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Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions: A Hierarchical Approach

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Book cover Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8196))

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Abstract

This paper presents a quasi-lexicographic judgment aggregation rule based on the hierarchy of judges. We do not assume completeness at both individual and collective levels, which means that a judge can abstain from a proposition and the collective judgment on a proposition can be undetermined. We prove that the proposed rule is (weakly) oligarchic. This is by no means a negative result. In fact, our result demonstrates that with abstentions, oligarchic aggregation is not necessarily a single level determination but can be a multiple-level democracy, which partially explains its pervasiveness in the real world.

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Jiang, G., Zhang, D., Tang, X. (2013). Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions: A Hierarchical Approach. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_26

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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