A Note on Bayesian Games

Liu, Yang

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_27

Yang Liu¹⁹

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8196))

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International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction

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Abstract

This paper tackles some conceptual problems in the epistemic foundations of classical game theory. Focus is placed on the discussions of the asymmetry of different epistemic standpoints in modeling a game and the thesis of no subjective probability for self-action in games.

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Authors and Affiliations

Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, 708 Philosohy Hall, New York, NY, 10027, USA
Yang Liu

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Yang Liu
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Editors and Affiliations

Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Ashton Building, Ashton Street, L69 3BX, Liverpool, UK
Davide Grossi
Fakultät für Philosophie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, München, Germany
Olivier Roy
Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, Zhejiang University, Xixi Campus, Tianmushan Road 148, 310028,, Hangzhou, China
Huaxin Huang

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Liu, Y. (2013). A Note on Bayesian Games. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_27

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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