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Universally Composable DKG with Linear Number of Exponentiations

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Security in Communication Networks (SCN 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3352))

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Abstract

Until now no distributed discrete-logarithm key generation (DKG) protocol is known to be universally composable. We extend Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing scheme to construct such a protocol. Our result holds for static adversaries corrupting a minority of the parties under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in a weak common random string model in which the simulator does not choose the common random string.

Our protocol is optimistic. If all parties behave honestly, each party computes O(3.5k) exponentiations, and otherwise each party computes O(k 2) exponentiations, where k is the number of parties. In previous constructions each party always computes Ω(k 2) exponentiations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), KTH, Nada, S-100 44, Stockholm, Sweden

    Douglas Wikström

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  1. Douglas Wikström
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica e Applicazioni, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Via Ponte Don Melillo, I-84084, Fisciano, (SA), Italy

    Carlo Blundo

  2. Dipartimento di Tecnologie dell’Informazione, Universitá di Milano, Via Bramante 65, P.O. Box, 26013, Crema, (CR), Italy

    Stelvio Cimato

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Wikström, D. (2005). Universally Composable DKG with Linear Number of Exponentiations. In: Blundo, C., Cimato, S. (eds) Security in Communication Networks. SCN 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3352. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30598-9_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30598-9_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24301-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30598-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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