Abstract
The expression “analytic narratives” is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical choice. The chapter explains what analytic narratives are by reviewing the studies of the major book Analytic Narratives (Bates et al., 1998), which are concerned with the workings of political institutions broadly speaking, as well as several cases drawn from military and security studies, which form an independent source of the analytic narratives literature. At the same time as it gradually develops a definition of analytic narratives, the chapter investigates how they fulfil one of their main purposes, which is to provide explanations of a better standing than those of traditional history. An important principle that will emerge in the course of the discussion is that narration is called upon not only to provide facts and problems but also to contribute to the explanation itself. The chapter distinguishes between several expository schemes of analytic narratives according to the way they implement this principle. From all the arguments developed here, it seems clear that the current applications of analytic narratives do not exhaust their potential, and in particular that they deserve the attention of economic historians, if only because they are concerned with microeconomic interactions that are not currently their focus of attention.
This chapter expands on work begun when the author visited Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in 2015–16. For useful comments and encouragement, the author thanks Steven Brams, Bertrand Crettez, Lorraine Daston, Claude Diebolt, Françoise Forges, Luca Giuliani, Michael Gordin, Michael Haupert, Benjamin Miller, Roger Ransom, Daniel Schönpflug, Frank Zagare, as well as the participants at the workshops “The Limits and Possibilities of Narrative Explanations” (Wissenschaftskolleg, 17–18 March 2016) and “Computational Models of Narrative 2016” (Krakow, 11–12 July 2016). Many thanks also to Ben Young and Michael Haupert for assisting in the preparation of the final draft.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Only the second game makes it possible to investigate the clans’ trade-off between fighting a civil war to gain control of Genoa and peacefully collaborating to get more maritime possessions.
- 3.
Critics of Greif’s approach to the podesteria have complained that this institution originated in a decision made by the German Emperor, not by the Genoese. See, however, fn 5.
- 4.
Perhaps because its topic has been heavily researched, Weingast’s study seems to have aroused special attention from readers of Analytic Narratives. Some have complained that it is not clear whether the rule of balance in the Senate was central to the stability of the Federation, and accordingly how much its collapse contributed to the civil war. A quick answer may be that the study selects one particular sequence of actions and events for investigation, and this provides a partial but real explanatory argument (which incidentally comes out most clearly at the post-modeling narrative stage, see section “The Role of Narration in Analytic Narratives”).
- 5.
An answer to the objection echoed in fn 3 is forthcoming along this line. The podesteria may well have been imposed “top-down” upon the Genoese from the outside, yet the question arises nonetheless of why they made its functioning possible, a question that the “institutions as rules” conception addresses. Clark’s (2007) otherwise critical account of Greif (2006) clearly recognizes this.
- 6.
Analytic Narratives has given rise to a rather large number of discussions, which space reasons prevent us from covering here. The reader may in particular consult American Political Science Review, 94, 2000, no 3, and Social Science History, 24, 2000, no 4, which contain one or more reviews followed by a rejoinder from the five authors. Some of these discussions express strong scepticism about either the individual contributions or the methodological project itself; among the reasons for this scepticism is the routine complaint that “rational choice theory” (whether formal or not) is either flawed or inapplicable. None of these discussions – even the favorable ones – properly recognizes the special function that narratives, as against other forms of reporting of historical events, fulfil in the AN methodology.
- 7.
One of the first works to explore this tension is the collection by Grenier et al. (2001); it does not yet refer to AN.
- 8.
In this paragraph, we imply the familiar conception of a model as a construct mediating between theories and real objects. The alternative conceptions canvassed in recent philosophy of science could also be brought into relation to AN.
- 9.
On the logical relation between the concepts of perfect information and complete information, see the texts by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Harrington (2009), Myerson (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). The first text in this list is the locus classicus for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept.
- 10.
- 11.
Schiemann (2007) promotes a further extension of AN to behavioral economics and illustrates this by a study of an event from the Yugoslav civil wars in the 1990s.
- 12.
See Betts (1997) for a more thorough discussion that includes a history of security studies.
- 13.
- 14.
At any rate, a later historical discovery showed that Bradley had in fact been cognizant of the orders received by von Kluge, as the Allies had broken the German Enigma code (see Ravid 1990).
- 15.
- 16.
In the latter work, Brams introduces a 2×2 game that schematizes the American and Soviet choices (Blockade and Air Strike, Withdraw and Maintenance, respectively) and applies his “theory of moves” to find that the Compromise issue (Blockade, Withdraw) emerges as a “non-myopic” equilibrium.
- 17.
The assumption made regarding Britain’s type appears to be connected with a mathematical difficulty. The Triple Crisis Game can currently be solved only in limiting cases. Concerning the Moroccan crisis, the restriction was that Challenger was “determined,” and here it is that Britain is “staunch” (Zagare 2015, p. 335, fn 7).
- 18.
Discussions of AN rarely make this point; see, however, Downing (2000, p. 91).
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
Game theory has another technical sense for the word “generic”; this will not be considered here.
- 22.
Other formal theories would specify the distinction somewhat differently.
- 23.
On the definitions given above, the Triple Crisis Game is not a generic game, but rather a set of such games. For instance, the specialized version for the Moroccan crisis is one such generic game, and the specialized version for Grey politics is another.
- 24.
- 25.
These and other conditions have been thoroughly discussed in the philosophy of science; see, e.g., Bird (1998, Chap. 1).
- 26.
There were five at the time: Britain, France, Germany, Austria, and Russia. Zagare and Kilgour (2006, p. 635) address this objection.
- 27.
- 28.
See Bates et al. (1998, p. 15): “Repeated games, for example, can yield a multiplicity of equilibria. To explain why an outcome occurred rather than another, the theorist must ground his or her explanation in empirical materials.” It is for “the narrative” to provide these “materials.”
- 29.
The novelist Philip Roth is said to have made this pronouncement: “Everything that matters comes to us in the form of a narrative.” At least, every action that matters comes to us in this form.
- 30.
- 31.
See in particular Roberts’s (2001) collection, with classic pieces by Dray, Mink, White, and others and the 1985 collection of Danto’s works in the philosophy of history, Narration and Knowledge.
- 32.
One may note the dramatic quality of this sequence, which reminds one of the triadic plot structure in many dramas or fictional stories: an initially stable situation, a conflict between the characters, and a positive or negative resolution of this conflict (see Freytag 1863, elaborating on Aristotle’s Poetics).
- 33.
Crettez and Deloche’s (2018) treatment of Cesar’s death further illustrates the subgenre of analyzed narratives. Following the general AN methodology, they carefully review the historical evidence and extract from it a problem they solve with the aid of a formal model. How plausible is the suggestion made by Suetonius and others that Cesar was aware of the plot to murder him when he went to the Ides of March meeting of the Senate? The authors’ two-person game of normal form has a single Nash equilibrium that is mixed, which in their view suggests a negative answer to this question. Here the narrative provides both the evidence and the problem, but the solution is stated in theoretical, non-narrative terms.
- 34.
The firm contrast that Annales postulates between narrative- and problem-oriented history appears among others in Furet (1981). The anti-narrative stand is also present among new economic historians, e.g., Kousser (1984), who defends “quantitative social scientific history” against a “revivalism” of narrative. Not every cliometrician has adopted this stance; witness the open attitude of the editors of this Handbook.
- 35.
For instance, Myerson (2004) suggests treating the events of 1930–1933 in terms of a signaling game between the Allies and the German conservative leaders. To get rid of the reparations burden, the latter would try to impress the former by pushing forward Nazism as a political force (a dangerous game if ever there was one).
- 36.
More examples could be found in Greif’s (2002) survey of game-theoretic economic history.
References
Allison GT (1971) Essence of decision, explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown and Co, Boston (2nd revised ed. co-authored with P. Zelikow, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 1999)
Bates RH, Greif A, Levi M, Rosenthal JL, Weingast B (1998) Analytic narratives. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Bates RH, Greif A, Levi M, Rosenthal JL, Weingast B (2000a) The analytic narrative project. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:696–702
Bates RH, Greif A, Levi M, Rosenthal JL, Weingast B (2000b) Analytic narratives revisited. Soc Sci Hist 24:685–696
Betts R (1997) Should strategic studies survive? World Polit 50:7–33
Bird A (1998) Philosophy of science. UCL Press (reprinted by Routledge, London, 2000)
Brams SJ (1975) Game theory and politics. Free Press, New York
Brams SJ (1985) Superpower games: applying game theory to superpower conflict. Yale University Press, New Haven
Brams SJ, Kilgour M (1988) Game theory and national security. Oxford University Press, New York
Braudel F (1969) Ecrits sur l’histoire. Flammarion, Paris (Engl. trans. On history. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980)
Clark S (1985) The Annales historians, ch. 10. In: Skinner Q (ed) The return of grand theory in the human sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 178–198
Clark G (2007) A review of Avner Greif’s institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade. J Econ Lit 14:727–743
Crettez B, Deloche R (2018). An analytic narrative of Caesar’s death: suicide or not? That Is the Question. Ration Soc 30:332–349
Danto A (1985) Narration and knowledge. Columbia University Press, New York
Downing BM (2000) Economic analysis in historical perspective. Hist Theory 39:88–97
Dray W (1971) On the nature and role of narrative in historiography. Hist Theory 10:153–171
Erickson P (2015) The world the game theorists made. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Freytag G (1863) Die Technik des Dramas. S. Hirzel, Leipzig
Furet F (1981) De l’histoire-récit à l’histoire-problème. In: L’atelier de 1’histoire. Flammarion, Paris, pp 73–90. Eng. tr. in G. Roberts (2001) (ed), ch. 17, pp 269–280
Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Game theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass
Greif A (1993) Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders’ coalition. Am Econ Rev 83:525–548
Greif A (2002) Economic history and game theory, ch. 52. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory with economic applications, vol 3. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1989–2024
Greif A (2006) Institutions and the path to modern economy. Cambridge University Press, New York
Greif A, Milgrom P, Weingast BR (1994) Coordination, commitment, and enforcement: the case of the merchant guild. J Polit Econ 102:745–776
Grenier JY, Grignon C, Menger PM (eds) (2001) Le modèle et le récit. Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris
Harrington J (2009) Game, strategies, and decision making. Worth Publishers, New York (2nd ed., 2014)
Haywood OG Jr (1950) Military decision and the mathematical theory of games. Air Univ Q Rev 4:17–30
Haywood OG Jr (1954) Military decision and game theory. J Oper Res Soc Am 2:365–385
Hempel C (1965) Aspects of scientific explanation. Academic, New York
Kousser JM (1984) The revivalism of narrative: a response to recent criticisms of quantitative history. Soc Sci Hist 8:133–149
Levi M (1997) Consent, dissent, and patriotism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Levi M (2002) Modeling complex historical processes with analytic narratives. In: Mayntz R (ed) Akteure-Mechanismen-Modelle. Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institute für Gesellschatsforschung Köln, vol 42. Campus, Frankfurt am Main, pp 108–127
Mongin P (2008) Retour à Waterloo. Histoire militaire et théorie des jeux. Ann Hist Sci Soc 63:39–69
Mongin P (2009) Waterloo et les regards croisés de l’interprétation. In: Berthoz A (ed) La pluralité interprétative. Odile Jacob, Paris
Mongin P (2016) What are analytic narratives? In: Miller B, Lieto A, Ronfard R, Ware SG, Finlayson MA (eds) Proceedings of the 7th workshop on computational models of narrative (CMN 2016), open access series in informatics. http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2016/6714/pdf/OASIcs-CMN-2016-13.pdf
Mongin P (2018) A game-theoretic analysis of the Waterloo campaign and some comments on the analytic narrative project. Cliometrica 12:451–480
Morrow JD (1994) Game theory for political scientists. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Myerson RB (1991) Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Myerson RB (2004) Political economics and the Weimar disaster. J Inst Theor Econ 160:187–209
Nagel E (1961) The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific explanation. Routledge, London
Nalepa M (2010) Captured commitments. An analytic narrative of transitions with transitional justice. World Polit 62:341–380
North DC (1981) Structure and change in economic history. Norton, New York
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1994) A course in game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Ravid I (1990) Military decision, game theory and intelligence: an anecdote. Oper Res 38:260–264
Riker WH (1982) Liberalism against populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. W.H. Freeman, San Francisco
Roberts G (ed) (2001) The history and narrative reader. Routledge, London
Salmon W (1992) Scientific explanation, ch. 1. In: Salmon MH, Earman J, Glymour C, Lennox JG, Machamer P, McGuire JE, Norton JD, Salmon WC, Schaffner KF (eds) Introduction to philosophy of science. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, pp 7–41
Schelling TC (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Schiemann JW (2007) Bizarre beliefs and rational choices: a behavioral approach to analytic narratives. J Polit 69:511–524
Stone L (1979) The revival of narrative: reflections on a new old history. Past Present 85:3–24
von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2nd ed., 1947)
Wagner H (1989) Uncertainty, rational learning, and bargaining in the Cuban missile crisis. In: Ordeshook P (ed) Models of strategic choice in politics. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp 177–205
White H (1984) The question of the narrative in contemporary historical theory. Hist Theory 23:1–33
White H (1987) The content of the form: narrative discourse and historical representation. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
Zagare FC (2009) Explaining the 1914 War in Europe. An analytic narrative. J Theor Polit 21:63–95
Zagare FC (2011) The games of July: explaining the great war. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
Zagare FC (2014) A game-theoretic history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Economies 2:20–44
Zagare FC (2015) The Moroccan crisis of 1905–1906: an analytic narrative. Peace Econ Peace Sci Public Policy 21:327–350
Zagare FC, Kilgour M (2000) Perfect deterrence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Zagare FC, Kilgour M (2003) Alignment patterns, crisis bargaining, and extended deterrence: a game-theoretic analysis. Int Stud Q 47:587–615
Zagare FC, Kilgour M (2006) The deterrence-versus-restraint dilemma in extended deterrence: explaining British policy in 1914. Int Stud Rev 8:623–641
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
About this entry
Cite this entry
Mongin, P. (2019). Analytic Narratives. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_52-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_52-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40458-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40458-0
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences