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Providing Receipt-Freeness in Mixnet-Based Voting Protocols

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Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003 (ICISC 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2971))

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Abstract

It had been thought that it is difficult to provide receipt-freeness in mixnet-based electronic voting schemes. Any kind of user chosen randomness can be used to construct a receipt, since a user can prove to a buyer how he had encrypted the ballot. In this paper we propose a simple and efficient method to incorporate receipt-freeness in mixnet-based electronic voting schemes by using the well known re-encryption technique and designated verifier re-encryption proof (DVRP). In our scheme a voter has to prepare his encrypted ballot through a randomization service provided by a tamper resistant randomizer (TRR), in such a way that he finally loses his knowledge on randomness. This method can be used in most mixnet-based electronic voting scheme to provide receipt-freeness.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Research Center, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia

    Byoungcheon Lee, Colin Boyd & Ed Dawson

  2. Joongbu University, 101 Daehak-Ro, Chuboo-Meon, Kumsan-Gun, Chungnam, 312-702, Korea

    Byoungcheon Lee, Jeongmo Yang & Seungjae Yoo

  3. Information and Communications University, 58-4, Hwaam-dong, Yusong-gu, Daejeon, 305-732, Korea

    Kwangjo Kim

Authors
  1. Byoungcheon Lee
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  2. Colin Boyd
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  3. Ed Dawson
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  4. Kwangjo Kim
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  5. Jeongmo Yang
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  6. Seungjae Yoo
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea

    Jong-In Lim

  2. CIST (Center for Information Security Technologies), Korea University, Anam Dong, Sungbuk Gu, Seoul, Korea

    Dong-Hoon Lee

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Lee, B., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Kim, K., Yang, J., Yoo, S. (2004). Providing Receipt-Freeness in Mixnet-Based Voting Protocols. In: Lim, JI., Lee, DH. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003. ICISC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2971. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-21376-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24691-6

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