Abstract
The cryptographic foundations of e-auction and e-voting schemes are similar, for instance, seminal works in both domains have applied mixnets, homomorphic encryption, and trapdoor bit-commitments. However, these developments have appeared independently and the two research communities are disjoint. In this paper, we demonstrate a relation between e-auction and e-voting: we present Hawk and Aucitas, two e-auction schemes derived from the Helios and Civitas e-voting schemes. Our results make progress towards the unification of the e-auction and e-voting domains.
Keywords
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Notes
- 1.
A price ceiling – that is, an upper bound on the price that may be offered by bidders – is common in e-auctions.
- 2.
Our implementation is available from the following URL: http://bensmyth.com/publications/2014-Hawk-and-Aucitas-auction-schemes/.
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Acknowledgements
We are particularly grateful to Florian Kerschbaum and the anonymous reviewers who read earlier versions of this paper and provided useful guidance. This work has been partly supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC project CRYSP (259639), the ANR-09-VERS-016 BEST project, and Campus France.
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McCarthy, A., Smyth, B., Quaglia, E.A. (2014). Hawk and Aucitas: e-Auction Schemes from the Helios and Civitas e-Voting Schemes. In: Christin, N., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8437. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_4
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