mathcal{O}(\log N)$ factor than in previous works, and are shorter than ours. On the other hand, the user’s secret key in [NZZ15] is still a matrix in $\mathbb{Z}^{2m \times 2m}$ (as in [LLLS13]), and the scheme requires larger parameters, e.g., $q = m^{2.5} \max(m^6 \omega(\log^{2.5} m), 4N)$, as well as stronger security assumptions than ours.

2 Preliminaries

NOTATIONS. For integer $n \geq 1$, we denote by $[n]$ the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$. The set of all permutations of k elements is denoted by \mathcal{S}_k . We assume that all vectors are column vectors. The concatenation of vectors $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}^k$ is denoted

by $(\mathbf{x}||\mathbf{y})$. We denote the column concatenation of matrices $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times k}$ by $[\mathbf{A}|\mathbf{B}]$. The identity matrix of order k is denoted by \mathbf{I}_k . If S is a finite set, $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} S$ means that y is chosen uniformly at random from S .

2.1 Group Signatures

Definition 1 ([BMW03]). A group signature scheme is a tuple of 4 polynomial-time algorithms:

- **KeyGen:** This algorithm takes as input $1^n, 1^N$, where $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is the security parameter and $N \in \mathbb{N}$ is the number of group users, and outputs a triple $(\text{gpk}, \text{gmsk}, \text{gsk})$, where gpk is the group public key; gmsk is the group manager’s secret key; and $\text{gsk} = \{\text{gsk}[i]\}_{i \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}}$, where for $i \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$, $\text{gsk}[i]$ is the secret key for user of index i .
- **Sign:** This algorithm takes as input $\text{gsk}[i]$ for some $i \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$, and a message M , and returns a group signature Σ .
- **Verify:** This algorithm takes as input gpk , a message M , a purported signature Σ on M , and returns either 1 (Valid) or 0 (Invalid).
- **Open:** This algorithm takes as input gmsk , a message M , a signature Σ , and returns an index $i \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$, or \perp (to indicate failure).

Correctness. The correctness requirement for a group signature is as follows. For all $n, N \in \mathbb{N}$, all $(\text{gpk}, \text{gmsk}, \text{gsk})$ produced by $\text{KeyGen}(1^n, 1^N)$, all $i \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$, and all $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\text{Verify}(\text{gpk}, M, \text{Sign}(\text{gsk}[i], M)) = 1 \wedge \text{Open}(\text{gmsk}, M, \text{Sign}(\text{gsk}[i], M)) = i.$$

Security. A secure group signature must satisfy two security notions:

- *Traceability* requires that all signatures, even those produced by a coalition of group users and the group manager, can be traced back to a member of the coalition.
- *Anonymity* requires that, signatures generated by two distinct group users are computationally indistinguishable to an adversary knowing all the user secret keys. In Bellare et al.’s model [BMW03], the anonymity adversary is granted access to an opening oracle (CCA-anonymity). Boneh et al. [BBS04] later proposed a relaxed notion, where the adversary cannot query the opening oracle (CPA-anonymity).

Formal definitions of the above notions are provided in Appendix A.

2.2 Average-Case Lattices Problems and Their Ring Variants

We first recall the definitions and hardness results for average-case problems SIS, LWE.

Definition 2 ([Ajt96, GPV08]). The $\text{SIS}_{n,m,q,\beta}^p$ problem is as follows: Given uniformly random matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, find a non-zero vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ such that $\|\mathbf{x}\|_p \leq \beta$ and $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$.

If $m, \beta = \text{poly}(n)$, and $q > \sqrt{n}\beta$, then the $\text{SIS}_{n,m,q,\beta}^\infty$ problem is at least as hard as SIVP_γ for some $\gamma = \beta \cdot \tilde{O}(\sqrt{nm})$ (see [GPV08,MP13]).

Definition 3 ([Reg05]). Let $n, m \geq 1$, $q \geq 2$, and let χ be a probability distribution on \mathbb{Z} . For $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, let $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{s},\chi}$ be the distribution obtained by sampling $\mathbf{a} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $e \leftarrow \chi$, and outputting $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}^T \cdot \mathbf{s} + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$. The $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ problem asks to distinguish m samples chosen according to $\mathcal{A}_{\mathbf{s},\chi}$ (for $\mathbf{s} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$) and m samples chosen according to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$.

If q is a prime power, $b \geq \sqrt{n}\omega(\log n)$, $\gamma = \tilde{O}(nq/b)$, then there exists an efficient sampleable b -bounded distribution χ (i.e., χ outputs samples with norm at most b with overwhelming probability) such that $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ is as least as hard as SIVP_γ (see [Reg05,Pei09,MM11,MP12]).

We now recall the ring variants of the SIS and LWE, as well as their hardness results. Let $f = x^n + 1$, where n is a power of 2, and let $q > 2$ be prime. Let $\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle f \rangle$ and $\mathbb{R}_q = \mathbb{R}/q\mathbb{R}$. (As an additive group, \mathbb{R}_q is isomorphic to \mathbb{Z}_q^n .) For an element $a = c_0 + c_1x + \dots + c_{n-1}x^{n-1} \in \mathbb{R}$, we define $\|a\|_\infty = \max_i(|c_i|)$. For a vector $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_m) \in \mathbb{R}^m$, we define $\|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty = \max_j(\|a_j\|_\infty)$. To avoid ambiguity, we will denote the multiplication operation of two ring elements by the symbol \otimes .

Definition 4 ([LM06,PR06,LMPR08]). The Ring-SIS $_{n,m,q,\beta}$ problem is as follows: Given a uniformly random $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_m) \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$, find a non-zero vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$ such that $\|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty \leq \beta$ and $\mathbf{a}\mathbf{x} = a_1 \otimes x_1 + \dots + a_m \otimes x_m = 0 \pmod q$.

For $m > \frac{\log q}{\log(2\beta)}$, $\gamma = 16\beta mn \log^2 n$, and $q \geq \frac{\gamma\sqrt{n}}{4\log n}$, the Ring-SIS $_{n,m,q,\beta}$ problem is at least as hard as SVP_γ^∞ in any ideal in the ring \mathbb{R} (see [LM06]).

Definition 5 ([LPR10]). Let $n, m \geq 1$, $q \geq 2$, and let χ be a probability distribution on \mathcal{R} . For $s \in \mathbb{R}_q$, let $\mathcal{A}_{s,\chi}$ be the distribution obtained by sampling $a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}_q$ and $e \leftarrow \chi$, and outputting the pair $(a, a \otimes s + e) \in \mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$. The Ring-LWE $_{n,m,q,\chi}$ problem asks to distinguish m samples chosen according to $\mathcal{A}_{s,\chi}$ (for $s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}_q$) and m samples chosen according to the uniform distribution over $\mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$.

Let $q = 1 \pmod{2n}$, $b \geq \omega(\sqrt{n \log n})$ and $\gamma = n^2(q/b)(nm/\log(nm))^{1/4}$. Then there exists an efficient sampleable b -bounded distribution χ such that the Ring-LWE $_{n,m,q,\chi}$ problem is at least as hard as SVP_γ^∞ in any ideal in the ring \mathbb{R} (see [LPR10]).

Note that the hardness of LWE is not affected if the secret \mathbf{s} is sampled from χ [ACPS09]. The same holds for Ring-LWE (see [LPR13]). This is called the ‘‘Hermite Normal Form’’ (HNF) of these problems.

2.3 Boyen’s “Lattice-mixing” Signature Scheme and Its Ring-Based Variant

Boyen’s signature scheme [Boy10] is a lattice analogue of Water’s pairing-based signature [Wat05]. Here we consider its improved version provided in [MP12]. The scheme uses the following parameters: n is the security parameter, ℓ is the message length, $q = \text{poly}(n)$ is sufficiently large, $m \geq 2n \log q$, $\sigma = \Omega(\sqrt{\ell n \log q \log n})$ and $\beta = \sigma \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. The public key is a tuple $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u})$, and the signing key is a trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$, where:

- Matrix \mathbf{A} is statistically close to uniform over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and its trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ is a short basis for the lattice $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \text{ mod } q\}$. The pair $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A})$ is generated by a PPT algorithm $\text{GenTrap}(n, m, q)$ (see [GPV08, AP11, MP12]).
- Matrices $\mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ are uniformly random.

To sign a message $d = (d_1, \dots, d_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, the signer forms matrix $\mathbf{A}_{(d)} = [\mathbf{A} \mid \mathbf{A}_0 + \sum_{i=1}^\ell d_i \mathbf{A}_i] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$, then runs the deterministic algorithm $\text{ExtBasis}(\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{(d)})$ from [CHKP10] to obtain a short basis $\mathbf{T}_{(d)}$ for the lattice $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A}_{(d)})$. Finally the signer runs the probabilistic algorithm $\text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{T}_{(d)}, \mathbf{A}_{(d)}, \mathbf{u}, \sigma)$ from [GPV08] to output a signature $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^{2m}$ satisfying $\|\mathbf{z}\|_\infty \leq \beta$ and $\mathbf{A}_{(d)}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \text{ mod } q$. It follows from the improved security reduction in [MP12] that scheme is unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attack if the $\text{SIS}_{n,m,q,\beta'}^\infty$ problem is hard for some $\beta' = \ell \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$. Therefore, for the given parameters, the security of the scheme can be based on the worst-case hardness of $\text{SIVP}_{\ell, \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^2)}$.

The public key in Boyen’s signature has size $\ell \mathcal{O}(nm \log q) = \ell \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^2)$, but can be reduced to $\ell \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$ by transforming the scheme into the ring setting, because the parameter m then can be set as $m = \Omega(\log q)$. This can be done rather straightforwardly, thanks to the constructions of the algorithms GenTrap , SamplePre , and ExtBasis for ideal lattices given by Stehlé et al. [SSTX09]. For an element $a \in \mathcal{R}_q$, define $\text{rot}(a) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ as the matrix whose i -th column is $x^i \otimes a$, for $i = 0, \dots, n - 1$. For a vector $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_m) \in \mathcal{R}_q^m$, define $\text{rot}(\mathbf{a}) = [\text{rot}(a_1) \mid \dots \mid \text{rot}(a_m)] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times nm}$.

In the ring variant of Boyen’s signature, the public key is a tuple $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}_0, \dots, \mathbf{a}_\ell, u) \in (\mathcal{R}_q^m)^{\ell+2} \times \mathcal{R}_q$, and the signing key is a trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Z}^{nm \times nm}$ for $\Lambda^\perp(\text{rot}(\mathbf{a}))$. Similarly, a signature on message $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ is a small-norm vector $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{R}^{2m}$ such that $[\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{a}_0 + \sum_{i=1}^\ell d_i \mathbf{a}_i] \mathbf{z} = u \text{ mod } q$. By adapting the security reduction from [MP12] into the ring setting, the security of the scheme can be based on the average-case hardness of the $\text{Ring-SIS}_{n,m,q,\beta'}$ problem for some $\beta' = \ell \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$, which in turn can be based on the worst-case hardness of the $\text{SVP}_{\ell, \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^2)}^\infty$ problem on ideal lattices.

2.4 Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems for Lattices

We will work with statistical zero-knowledge argument systems, namely, interactive protocols where the soundness property only holds for *computationally*

bounded cheating provers, while the zero-knowledge property holds against *any* cheating verifier. More formally, let the set of statements-witnesses $R = \{(y, w)\} \in \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^*$ be an NP relation. A two-party game $\langle P, V \rangle$ is called an interactive argument system for the relation R with soundness error e if the following two conditions hold:

- **Completeness.** If $(y, w) \in R$ then $\Pr[\langle P(y, w), V(y) \rangle = 1] = 1$.
- **Soundness.** If $(y, w) \notin R$, then \forall PPT P^* : $\Pr[\langle P^*(y, w), V(y) \rangle = 1] \leq e$.

An interactive argument system is called statistical zero-knowledge if for any $V^*(y)$, there exists a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}(y)$ producing a simulated transcript that is statistically close to the one of the real interaction between $P(y, w)$ and $V^*(y)$. A related notion is argument of knowledge, which requires the witness-extended emulation property. For protocols consisting of 3 moves (i.e., commitment-challenge-response), witness-extended emulation is implied by *special soundness* [Gro04], where the latter assumes that there exists a PPT extractor which takes as input a set of valid transcripts with respect to all possible values of the ‘challenge’ to the same ‘commitment’, and outputs w' such that $(y, w') \in R$.

Statistical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge (sZKAoK) are usually constructed using a statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme. Kawachi et al. [KTX08] designed such commitment scheme from lattices, where the binding property relies on the hardness of SIVP $_{\tilde{O}(n)}$. Using this primitive, Ling et al. [LSW13] proposed a Stern-type [Ste96] sZKAoK for the Inhomogeneous SIS relation:

$$R_{\text{SIS}} = \left\{ ((\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}; \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m) : \|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty \leq \beta \wedge \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{u} \pmod q) \right\}.$$

The core technique in Ling et al.’s work is called Decomposition-Extension. This technique is as follows. Letting $p = \lceil \log \beta \rceil + 1$, Ling et al. observe that an integer $x \in [0, \beta]$ if and only if there exist $x_1, \dots, x_p \in \{0, 1\}$ such that $x = \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j x_j$, where the sequence of integers β_1, \dots, β_p is determined as follows:

$$\beta_1 = \lceil \beta/2 \rceil; \beta_2 = \lceil (\beta - \beta_1)/2 \rceil; \beta_3 = \lceil (\beta - \beta_1 - \beta_2)/2 \rceil; \dots; \beta_p = 1.^2$$

This observation allows the prover to efficiently decompose $\mathbf{x} \in [-\beta; \beta]^m$ into $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_p \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^m$ such that $\sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_j = \mathbf{x}$. To argue the possession of the $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_j$ ’s in zero-knowledge, the prover extends $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_j$ to $\mathbf{x}_j \in \mathbf{B}_{3m}$, where \mathbf{B}_{3m} is the set of all vectors in $\{-1, 0, 1\}^{3m}$ having exactly m coordinates equal 0; m coordinates equal to 1; and m coordinates equal to -1 . This set has a helpful property: if π is a permutation of $3m$ elements, then $\mathbf{x}_j \in \mathbf{B}_{3m}$ if and only if $\pi(\mathbf{x}_j) \in \mathbf{B}_{3m}$. Then in the framework of Stern’s 3-move protocol, the prover is able to demonstrate that:

² We note that the same sequence of integers was previously used by Lipmaa et al. [LAN02] in the context of range proofs, but under a different representation: $\beta_j = \lfloor (\beta + 2^{j-1})/2^j \rfloor$ for each $j \in [p]$.

1. For each j , a random permutation of \mathbf{x}_j belongs to \mathcal{B}_{3m} , which implies that $\mathbf{x}_j \in \mathcal{B}_{3m}$, and thus, $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_j \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^m$. This will convince the verifier that $\mathbf{x} \in [-\beta, \beta]^m$.
2. $\mathbf{A}^* \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j (\mathbf{x}_j + \mathbf{r}_j) - \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}^* \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \mathbf{r}_j \pmod q$, where $\mathbf{A}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 3m}$ is the extended matrix obtained by appending $2m$ “dummy” zero-columns to \mathbf{A} , and $\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_p \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{3m}$ are uniformly “masking” vectors for the \mathbf{x}_j ’s. This equation implies $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{A}^* \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \mathbf{x}_j = \mathbf{u} \pmod q$.

3 New Zero-Knowledge Protocols for Lattice-Based Cryptography

In this section, we first present a sZKAoK of a valid message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) for Boyen’s signature scheme ([Boy10], see also Section 2.3). Then we provide a lattice-based verifiable encryption protocol to show that a given ciphertext correctly encrypts d . The combined protocol of these two ones, which will serve as the building block in both constructions of our group signatures, is described in detail in Section 3.3.

3.1 ZKAoK of a Valid Message-Signature Pair for Boyen’s Signature Scheme

Suppose that the verification key for Boyen’s signature scheme is a tuple $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u})$. Our goal is to design a statistical ZKAoK of a pair $(d, \mathbf{z}) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathbb{Z}^{2m}$ satisfying $\|\mathbf{z}\|_\infty \leq \beta$ and $\mathbf{A}_{(d)}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \pmod q$, where $\mathbf{A}_{(d)} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_0 + \sum_{i=1}^\ell d_i \mathbf{A}_i] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$. We first observe that obtaining a ZKAoK of a Boyen signature on a *given* message d is relatively straightforward: one can just run a zero-knowledge protocol for an ISIS solution (e.g., [MV03, Lyu08, LNSW13]) on public input $(\mathbf{A}_{(d)}, \mathbf{u})$, and prover’s witness \mathbf{z} . However, constructing a ZKAoK of a message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) is challenging, because on one hand, the prover has to convince the verifier that $\mathbf{A}_{(d)}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \pmod q$, while on the other hand, *both* \mathbf{z} and d should be kept *secret* from the verifier.

Our first step towards solving the above challenge is making the public verification matrix independent of d . Let $\bar{\mathbf{A}} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_0 | \mathbf{A}_1 | \dots | \mathbf{A}_\ell] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (\ell+2)m}$, and let $\mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{x} || \mathbf{y})$, where $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$, then we have:

$$\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}_{(d)}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{A}_0\mathbf{y} + \sum_{j=1}^\ell \mathbf{A}_j(d_j\mathbf{y}) = \bar{\mathbf{A}}\bar{\mathbf{z}} \pmod q,$$

where $\bar{\mathbf{z}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{(\ell+2)m}$ has the form $\bar{\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{x} || \mathbf{y} || d_1\mathbf{y} || \dots || d_\ell\mathbf{y})$. Now our goal is: Given $(\bar{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{u})$, arguing in zero-knowledge the possession of $\bar{\mathbf{z}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{(\ell+2)m}$ such that:

1. “ $\|\bar{\mathbf{z}}\|_\infty \leq \beta$ and $\bar{\mathbf{A}}\bar{\mathbf{z}} = \mathbf{u} \pmod q$.” This part can be done using the Decomposition-Extension technique from [LNSW13] for an ISIS solution. Specifically, we transform \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} into $p = \lceil \log \beta \rceil + 1$ vectors $\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_p \in \mathcal{B}_{3m}$ and $\mathbf{y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{y}_p \in \mathcal{B}_{3m}$, respectively.

2. “ $\bar{\mathbf{z}}$ has the form $\bar{\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{x} \parallel \mathbf{y} \parallel d_1 \mathbf{y} \parallel \dots \parallel d_\ell \mathbf{y})$ for certain secret $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$.” At a high level, in order to argue that $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, we first extend d to $d^* = (d_1, \dots, d_\ell, d_{\ell+1}, \dots, d_{2\ell}) \in \mathbf{B}_{2\ell}$, where $\mathbf{B}_{2\ell}$ is the set of all vectors in $\{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$ having Hamming weight ℓ , and then show that a random permutation of d^* belongs to the set $\mathbf{B}_{2\ell}$, which implies that the original $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$.

Now, for simplicity of description of our technique, we introduce the following notations:

- For permutations $\pi, \psi \in \mathbf{S}_{3m}$; $\tau \in \mathbf{S}_{2\ell}$, and for $\mathbf{t} = (\mathbf{t}_{-1} \parallel \mathbf{t}_0 \parallel \mathbf{t}_1 \parallel \dots \parallel \mathbf{t}_{2\ell}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(2\ell+2)3m}$ consisting of $(2\ell + 2)$ blocks of size $3m$, we define:

$$F_{\pi, \psi, \tau}(\mathbf{t}) = (\pi(\mathbf{t}_{-1}) \parallel \psi(\mathbf{t}_0) \parallel \psi(\mathbf{t}_{\tau(1)}) \parallel \psi(\mathbf{t}_{\tau(2)}) \parallel \dots \parallel \psi(\mathbf{t}_{\tau(2\ell)})).$$

Namely, $F_{\pi, \psi, \tau}(\mathbf{t})$ is a composition of 3 permutations. It *rearranges* the order of the 2ℓ blocks $\mathbf{t}_1, \mathbf{t}_2, \dots, \mathbf{t}_{2\ell}$ according to τ , and then *permutes* block \mathbf{t}_{-1} according to π , and the other $(2\ell + 1)$ blocks according to ψ .

- Given $e = (e_1, e_2, \dots, e_{2\ell}) \in \{0, 1\}^{2\ell}$, we say that vector $\mathbf{t} \in \text{VALID}(e)$ if $\mathbf{t} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^{(2\ell+2)3m}$, and there exist certain $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \in \mathbf{B}_{3m}$ such that $\mathbf{t} = (\mathbf{v} \parallel \mathbf{w} \parallel e_1 \mathbf{w} \parallel e_2 \mathbf{w} \parallel \dots \parallel e_{2\ell} \mathbf{w})$.

We now describe our technique. We define the sequence of integers β_1, \dots, β_p as in [LNSW13], and let:

$$\mathbf{A}^* = [\mathbf{A} \parallel 0^{n \times 2m} \parallel \mathbf{A}_0 \parallel 0^{n \times 2m} \parallel \mathbf{A}_1 \parallel 0^{n \times 2m} \parallel \dots \parallel \mathbf{A}_\ell \parallel 0^{n \times 2m} \parallel 0^{n \times 3m\ell}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (2\ell+2)3m}, \quad (1)$$

$$\mathbf{z}_j = (\mathbf{x}_j \parallel \mathbf{y}_j \parallel d_1 \mathbf{y}_j \parallel \dots \parallel d_\ell \mathbf{y}_j \parallel d_{\ell+1} \mathbf{y}_j \parallel \dots \parallel d_{2\ell} \mathbf{y}_j) \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^{(2\ell+2)3m}, \forall j \in [p]. \quad (2)$$

We then have: $\mathbf{A}^* (\sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \mathbf{z}_j) = \mathbf{u} \bmod q$, and $\mathbf{z}_j \in \text{VALID}(d^*)$ for all $j \in [p]$. In Stern’s framework, we proceed as follows:

- To argue that $\mathbf{A}^* (\sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \mathbf{z}_j) = \mathbf{u} \bmod q$, we instead show that

$$\mathbf{A}^* \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j (\mathbf{z}_j + \mathbf{r}_z^{(j)}) - \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}^* (\sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \mathbf{r}_z^{(j)}) \bmod q,$$

where $\mathbf{r}_z^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{r}_z^{(p)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (2\ell+2)3m}$ are uniformly random “masking” vectors for the \mathbf{z}_j ’s.

- We sample a uniformly random permutation $\tau \in \mathbf{S}_{2\ell}$, and for each $j \in [p]$, sample uniformly random $\pi_j, \psi_j \in \mathbf{S}_{3m}$, and send $\mathbf{t}_d = \tau(d^*)$ together with $\mathbf{t}_z^{(j)} = F_{\pi_j, \psi_j, \tau}(\mathbf{z}_j)$, for all j . Seeing that $\mathbf{t}_d \in \mathbf{B}_{2\ell}$, and $\mathbf{t}_z^{(j)} \in \text{VALID}(\mathbf{t}_d)$, the verifier will be convinced that $\mathbf{z}_j \in \text{VALID}(d^*)$ while learning no additional information about \mathbf{z}_j or d^* .

Based on the above discussion, we can build a ZKAoK of a valid message-signature pair for Boyen’s signature scheme. For convenience, we will present the details in the combined protocol in Section 3.3.

3.2 A Lattice-Based Verifiable Encryption Protocol

We consider two lattice-based encryption schemes:

1. The GPV-IBE scheme [GPV08] based on LWE, to be employed in the group signature in Section 4.
2. The LPR encryption scheme [LPR13] based on Ring-LWE, to be employed in the ring-based group signature in Section 5.

We observe that, in both of these schemes, if one encrypts a plaintext $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ using the HNF variants of LWE and Ring-LWE, respectively, then the relation among the related objects can be expressed as:

$$\mathbf{P}\mathbf{e} + (0^{k_1-\ell} \parallel \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d) = \mathbf{c} \bmod q,$$

where $\mathbf{P} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1 \times k_2}$ is a matrix obtained from the public key, $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1}$ is a ciphertext, $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k_2}$ is the encryption randomness satisfying $\|\mathbf{e}\|_\infty \leq b$. Here k_1, k_2, b are certain parameters depending on the underlying scheme.

Our goal is to construct a verifiable encryption protocol for both of the mentioned above schemes, namely, a protocol such that: given (\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c}) , the prover, possessing (\mathbf{e}, d) , can argue in zero-knowledge that \mathbf{c} is a correct encryption of d . We observe that, this task can be achieved as follows:

- To argue that $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, we can use the same technique as in the previous section, i.e., extend d to $d^* \in \mathbb{B}_{2\ell}$, then use a random permutation.
- To argue that $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k_2}$ and $\|\mathbf{e}\|_\infty \leq b$, we form vectors $\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{\bar{p}} \in \mathbb{B}_{3k_2}$, where $\bar{p} = \lfloor \log b \rfloor + 1$, then use random permutations to show $\mathbf{e}_j \in \mathbb{B}_{3k_2}$.
- Next, we define the matrices $\mathbf{P}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1 \times 3k_2}$, $\mathbf{Q} \in \{0, \lfloor q/2 \rfloor\}^{k_1 \times 2\ell}$, where:

$$\mathbf{P}^* = [\mathbf{P} \mid 0^{k_1 \times 2k_2}]; \quad \mathbf{Q} = \begin{pmatrix} 0^{(k_1-\ell) \times \ell} & \mid & 0^{(k_1-\ell) \times \ell} \\ \text{-----} & & \text{-----} \\ \lfloor q/2 \rfloor \mathbf{I}_\ell & \mid & 0^{\ell \times \ell} \end{pmatrix}. \quad (3)$$

We then have that:

$$\mathbf{P}^* \left(\sum_{j=1}^{\bar{p}} b_j \mathbf{e}_j \right) + \mathbf{Q}d^* = \mathbf{P}\mathbf{e} + (0^{k_1-\ell} \parallel \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d) = \mathbf{c} \bmod q. \quad (4)$$

In Stern’s framework, to argue that (4) is true, we instead show that:

$$\mathbf{P}^* \left(\sum_{j=1}^{\bar{p}} b_j (\mathbf{e}_j + \mathbf{r}_e^{(j)}) \right) + \mathbf{Q}(d^* + \mathbf{r}_d) - \mathbf{c} = \mathbf{P}^* \left(\sum_{j=1}^{\bar{p}} b_j \mathbf{r}_e^{(j)} \right) + \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{r}_d \bmod q,$$

where $\mathbf{r}_e^{(j)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{3k_2}$, for every $j \in [\bar{p}]$, and $\mathbf{r}_d \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2\ell}$ are masking vectors.

3.3 The Combined Protocol

We now describe in detail the combined protocol that allows the prover to argue that it knows a valid message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) for Boyen’s signature scheme, and that a given ciphertext correctly encrypts d . The associated relation $\mathbf{R}_{\text{gs}}(n, \ell, q, m, k_1, k_2, \beta, b)$ is defined as follows.

Definition 6

$$R_{gs} = \left\{ \left((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}; \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n; \mathbf{P} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1 \times k_2}; \mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1}); d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell; \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^{2m}; \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k_2} \right) : (\|\mathbf{z}\|_\infty \leq \beta \wedge \left[\mathbf{A} \mid \mathbf{A}_0 + \sum_{i=1}^\ell d_i \mathbf{A}_i \right] \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \bmod q) \wedge \right. \\ \left. \wedge (\|\mathbf{e}\|_\infty \leq b \wedge \mathbf{P}\mathbf{e} + (0^{k_1 - \ell} \parallel \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d) = \mathbf{c} \bmod q). \right\}$$

Let COM be the statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme from [KTX08]. Let $p = \lfloor \log \beta \rfloor + 1$ and $\bar{p} = \lfloor \log b \rfloor + 1$ and define two sequences of integers β_1, \dots, β_p and $b_1, \dots, b_{\bar{p}}$ as in sections [LNSW13]. The inputs of two parties are as follows:

- The common input is $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c})$. Both parties form matrices $\mathbf{A}^*, \mathbf{P}^*, \mathbf{Q}$ as described in (1) and (3).
- The prover’s witness is $(d, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e})$. Using the techniques above, the prover extends d to some $d^* \in \mathbb{B}_{2\ell}$ and forms vectors $\mathbf{z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{z}_p \in \text{VALID}(d^*)$, and $\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{\bar{p}} \in \mathbb{B}_{3k_2}$. The obtained vectors satisfy:

$$\mathbf{A}^* \left(\sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \mathbf{z}_j \right) = \mathbf{u} \bmod q \quad \wedge \quad \mathbf{P}^* \left(\sum_{j=1}^{\bar{p}} b_j \mathbf{e}_j \right) + \mathbf{Q}d^* = \mathbf{c} \bmod q.$$

The interaction between P and V is described in Figure 1.

The following theorem summarizes the properties of our protocol.

Theorem 1. *Let COM be a statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme. Then the protocol in Figure 1 is a statistical ZKAoK for the relation $R_{gs}(n, \ell, q, m, k_1, k_2, \beta, b)$. Each round of the protocol has perfect completeness, soundness error $2/3$, and communication cost $(\mathcal{O}(\ell m) \log \beta + \mathcal{O}(k_2) \log b) \log q$.*

The proof of Theorem 1 employs the standard proof technique for Stern-type protocols. It is given in the full version [LNW15].

4 An Improved Lattice-Based Group Signature Scheme

4.1 Description of Our Scheme

We first specify the parameters of the scheme. Let n be the security parameter, and let $N = 2^\ell = \text{poly}(n)$ be the maximum expected number of group users. Then we choose other scheme parameters such that Boyen’s signature scheme and the GPV-IBE scheme function properly, and are secure. Specifically, let modulus $q = \mathcal{O}(\ell \cdot n^2)$ be prime, dimension $m \geq 2n \log q$, and Gaussian parameter $s = \omega(\log m)$. The infinity norm bound for signatures from Boyen’s scheme is integer $\beta = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{\ell n})$. The norm bound for LWE noises is integer b such that $q/b = \ell \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$.

Choose hash functions $\mathcal{H}_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell}$ and $\mathcal{H}_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{1, 2, 3\}^\ell$, to be modeled as random oracles, and select a one-time signature scheme $\mathcal{OTS} = (\text{OGen}, \text{OSign}, \text{Over})$. Let χ be a b -bounded distribution over \mathbb{Z} .

Our group signature scheme is described as follows:




Fig. 1. A zero-knowledge argument that the prover possesses a valid message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) for Boyen’s signature scheme, and that a given ciphertext correctly encrypts d .

KeyGen($1^n, 1^N$): This algorithm performs the following steps:

1. Generate verification key $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u})$ and signing key $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$ for Boyen’s signature scheme (see Section 2.3 for more details). Then for each $d = (d_1, \dots, d_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, use $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$ to generate $\text{gsk}[d]$ as a Boyen signature on message d .
2. Generate encrypting and decrypting keys for the GPV-IBE scheme: Run algorithm $\text{GenTrap}(n, m, q)$ from [GPV08] to output $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ together with a trapdoor basis $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{B}$ for $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{B})$.
3. Output

$$\text{gpk} = ((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}), \mathbf{B}); \text{gmsk} = \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{B}; \text{gsk} = \{\text{gsk}[d]\}_{d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell}.$$

Sign($\text{gsk}[d], M$): Given gpk , to sign a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ using the secret key $\text{gsk}[d] = \mathbf{z}$, the user generates a key pair $(\text{ovk}, \text{osk}) \leftarrow \text{OGen}(1^n)$ for OTS , and then performs the following steps:

1. Encrypt the index d with respect to “identity” ovk as follows. Let $\mathbf{G} = \mathcal{H}_1(\text{ovk}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell}$. Sample $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \chi^n; \mathbf{e}_1 \leftarrow \chi^m; \mathbf{e}_2 \leftarrow \chi^\ell$, then compute the ciphertext:

$$(\mathbf{c}_1 = \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}_1, \mathbf{c}_2 = \mathbf{G}^T \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}_2 + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \times \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell.$$

2. Generate a NIZKAoK Π to show the possession of a valid message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) for Boyen’s signature, and that $(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$ is a correct GPV-IBE encryption of d with respect to “identity” ovk . This is done as follows:

– Let $k_1 := m + \ell$ and $k_2 := n + m + \ell$, and form the following:

$$\mathbf{P} = \left(\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{B}^T & \\ \hline - & \mathbf{I}_{m+\ell} \\ \mathbf{G}^T & \end{array} \right) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1 \times k_2}; \mathbf{c} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{c}_1 \\ \mathbf{c}_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k_1}; \mathbf{e} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{s} \\ \mathbf{e}_1 \\ \mathbf{e}_2 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k_2}, \quad (8)$$

Then we have $\|\mathbf{e}\|_\infty \leq b$, and $\mathbf{P}\mathbf{e} + (0^{k_1 - \ell} \parallel \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d) = \mathbf{c} \pmod q$. Now one can observe that:

$$((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c}), d, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}) \in \text{R}_{\text{gs}}(n, \ell, q, m, k_1, k_2, \beta, b).$$

- Run the protocol described in Section 3.3 with public parameter $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c})$ and prover’s witness $(d, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e})$. The protocol is repeated $t = \omega(\log n)$ times to make the soundness error negligibly small, and then made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic as a triple $\Pi = (\{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \text{CH}, \{\text{RSP}_j\}_{j=1}^t)$, where

$$\text{CH} = \{\text{Ch}_j\}_{j=1}^t = \mathcal{H}_2(M, \{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2).$$

3. Compute a one-time signature $\text{sig} = \text{OSign}(\text{osk}; \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \Pi)$.
4. Output the group signature $\Sigma = (\text{ovk}, (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), \Pi, \text{sig})$.

Verify(gpk, M, Σ) : This algorithm works as follows:

1. Parse Σ as $(\text{ovk}, (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), \Pi, \text{sig})$. If $\text{Over}(\text{ovk}; \text{sig}; (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), \Pi) = 0$, then return 0.
2. Parse Π as $(\{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \{\text{Ch}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \{\text{RSP}_j\}_{j=1}^t)$.
If $(\text{Ch}_1, \dots, \text{Ch}_t) \neq \mathcal{H}_2(M, \{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$, then return 0.
3. Compute $\mathbf{G} = \mathcal{H}_1(\text{ovk})$ and form \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c} as in (8). Then for $j = 1$ to t , run the verification step of the protocol from Section 3.3 with public input $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c})$ to check the validity of RSP_j with respect to CMT_j and Ch_j . If any of the conditions does not hold, then return 0.
4. Return 1.

Open(gmsk, M, Σ) On input $\text{gmsk} = \mathbf{T}_B$ and $\Sigma = (\text{ovk}, (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), \Pi, \text{sig})$, this algorithm decrypts $(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$ as follows:

1. Extract the decryption key for “identity” ovk : Let $\mathbf{G} = [\mathbf{g}_1 | \dots | \mathbf{g}_\ell] = \mathcal{H}_1(\text{ovk})$. Then for $i \in [\ell]$, sample $\mathbf{y}_i \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{T}_B, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{g}_i, s)$ (see [GPV08]), and let $\mathbf{Y} = [\mathbf{y}_1 | \dots | \mathbf{y}_\ell] \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times \ell}$.
2. Compute $\mathbf{d}' = (d'_1, \dots, d'_\ell) = \mathbf{c}_2 - \mathbf{Y}^T \mathbf{c}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$. For each $i \in [\ell]$, if d'_i is closer to 0 than to $\lfloor q/2 \rfloor$ modulo q , then let $d_i = 0$; otherwise, let $d_i = 1$.
3. Return $\mathbf{d} = (d_1, \dots, d_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$.

4.2 Analysis of the Scheme

Efficiency and Correctness. The given group signature scheme can be implemented in polynomial time. The bit-size of the NIZKAoK Π is roughly $t = \omega(\log n)$ times the communication cost of the interactive protocol in Section 3.3, which is $\tilde{O}(\ell n)$ for the chosen parameters. This is also the asymptotical bound on the size of the group signature Σ .

The correctness of algorithm **Verify** follows from the facts that every group user with a valid secret key is able to compute a satisfying witness for $\text{R}_{\text{gs}}(n, \ell, q, m, k_1, k_2, \beta, b)$, and that the underlying argument system is perfectly complete. Moreover, we set the parameters so that the GPV-IBE scheme is correct, which implies that algorithm **Open** is also correct.

Theorem 2 (CCA-anonymity). *Suppose that \mathcal{OTS} is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature. In the random oracle model, the group signature described in Section 4.1 is CCA-anonymous if $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ is hard.*

As a corollary, the CCA-anonymity of the scheme can be based on the quantum worst-case hardness of SIVP_γ , with $\gamma = \tilde{O}(nq/b) = \ell \tilde{O}(n^2)$.

The proof of Theorem 2 uses the strong unforgeability of \mathcal{OTS} , the statistical zero-knowledge property of the underlying argument system, and the $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ assumption. Due to the lack of space, the proof is provided in the full version [LNW15].

Theorem 3 (Traceability). *In the random oracle model, the group signature described in Section 4.1 is fully traceable if $\text{SIVP}_{\ell \cdot \tilde{O}(n^2)}$ is hard.*

Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the string commitment scheme COM used in the underlying NIZKAoK is computationally binding, because an adversary breaking its computational binding property can be used to solve SIVP $_{\ell, \tilde{O}(n^2)}$.

Let \mathcal{A} be an PPT traceability adversary against our group signature scheme with advantage ϵ , we construct a PPT forger \mathcal{F} for Boyen’s signature scheme whose advantage is polynomially related to ϵ . Since the unforgeability of Boyen’s signature scheme can be based on the hardness of SIVP $_{\ell, \tilde{O}(n^2)}$ [Boy10, MP12], this completes the proof.

\mathcal{F} is given the verification key $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u})$ for Boyen’s signature scheme. It generates a key-pair $(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{B})$ for the GPV IBE scheme, and begins interacting with \mathcal{A} by sending $\mathbf{gpk} = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{B})$ and $\mathbf{gsk} = \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{B}$, the distribution of which is statistically close to that in the real game. Then \mathcal{F} sets $CU = \emptyset$ and handles the queries from \mathcal{A} as follows:

- Queries to \mathcal{H}_1 and \mathcal{H}_2 are handled by consistently returning uniformly random values in the respective ranges. If \mathcal{A} makes $Q_{\mathcal{H}_2}$ queries to \mathcal{H}_2 , then $\forall \kappa \leq Q_{\mathcal{H}_2}$, we let r_κ denote the answer to the κ -th query.
- Queries for the secret key $\mathbf{gsk}[d]$, for any $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$: \mathcal{F} queries its own signing oracle for Boyen’s signature of d , and receives in return $\mathbf{z}_{(d)} \in \mathbb{Z}^{2m}$ such that $\|\mathbf{z}_{(d)}\|_\infty \leq \beta$ and $\mathbf{A}_{(d)}\mathbf{z}_{(d)} = \mathbf{u} \bmod q$, where $\mathbf{A}_{(d)}$ is computed in the usual way. Then \mathcal{F} sets $CU := CU \cup \{d\}$ and sends $\mathbf{z}_{(d)}$ to \mathcal{A} .
- Queries for group signatures on arbitrary message: \mathcal{F} returns with a simulated signature $\Sigma = (\mathbf{ovk}, (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), \Pi', sig)$, where $(\mathbf{ovk}, (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), sig)$ are faithfully generated, while the NIZKAoK Π' is simulated without using the valid secret key (as in experiment $G_3^{(b)}$ in the proof of anonymity). The zero-knowledge property of the underlying argument system guarantees that Σ is indistinguishable from a legitimate signature.

Eventually \mathcal{A} outputs a message M^* and a forged group signature

$$\Sigma^* = (\mathbf{ovk}, (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2), (\{\mathbf{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \{Ch_j\}_{j=1}^t, \{\mathbf{RSP}_j\}_{j=1}^t), sig),$$

which satisfies the requirements of the traceability game. Then \mathcal{F} exploits the forgery as follows. First, one can argue that \mathcal{A} must have queried \mathcal{H}_2 on input $(M, \{\mathbf{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$, since otherwise, the probability that $(Ch_1, \dots, Ch_t) = \mathcal{H}_2(M, \{\mathbf{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$ is at most 3^{-t} . Therefore, with probability at least $\epsilon - 3^{-t}$, there exists certain $\kappa^* \leq Q_{\mathcal{H}_2}$ such that the κ^* -th oracle query involves the tuple $(M, \{\mathbf{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$. Next, \mathcal{F} picks κ^* as the target forking point and replays \mathcal{A} many times with the same random tape and input as in the original run. In each rerun, for the first $\kappa^* - 1$ queries, \mathcal{A} is given the same answers $r_1, \dots, r_{\kappa^* - 1}$ as in the initial run, but from the κ^* -th query onwards, \mathcal{F} replies with fresh random values $r'_{\kappa^*}, \dots, r'_{q_{\mathcal{H}_2}} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{1, 2, 3\}^t$. The Improved Forking Lemma of Pointcheval and Vaudenay [PV97, Lemma 7] implies that, with probability larger than $1/2$, algorithm \mathcal{F} can obtain a 3-fork involving the tuple $(M, \{\mathbf{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$ after less than $32 \cdot Q_{\mathcal{H}_2} / (\epsilon - 3^{-t})$ executions of \mathcal{A} .

Now, let the answers of \mathcal{F} with respect to the 3-fork branches be

$$r_{\kappa^*}^{(1)} = (Ch_1^{(1)}, \dots, Ch_t^{(1)}); r_{\kappa^*}^{(2)} = (Ch_1^{(2)}, \dots, Ch_t^{(2)}); r_{\kappa^*}^{(3)} = (Ch_1^{(3)}, \dots, Ch_t^{(3)}).$$

A simple calculation shows that:

$$\Pr[\exists j \in \{1, \dots, t\} : \{Ch_j^{(1)}, Ch_j^{(2)}, Ch_j^{(3)}\} = \{1, 2, 3\}] = 1 - (7/9)^t.$$

Conditioned on the existence of such j , one parses the 3 forgeries corresponding to the fork branches to obtain $(RSP_j^{(1)}, RSP_j^{(2)}, RSP_j^{(3)})$. They turn out to be 3 *valid* responses to 3 different challenges for the same commitment CMT_j . Since COM is assumed to be computationally-binding, we can use the knowledge extractor of the underlying argument system to extract $(d^*, \mathbf{z}^*, \mathbf{s}^*, \mathbf{e}_1^*, \mathbf{e}_2^*) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathbb{Z}^{2m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^\ell$ such that $\|\mathbf{z}^*\|_\infty \leq \beta$ and $\mathbf{A}_{(d^*)}\mathbf{z}^* = \mathbf{u} \bmod q$; and $\mathbf{s}^*, \mathbf{e}_1^*, \mathbf{e}_2^*$ has infinity norm bounded by b , and $\mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{s}^* + \mathbf{e}_1^* = \mathbf{c}_1 \bmod q$, $\mathbf{G}^T \mathbf{s}^* + \mathbf{e}_2^* + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d^* = \mathbf{c}_2 \bmod q$, where $\mathbf{G} = \mathcal{H}_1(\text{ovk})$. Now observe that, $(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2)$ is a correct encryption of d^* , the opening algorithm $\text{Open}(\mathbf{T}_B, M^*, \Sigma^*)$ must return d^* . It then follows from the requirements of the traceability game that $d^* \notin CU$. As a result, (\mathbf{z}^*, d^*) is a valid forgery for Boyen’s signature with respect to the verification key $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u})$. Furthermore, the above analysis shows that, if \mathcal{A} has non-negligible success probability and runs in polynomial time, then so does \mathcal{F} . This concludes the proof.

5 A Ring-Based Group Signature Scheme

5.1 Description of the Scheme

Let $f = x^n + 1$, where $n = 2^k$ for $k \geq 2$, and let $N = 2^\ell = \text{poly}(n)$ be the number of group users. Then we choose other scheme parameters such that the ring variant of Boyen’s signature scheme and the LPR encryption scheme are correct and secure. Let $q = \mathcal{O}(\ell \cdot n^2)$ be a prime satisfying $q = 1 \bmod 2n$. Let $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle f \rangle$ and $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R}$. Let $m = \mathcal{O}(\log q)$. The infinity norm bound for signatures from Boyen’s scheme is integer $\beta = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{\ell n})$. The norm bound for Ring-LWE noises is integer b such that $q/b = \ell \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^{1.5})$. Choose a hash function $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{1, 2, 3\}^t$ to be modeled as random oracles. Let χ be a b -bounded distribution over \mathcal{R} .

KeyGen $(1^n, 1^N)$: This algorithm performs the following steps:

1. Generate verification key $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}_0, \dots, \mathbf{a}_\ell, u)$ and signing key \mathbf{T}_a for the ring variant of Boyen’s signature (see Section 2.3 for more details). Then for each $d = (d_1, \dots, d_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, generate $\text{gsk}[d]$ as a ring-based Boyen’s signature on message d .
2. Generate keys for the LPR encryption scheme: Sample $f \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_q$ and $x, e \leftarrow \chi$. Then compute $g = f \otimes x + e \in \mathcal{R}_q$.
3. Output

$$\text{gpk} = ((\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}_0, \dots, \mathbf{a}_\ell, u), (f, g)); \text{gmsk} = x; \text{gsk} = \{\text{gsk}[d]\}_{d \in \{0,1\}^\ell}.$$

Sign(gsk[d], M): Given gpk, to sign a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ using the secret key gsk[d] = $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{R}^{2m}$, the user performs the following steps:

1. Encrypt d : First extend d to $\bar{d} = (0^{n-\ell} \| d) \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and view \bar{d} as an element of \mathcal{R} with coefficients 0, 1. Then sample $s, e_1, e_2 \leftarrow \chi$, and compute the ciphertext:

$$(c_1 = f \otimes s + e_1, c_2 = g \otimes s + e_2 + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor \bar{d}) \in \mathcal{R}_q^2. \tag{9}$$

2. Generate a NIZKAoK Π to show the possession of a valid message-signature pair (d, \mathbf{z}) for the ring variant of Boyen’s signature, and that (c_1, c_2) is a correct LPR encryption of \bar{d} . This is done as follows:

- Let $\mathbf{A} = \text{rot}(\mathbf{a}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times nm}$, and $\mathbf{A}_i = \text{rot}(\mathbf{a}_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times mn}$ for every $i = 0, \dots, \ell$. Next, consider \mathbf{z} as a vector in \mathbb{Z}^{2mn} with infinity norm bounded by β , and consider \mathbf{u} as vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Then one has $[\mathbf{A} \mid \mathbf{A}_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} d_i \mathbf{A}_i] \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \pmod q$.

Furthermore, let $\mathbf{P}_0 = [\text{rot}(b) \mid \text{rot}(g)]^T \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n \times n}$ and form $\mathbf{P} = [\mathbf{P}_0 \mid \mathbf{I}_{2n}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n \times 3n}$. Next, consider $\mathbf{c} = (c_1 \| c_2)$ as a vector in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n} , and $\mathbf{e} = (s \| e_1 \| e_2)$ as a vector in \mathbb{Z}^{3n} . Then (9) can be equivalently written as: $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{P}\mathbf{e} + (0^{2n-\ell} \| \lfloor q/2 \rfloor d) \pmod q$.

The above transformation leads to the following observation:

$$((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c}), d, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}) \in \text{R}_{\text{gs}}(n, \ell, q, m', k_1, k_2, \beta, b),$$

where $m' = nm$, $k_1 = 2n$, and $k_2 = 3n$.

- Run the protocol for $\text{R}_{\text{gs}}(n, \ell, q, m', k_1, k_2, \beta, b)$ in Section 3.3 with public input $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c})$ and prover’s witness $(d, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e})$. The protocol is repeated $t = \omega(\log n)$ times to make the soundness error negligibly small, and then made non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir heuristic as $\Pi = (\{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \text{CH}, \{\text{RSP}_j\}_{j=1}^t)$, where $\text{CH} = \{\text{Ch}_j\}_{j=1}^t = \mathcal{H}(M, \{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, (c_1, c_2))$.

3. Output the group signature $\Sigma = ((c_1, c_2), \Pi)$.

Verify(gpk, M , Σ) This deterministic algorithm works as follows:

1. Parse Σ as $((c_1, c_2), (\{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, \text{CH}, \{\text{RSP}_j\}_{j=1}^t))$. If $(\text{Ch}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{Ch}^{(t)}) \neq \mathcal{H}(M, \{\text{CMT}_j\}_{j=1}^t, (c_1, c_2))$, then return 0.
2. Then for $j = 1$ to t , run the verification step of the protocol from Section 3.3 with public input $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \dots, \mathbf{A}_\ell, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{c})$ to check the validity of RSP_j with respect to CMT_j and Ch_j . If any of the conditions does not hold, then return 0.
3. Return 1.

Open(gmsk, M , Σ) Let gmsk= x and $\Sigma = ((c_1, c_2), \Pi)$, proceed as follows:

1. Compute $\bar{d} = \mathbf{c}_2 - x \otimes \mathbf{c}_1 \in \mathcal{R}_q$. For each $i \in [n]$, if \bar{d}_i is closer to 0 than to $\lfloor q/2 \rfloor$ modulo q , then let $\bar{d}_i = 0$; otherwise, let $\bar{d}_i = 1$.
2. If \bar{d} is of the form $(0^{n-\ell} \| d)$, then return $d \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Otherwise, return \perp .

5.2 Analysis

Efficiency and Correctness. The ring-based group signature can be implemented in polynomial time. The public key $((\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}_0, \dots, \mathbf{a}_\ell, u), (f, g))$ has bit-size $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\ell n)$. In comparison with the scheme from Section 4, a factor of $\mathcal{O}(n)$ is saved. The signature size is also bounded by $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\ell n)$.

The correctness of algorithm `Verify` follows from the facts that every user with a valid secret key is able to compute a satisfying witness for $\mathbf{R}_{\text{gs}}(n, \ell, q, nm, 2n, 3n, \beta, b)$, and that the underlying argument system is perfectly complete. We also set the parameters so that the LPR encryption scheme is correct, which implies that algorithm `Open` is also correct.

The anonymity and traceability properties of the scheme are stated in Theorem 4 and 5, respectively.

Theorem 4. *In the random oracle model, the group signature scheme described in Section 5.1 is CPA-anonymous if $\text{SVP}_{\ell, \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^{3.5})}^\infty$ on ideal lattices in the ring \mathcal{R} is hard in the worst case.*

The proof of Theorem 4 uses the fact that the underlying argument system is statistical zero-knowledge, and the assumed hardness of the HNF variant of Ring-LWE $_{n,q,\chi}$. The proof is given in the full version [LNW15].

Theorem 5. *In the random oracle model, the group signature scheme described in Section 5.1 is traceable if $\text{SVP}_{\ell, \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^2)}^\infty$ on ideal lattices in the ring \mathcal{R} is hard in the worst case.*

The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to that of Theorem 3, and is given in the full version [LNW15].

A Security Requirements for Group Signatures

The presentation in this section follows the model of Bellare et al. [BMW03], and the relaxed anonymity notion proposed by Boneh et al. [BBS04].

ANONYMITY. Consider the anonymity experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{t-anon}}(n, N)$ between a challenger \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} , where $\text{t} \in \{\text{CPA}, \text{CCA}\}$.

- \mathcal{C} generates $(\text{gpk}, \text{gmsk}, \text{gsk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^n, 1^N)$, then gives (gpk, gsk) to \mathcal{A} .
- If $\text{t} = \text{CCA}$, then \mathcal{A} can query the opening oracle. On input a message M and a signature Σ , the oracle returns $\text{Open}(\text{gmsk}, M, \Sigma)$ to \mathcal{A} .
- \mathcal{A} outputs two distinct identities i_0, i_1 and a message M^* . Then \mathcal{C} picks a coin $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$, and sends $\Sigma^* \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{gsk}[i_b], M^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
- If $\text{t} = \text{CCA}$, then \mathcal{A} can query the opening oracle. On input (M, Σ) , if $(M, \Sigma) = (M^*, \Sigma^*)$, then \mathcal{C} outputs 0 and halts; otherwise it returns $\text{Open}(\text{gmsk}, M, \Sigma)$ to \mathcal{A} .
- \mathcal{A} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. \mathcal{C} outputs 1 if $b' = b$, or 0 otherwise.

Define $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{t-anon}}(n, N) = \left| \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{t-anon}}(n, N) = 1] - 1/2 \right|$. We say that the scheme is CPA-anonymous (resp., CCA-anonymous) if for all polynomial N , and all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the function $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CPA-anon}}(n, N)$ (resp., $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CCA-anon}}(n, N)$) is negligible in the security parameter n .

TRACEABILITY. Consider the traceability experiment $\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{trace}}(n, N)$ between a challenger \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} .

- \mathcal{C} runs $\text{KeyGen}(1^n, 1^N)$ to obtain $(\text{gpk}, \text{gmsk}, \text{gsk})$, then it sets $CU \leftarrow \emptyset$ and gives $(\text{gpk}, \text{gmsk})$ to \mathcal{A} .
- \mathcal{A} can make the following queries adaptively, and in any order:
 - Key query: On input an index i , \mathcal{C} adds i to CU , and returns $\text{gsk}[i]$.
 - Signing query: On input i, M , \mathcal{C} returns $\text{Sign}(\text{gsk}[i], M)$.
- \mathcal{A} outputs a message M , and a signature Σ . Then \mathcal{C} proceeds as follows: If $\text{Verify}(\text{gpk}, M, \Sigma) = 0$ then return 0. If $\text{Open}(\text{gmsk}, M, \Sigma) = \perp$ then return 1. If $\exists i$ such that the following are true then return 1, else return 0:
 1. $\text{Open}(\text{gmsk}, M, \Sigma) = i \notin CU$,
 2. \mathcal{A} has never made a signing query for i, M .

Define $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{trace}}(n, N) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{trace}}(n, N) = 1]$. We say that the scheme is fully traceable if for all polynomial N and all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the function $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{G},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{trace}}(n, N)$ is negligible in the security parameter n .

Acknowledgments. This research is supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education under Research Grant MOE2013-T2-1-041. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of PKC 2015 for their helpful comments.

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