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Modeling the Pre Auction Stage The Truckload Case

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Innovations in Distribution Logistics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 619))

Summary

In transportation service procurement, shipper and carriers cost functions for serving a pair of origin-destination points, usually called lanes, are highly dependent on the opportunity to serve neighboring lanes. Traditional single-item auctions do not allow to capture this type of preferences. On the contrary, they are perfectly modeled in combinatorial auctions where bids on bundles of items are allowed. In transportation service procurement the management of a combinatorial auction can be seen as a three-stage process. Each stage involves several complex decision making problems. All such problems have relevant practical implications but only some of them have received attention in the literature. In the present paper we focus on the pre-auction stage for transportation procurement. In particular, we analyze the problem of a shipper who has to decide between undertaking and/or outsourcing (through an auction) his transportation requests. The problem has never been analyzed before.We propose two different models for the problem in the truckload case and provide their computational comparison on randomly generated instances.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Brescia, Department of Quantitative Methods, Italy

    Gianfranco Guastaroba

  2. University of Brescia, Department of Electronics for Automation, Italy

    Renata Mansini

  3. University of Brescia, Department of Quantitative Methods, Italy

    M Grazia Speranza

Authors
  1. Gianfranco Guastaroba
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  2. Renata Mansini
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  3. M Grazia Speranza
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Gianfranco Guastaroba , Renata Mansini or M Grazia Speranza .

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    © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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    Guastaroba, G., Mansini, R., Speranza, M.G. (2009). Modeling the Pre Auction Stage The Truckload Case. In: Nunen, J., Speranza, M., Bertazzi, L. (eds) Innovations in Distribution Logistics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 619. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92944-4_11

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