Abstract
In a novel form of game theoretic simulation we show (1) that pure cooperation is not a stable strategy in populations of individuals with unequal abilities and (2) that memory for past interactions is not necessary to maintain a stable system of cooperation; the ability to assess a competitor’s fighting ability is sufficient. The strategies of our agents are based solely on their own fighting ability and cues of the fighting strength of other agents.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Werner, G.M., Davis, J.N. (1997). Cooperation Without Memory. In: Conte, R., Hegselmann, R., Terna, P. (eds) Simulating Social Phenomena. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 456. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63329-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-03366-1
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