Abstract
In this paper we explore some of the connections between cooperative game theory and the utility maximization framework for routing and flow control in networks. Central to both approaches are the allocation of scarce resources between the various users of a network and the importance of discovering distributed mechanisms that work well. The specific setting of our study is ad-hoc networks where a game-theoretic approach is particularly appealing. We discuss the underlying motivation for the primal and dual algorithms that assign routes and flows within the network and coordinate resource usage between the users. Important features of this study are the stochastic nature of the traffic pattern offered to the network and the use of a dynamic scheme to vary a user’s ability to send traffic. We briefly review coalition games defined by a characteristic function and the crucial notion of the Shapley value to allocate resources between players. We present a series of experiments with several test networks that illustrate how a distributed scheme of flow control and routing can in practice be aligned with the Shapley values which capture the influence or market power of individual users within the network.
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gibbens, R.J., Key, P.B. (2008). Coalition Games and Resource Allocation in Ad-Hoc Networks. In: Liò, P., Yoneki, E., Crowcroft, J., Verma, D.C. (eds) Bio-Inspired Computing and Communication. BIOWIRE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5151. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92191-2_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92191-2_34
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92190-5
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