Abstract
To characterize the structures and reason about strategies of extensivegames,much work has been done to provide the logical systems for such games. These logic systems focus on various perspectives of extensive games: (Harrenstein et al., 2003) concentrated on describing equilibrium concepts and strategic reasoning. (van Benthem, 2002) used dynamic logic to describe games as well as strategies.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Blackburn, P., de Rijke, M., Venema, Y.: Modal logic. Cambridge University Press (2001)
Grossi, D., Turrini, P.: Short sight in extensive games. In: AAMAS, pp. 805–812 (2012)
Harrenstein, P., van der Hoek, W., Meyer, J.-J.C., Witteveen, C.: A modal characterization of nash equilibrium. Fundamenta Informaticae 57(2-4), 281–321 (2003)
van Benthem, J.: Extensive games as process models. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11(3), 289–313 (2002)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Liu, C., Liu, F., Su, K. (2013). A Logic for Extensive Games with Short Sight. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_28
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_28
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)