Psychic Causality

Taieb, Hamid

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_2

Hamid Taieb⁶

Part of the book series: Primary Sources in Phenomenology ((FRBRE))

908 Accesses

Abstract

Franz Brentano is one of the major figures of what is known as the “Austro-German” tradition. A distinctive feature of this tradition is its concern with clarity and argument, as opposed to the speculative and “jargon-laden” philosophy of the nineteenth century, which is to say—according to the Austro-German authors themselves—post-Kantian idealism. In this respect, the Austrian philosopher and Catholic priest Bernard Bolzano, inasmuch as he was anti-Kantian and anti-idealist, can be placed at the origins of Austro-German philosophy. It should be noted that Bolzano was well-versed in Aristotelian philosophy and logic, as the numerous references in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1837 attest. Nonetheless, the most influential thinker in the Austro-German tradition was not Bolzano, but Brentano. From a methodological perspective, Brentano also insists on the importance of clarity and argument, and he also is opposed to speculative thinking. In the famous fourth thesis in his Habilitationsschrift, he maintains that philosophy, which includes psychology, should follow “the method of the natural sciences,” that is, it should be based on experience. In the case of psychology, this amounts to saying that it must rest on “inner perception”—in other words, it should be done from the point of view of reflexive consciousness—and free itself from any metaphysical prejudices. Brentano’s research inspired a large number of followers: probably the best-known products of the school of Brentano are Husserl’s phenomenology, Meinong’s theory of objects, the Lvov–Warsaw school of logic founded by Twardowski, and the various traditions of Gestalt psychology. Brentano himself was a student of Adolf Trendelenburg in Berlin. Trendelenburg played an important role in the renewal of Aristotelian thought in the German-speaking world: he taught the philosophy of Aristotle for almost thirty years without interruption, and was a major influence on many students. Having in this way become familiarized with the philosophy and psychology of Aristotle, Brentano wrote his famous doctoral thesis on the Aristotelian theory of categories in 1862, and his Habilitationsschrift on Aristotles’s psychology in 1867. These two works also attach great importance to the scholastic reception of Aristotle’s philosophy, especially Thomas Aquinas. This interest in Aristotle was not confined to Brentano’s youth: he published books on Aristotle throughout his life, and regularly lectured on the history of ancient and medieval philosophy. It should also be pointed out that Brentano too was a priest, but left the priesthood around 1870 after contesting the doctrine of papal infallibility.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 84.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 109.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
On these issues, see Mulligan, Wittgenstein et la tradition austro-allemande.
2.
Brentano, Die Habilitationsthesen.
3.
On this, see Brentano, Psychologie and Deskriptive Psychologie.
4.
There is an abundant scholarly literature on the context in which Brentano developed and on the nature and influence of his thought. See especially Smith, Austrian Philosophy; Albertazzi et al. (eds.), The School of Franz Brentano; Mulligan, Introduction: De la philosophie autrichienne et de sa place; Benoist, Représentations sans objet; Fisette and Fréchette (eds.), À l’école de Brentano; Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School; Kriegel, Brentano’s Philosophical System. For an overview of the Brentano school, see Dewalque, Schema of the Brentano School Intellectual Progeny, as well as Dewalque, The Rise of the Brentano School, and The Unity of the Brentano School. For a general history of phenomenology , see Spiegelberg and Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement.
5.
On the renewal of Aristotelianism in the German-speaking world, and on the importance of Trendelenburg, see Thouard (ed.), Aristote au XIXe siècle, and Hartung et al. (eds.), Aristotelian Studies in 19th Century Philosophy. Trendelenburg edited and commented on Aristotle’s De anima, and wrote a Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, in which Aristotle plays a central role.
6.
Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, and Die Psychologie des Aristoteles.
7.
See Brentano, Über den Creatianismus des Aristoteles, Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes, and Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung. See also the lecture courses collected in Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie and Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im christlichen Abendland.
8.
Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b2–3: “τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου.” My translation. On alteration , see De gen. et corr. 1.4, 319b6–320a7. Note that the causality in question is efficient causality . On Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes, see Met. Δ.2, 1013a24–1014a25.
9.
Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b14–16.
10.
Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b3–5: “τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν.” Trans. Shields, in De anima, 33.
11.
Aristotle, De anima 2.12, 424a17–24.
12.
Aristotle, De anima 3.8, 431b26–432a2.
13.
Aristotle, De anima 3.8, 431b29–432a1: “οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος.” Trans. Shields, in De anima, 65.
14.
Aristotle, De anima 3.4, 429a17–18.
15.
Aristotle, De anima 3.8, 431b21: “ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα.” Trans. Shields, in De anima, 65.
16.
Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 82–83: “Unter dem eigenthümlichen Sinnesobjecte versteht Aristoteles jene Eigenschaft des wahrgenommenen Gegenstandes, welche das wirkende Princip für die Alteration des Sinnes ist, und nach der wir, weil sie das natürliche Correlat des leidenden Vermögens ist, wie schon bemerkt, das Wesen des Sinnes zu bestimmen haben.” Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 56 (slightly modified).
17.
Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 79–81. Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 54 (modified).
18.
Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 80: “Allein nicht insofern wir kalt werden, empfinden wir das Kalte, sonst würden auch Pflanzen und unorganische Körper empfinden, sondern insofern das Kalte objectiv, d. h. als Erkanntes, in uns existirt.” Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 54–55.
19.
Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 80n6: “Wir gebrauchen den Ausdruck ‘objectiv’ hier und im Folgenden nicht in dem Sinne, der in neuerer Zeit der übliche ist, sondern in jenem, den die Aristoteliker des Mittelalters damit (mit dem scholastischen objective) zu verbinden pflegten, und der eine sehr kurze und präcise Bezeichnung der Aristotelischen Lehre ermöglicht. Materiell, als physische Beschaffenheit, ist die Kälte in dem Kalten; als Object, d.h. als Empfundenes, ist sie in dem Kältefühlenden. Vgl. De Anim. III, 2. §. 4 ff. p. 425, b, 25, wo Aristoteles sagt, dass das αἰσθητὸν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν in dem Sinne sei.” Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 210 (slightly modified). On these two passages, see Courtine, La cause de la phénoménologie, 57–59.
20.
As indicated previously, I will return in Sects. 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2 below to the medieval theory of esse obiective .
21.
Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 18.
22.
Burnyeat, ‘De anima’ II 5, 76.
23.
There is a vast scholarly literature on this debate, and I will limit myself to the work of Sorabji and Burnyeat, since they are the principal antagonists, as well as an article by Victor Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, which summarizes, discusses, and finally rejects both the positions already mentioned; however, I will not discuss Caston’s own position. Two monographs have been devoted to this debate: Everson, Aristotle on Perception, and Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, which defend the positions of Sorabji and Burnyeat respectively. For an extensive bibliography on the debate, see Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, 246nn3–5 and 247n7. In a recent, original interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the reception of sensible forms without matter, Kalderon rejects the causal reading in favour not so much of awareness, but rather of “constitution.” This is reminiscent of contemporary disjunctivist theories of perception, inasmuch as he argues that the sensible form of the thing as it exists outside is a constituent of sensory experience; see Kalderon, Form Without Matter, esp. ch. 9.
24.
Sorabji, Body and Soul in Aristotle, revised version, 49–50; Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception, 209–210; Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality, 49, 53, and 59.
25.
Sorabji, Intentionality and Physiological Processes, 214. On the fact that the intelligible form is nonetheless the efficient cause of the act, see Sorabji, Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality, 60; The Philosophy of the Commentators I, 131–132; and The Philosophy of the Commentators III, 324–325.
26.
“τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι […].” My translation.
27.
Sorabji, Body and Soul in Aristotle, 47, and Intentionality and Physiological Processes, 219.
28.
Sorabji, From Aristotle to Brentano, 248.
29.
Sorabji, Intentionality and Physiological Processes, 210–211, and From Aristotle to Brentano, 247–248.
30.
Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 18, 24–25.
31.
Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 24.
32.
Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C? Remarks on De Anima 2.7–8, 430.
33.
Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 24.
34.
Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 149.
35.
Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, 257–258 (Caston’s emphasis). For Alexander of Aphrodisias, see his De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 61.30–62.15, but also 38.20–39.2 and 84.13–14.
36.
Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 141 (Burnyeat’s emphasis).
37.
Burnyeat, ‘De anima’ II 5, 45.
38.
Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?, 426.
39.
Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?, 429 (Burnyeat’s emphasis).
40.
Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 146.
41.
Burnyeat, ‘De anima’ II 5, 76.
42.
Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 22 (Burnyeat’s emphasis).
43.
Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 149.
44.
Burnyeat, ‘De anima’ II 5, 76.
45.
Caston, The Spirit and the Letter, 260 (Caston’s emphasis).
46.
Brentano, M 88, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31011 (Kategorienlehre, 241): “Wie wir bei den passiven Affektionen, die keine Umwandlungen sind, eine Doppelheit der Beziehung bemerkt haben, eine—zum Wirkenden und die andere—zum Objekte des Denkens […].” My translation; cf. trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 174.
47.
See Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117 (quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).
48.
See Aristotle, Met. Δ.15, 1020b26–1021b11. For a division that omits the third class, see Aristotle, Phys. 3.1, 200b28–32. There is also a division proposed in Top. 4.4, 125a33–b4. For commentary on these divisions, see Ross in Aristotle, Physics, ad 3.1, 200b28–32, and Vuillemin, La théorie des relations mixtes, 145–147. For general studies on relations in Aristotle, see especially Caujolle-Zaslawsky, Les relatifs dans les Catégories; Mignucci, Aristotle’s Definitions of Relatives in Cat. 7; Morales, Relational Attributes in Aristotle; Sedley, Aristotelian Relativities; Hood, Aristotle on the Category of Relation; Jansen, Aristoteles’ Kategorie des Relativen zwischen Dialektik und Ontologie; Harari, The Unity of Aristotle’s Category of Relatives; Duncombe, Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7.
49.
This section incorporates material published in Taieb, Intentionnalité et κρίσις dans la réception antique de Métaphysique Δ, 15.
50.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 185–186.
51.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 187.
52.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 182.
53.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 189.
54.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 192–194.
55.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 195, and Aristotle, De anima 3.4, 429b10–13.
56.
Ebert, Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving, 194.
57.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 407.20–25.
58.
On the fact that opinion can be about a non-existent object , see Aristotle, De int. 11, 21a32–33 and Top. 4.1, 121b1–4.
59.
Alexander has some difficulties with this text, especially when he tries to explain why there is an asymmetry between the correlates of the third class, that is, when he wonders why one of the correlates is relative because the other is relative to it. See especially Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 409.25–36, and Dooley’s critical remarks in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, ad 409.32–33. For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s text, see Sect. 3.1 below. On Alexander’s exegesis, see the remarks at the beginning of Sect. 3.2.2 below.
60.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 402.8–13: “τρίτον σημαινόμενον ἐκτίθεται, ὡς τὸ μετρητὸν πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ ἐπιστητὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς αἴσθησιν· καὶ εἴη ἂν τὸ σημαινόμενον τοῦτο τοῦ πρός τι ὑπὸ τὸ κριτικόν τε καὶ κρινόμενον· τό τε γὰρ μέτρον τὸ μετρούμενον κρίνει, ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη κριτήρια καὶ κρίσεις, ἡ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιστητῶν.” Trans. Dooley, in On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5, 82.
61.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 84.4–6: “καὶ γὰρ εἰ διά τινων παθῶν σωματικῶν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεται, ἀλλ’αὐτό γε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ πάσχειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κρίνειν.” My translation.
62.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, In De sensu, CAG 3.1: 127.12–128.6 and Mantissa, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 144.29–145.7. These passages are quoted and discussed by Ierodiakonou, in Alexander of Aphrodisias on Seeing as a Relative; this article also discusses the Stoic background of Alexander’s position. Interestingly, Alexander already uses the term σχέσις to talk about the relation of sight to its object, before the Neoplatonist adoption of this term in their commentaries on Aristotle’s theory of relation (see for example Porphyry, In Cat., CAG 4.1: 125.16–19, and Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 201.34–203.13). Alexander also uses it in his discussion of Aristotle’s πρός τι. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 83.25–26: “Relatives have their being in the relation that they have one to another” (τὰ δὲ πρός τι ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν; my translation). For more on the notion of σχέσις in Neoplatonism, see Harari, Simplicius on the Reality of Relations and Relational Change.
63.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 80.20–22. On this issue, see Moraux, Alexandre d’Aphrodise, 75.
64.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 78.10–21.
65.
Aristotle, Met. Θ.8, 1050a23–37: “ἐπεὶ δ’ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ οὐθὲν γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), ἀπ’ ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεταί τι (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν). […] ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).” Trans. Ross, in Complete Works of Aristotle. Dooley emphasizes that the action that Alexander might be appealing to in his discussion of the third class of relatives in Met. Δ.15 could only be Aristotelian immanent action , and not “transitive” action, which results in something external to the agent; see Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, ad 409.23–25. For detailed discussion of immanent action in medieval philosophy, see de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution, 295–577.
66.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 407.3–12; cf. 409.18–25.
67.
John Philoponus, In De anima, CAG 15: 39.12–13, and 39.18.
68.
Numerous passages about the active dimension of psychism in the Neoplatonists, especially as regards sensation, are cited by Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens, and Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators I, section 1(b), which I follow here. See also Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception: Aristotle, Philoponus, and Pseudo-Simplicius.
69.
Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 312.32–37: “ἐπιστάσεως δὲ ἄξιον, μήποτε τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ ἔστιν πάσχειν μόνον καὶ τυποῦσθαι, ἀλλ’ἔχει τινὰ καὶ ἔνδοθεν ἀνεγειρομένην ἐνέργειαν, καθ’ ἣν ἡ ἀντίληψις γίνεται. καὶ οὐδὲν οἶμαι θαυμαστόν, εἰ συμμιγές τι ἐπὶ τούτων συμβαίνει· καὶ γὰρ ἀκόλουθον τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν μόνως, τὰ δὲ πάσχειν μόνως, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἅμα καὶ πάσχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν.” Trans. Gaskin, in On Aristotle Categories 9–15, 39 (slightly modified). For a discussion of this passage, in the medieval context, see Côté, L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines, 415n25.
70.
Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 165.31–166.8.
71.
See Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 126.1–16, as well as Priscian, Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, CAG Suppl. 1.2: 2.26–3.9, and the comments in Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens, 47–49, and Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception, 70–75.
72.
Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens, 55. For recalling or reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις) in Plato, see Meno 81d4–5 and Phaedo 72e5–6.
73.
For a general account of the differences between Neoplatonic psychology and Aristotle’s, see Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity, 121–125 (quoted in the Introduction [Chap. 1] above).
74.
Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 165.31–166.8 (quoted above).
75.
For a comparison of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists on this active dimension of cognition, see Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception.
76.
Priscian, Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, CAG Suppl. 1.2: 2.12–14: “ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἀμερίστως τε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ περιλαμβάνει, καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ κρίσις τελεία καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν ἅμα ὅλη, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἤδη τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἕστηκε.” My translation, following the French translation in Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens, 46; cf. trans. Huby, in On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, 10. See also John Philoponus, In De anima, CAG 15: 104.8–11 and 309.15–29; Pseudo-Simplicius, In De anima, CAG 11: 166.5.
77.
See Asclepius, In Met., CAG 6.2: 337.21–33.
78.
Simplicius, In Phys., CAG 9: 401.31–33: “καὶ ἄλλα δὲ εἴδη πολλὰ τοῦ πρός τι ἐστί, τὰ μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι, τὰ δὲ ἐν ὁμοιότητι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ κρίσιν, ὡς τὸ ὁρατικὸν καὶ ὁρατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἐπιστητόν.” Trans. Urmson, in On Aristotle’s Physics 3, 18 (modified).
79.
See Simplicius, In Cat., CAG 8: 161.16–17 and 161.22–24.
80.
Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 121 and Plotinus, Enneads 3.6.1.
81.
De Haas, The Discriminating Capacity of the Soul in Aristotle’s Theory of Learning; Corcilius, Activity , Passivity , and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle; Narcy, ΚΡΙΣΙΣ et ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ (De anima, III, 2). For references to contemporary interpreters who discuss Aristotle’s κρίσις, see De Haas, The Discriminating Capacity of the Soul, 326n23, and Corcilius, Activity, Passivity , and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle, 40n26.
82.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, trans. Dooley; Blumenthal, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity, 124; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De l’âme, trans. Bergeron and Dufour.
83.
Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens; Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception.
84.
Kalderon, Priscian on Perception; Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 121–125.
85.
See Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 67.20–22.
86.
See Caston, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Soul: Part I, ad 39.4–5.
87.
Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception, 64–70; but see p. 71 for a parallel between κρίσις and the notion of judgement.
88.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 78.23.
89.
Huby, in Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, ad 2.13.
90.
Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?, 24.
91.
“τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.”
92.
Sorabji, Body and Soul in Aristotle, 47.
93.
Corcilius, Activity , Passivity , and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle.
94.
Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 122.
95.
Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense, 145.
96.
Caston, Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality, 39.
97.
Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II, §23, Husserliana 19.1: 168.21–27 (1913 ed., 164): “Der Umfang des einheitlichen Begriffes Aufmerksamkeit ist also ein so weiter, daß er zweifellos den ganzen Bereich des anschauenden und denkenden Meinens umfaßt, also den des Vorstellens in einem fest begrenzten, aber hinreichend weit gefaßten Sinne, der Anschauen und Denken gleichmäßig begreift. Schließlich reicht er überhaupt soweit als der Begriff des Bewusstseins von etwas.” Trans. Findlay, in Logical Investigations 1: 275 (slightly modified). Admittedly, certain cognitive acts apparently cannot be attentionally modulated, judgement for example: there is no inattentive judgement (I thank Kevin Mulligan for suggesting this to me). Nevertheless, this would not rule out attributing attention to any “consciousness of something,” as Husserl does. Indeed, one might say that cognitive acts which cannot be attentionally modulated always come with attention, e.g., judgements. For discussion of the Husserlian notion of attention and its complex and changing connections with intentionality, see Begout, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Attention; Dwyer, Husserl’s Appropriation of the Psychological Concepts of Apperception and Attention; Depraz, Where Is the Phenomenology of Attention That Husserl Intended to Perform?; Wehrle, L’attention: Plus ou moins que la perception?; Arvidson, Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality. Many passages on attention from Husserl’s corpus are listed and discussed in Vermesch, Husserl et l’attention, Phénoménologie de l’attention selon Husserl: 2/ la dynamique de l’éveil de l’attention, and Husserl et l’attention. 3/ les différentes fonctions de l’attention.
98.
Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 23–24 (trans. Müller, in Descriptive Psychology , 26); see also Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 31–65, and Grundzüge der Ästhetik, 38–40, all quoted in the Introduction (Chap. 1) above.
99.
Husserl, Die Lebenswelt, nn. 11 and 24, Husserliana 39: 101.23 and 250.29. These two passages date from 1933. On attention in the late Husserl, see Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §§17–20.
100.
Husserl, Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit, Husserliana 38: 73.12–15 and 117.6–11: “Wieder scheint der Sinn der Rede von Meinung zur Aufmerksamkeit Bezug zu haben oder gar etwas mit ihr Identisches zu besagen. Das Beachtete ist das speziell Gemeinte im Gegensatz zum Unbeachteten. […] Worauf bin ich in diesem Sinn aufmerksam? Nun, womit ich mich besonders beschäftige, d. h. hier, was ich in einem besonderen, abgegrenzten Akt gegenständlich habe. Der abgrenzende Akt ist das Meinen, das Gemeinte ist das ‘Bemerkte’.” My translation, following the French translation of Depraz, who quotes and discusses this passage in Depraz, Introduction, 14–16.
101.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met., CAG 1: 402.8–13, quoted above in this section. Admittedly, at Met. Ι.1, 1053a31–b3 and Ι.6, 1057a7–12 Aristotle suggests reversing the order of comparison between thought/measure and object/measurable so that the thought is the measurable and the object is the measure. However, this does not rule out that the order in Met. Δ.15, 1021a26–b3 has its own meaning and remains legitimate; in any case, this is how Alexander reads Aristotle.
102.
See in particular Caston, Connecting Traditions, 37, and Leijenhorst, Attention Please!, 205–206. For a critique of the view that Aristotle’s psychology is strictly passive, see also Tuominen, On Activity and Passivity in Perception.
103.
See Sect. 2.3 below.
104.
On the fact that the sense organ does not become coloured when it senses, see Albert the Great, In De anima 2.3.3 (ed. Geyer, 7.1: 101.21–25), quoted in Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 14.
105.
Albert the Great, In De anima 2.3.3–4 (ed. Geyer, 7.1: 101.32, 101.65, and 102.28–33). On the Avicennian origins of intentio understood as “concept” and on its history in general, see Engelhardt, Intentio; Knudsen, Intentions and Impositions; de Libera, Intention; Solère, Tension et Intention (I will return to this idea in more detail in Sect. 2.2.3.1 below). For a history of species, see Spruit, Species intelligibilis.
106.
Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 13–14).
107.
Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 35): “Nam actus et aspectus cognitivus figitur in obiecto et intentionaliter habet ipsum intra se imbibitum; propter quod actus cognitivus vocatur apprehensio et apprehensiva tentio obiecti. In qua quidem tentione et imbibitione actus intime conformatur et configuratur obiecto.” Trans. Pasnau, in Questions on Book II of the Sentences.
108.
See Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche de Pier di Giovanni Olivi, 429–466; Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham, 39–54; Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 215–224; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 168–181; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 127–138.
109.
Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 170; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 135–136.
110.
Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 72 (ed. Jansen, 3: 37): “Sic causa terminativa habet vere rationem causae, quamvis non sit proprie causa efficiens actionis terminatae in ipsa.” Trans. Pasnau, in Questions on Book II of the Sentences.
111.
Peter John Olivi, In II Sent., q. 58 (ed. Jansen, 2: 420): “[…] nisi obiectum per se aut per speciem imaginariam aut per speciem memorialem sit eis praesens, quod non possunt aliquid actu considerare et velle. Ipsa etiam essentia actuum praedictorum hoc ostendit, quoniam referri ad aliquid ut ad principium sui esse et referri ad aliquid ut ad terminum extrinsecum sui esse et suae inclinationis sunt respectus ita diversi quod in primo respectu ipsum principium tenet rationem extremi seu termini a quo, ipse vero actus cum suo susceptibili tenent rationem extremi seu termini ad quem. In secundo vero respectu est e contrario, quoniam ipse actus cum suo susceptibili tenet rationem extremi seu termini a quo, et terminus suae inclinationis tenet rationem extremi seu termini ad quem. Certum est autem quod actus apprehensivi et appetitivi habent respectum et inclinationem ad sua obiecta tanquam ad terminum ad quem, sicut experimento intimo in nobis ipsis probamus. Unde posito quod obiecta efficiant actus ipsos aut eorum habitus, adhuc praeter hoc exigentur ad productionem et continuationem ipsorum actuum tanquam termini eorum seu tanquam obiecta ab ipsis actibus et eorum potentiis apprehensa et volita et non solum tanquam principia ipsos actus generantia.” My translation. On the connnections between Olivi’s psychology and his theory of relations, see also Demange, Accidents et relations non convertibles selon Thomas d’Aquin, Pierre Olivi et Jean Duns Scot (I thank Dominique Demange for sending me the text of the talk from which his article originates), as well as Boureau, Le concept de relation chez Pierre de Jean Olivi. On the lost works of Olivi on relations, see Piron, Les oeuvres perdues d’Olivi, 386–387. For a comparison between Olivi and Robert Kilwardby, see Silva and Toivanen, The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception.
112.
Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117: “[Aristoteles] teilte die Relationen in drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen, die dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt.” Trans. Chisholm et al., in The True and the Evident, 70.
113.
See Sect. 2.2.2 above.
114.
Thomas Aquinas, Peryermeneias 1.1.2, nn. 2 and 6 (Leonina 1*.1: 9.23–25 and 11.130–133): “Nam passio est ex inpressione alicuius agentis, et sic passiones anime originem habent ab ipsis rebus. […] significatio uocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam inpressionis vel passionis.” My translation.
115.
On the “physics of form alone,” see Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C?, 430–431.
116.
See especially Thomas Aquinas, In De anima, 2.24, and Quodl. VIII, q. 2, art. 2, corp., and Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 46 and 70–71.
117.
See Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 42–52.
118.
See Thomas Aquinas, In De anima 2.14, and ST I, q. 78, art. 3, corp., together with Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception, 131–137, and Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 44. For a detailed discussion of perception in Aquinas, see Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Perception.
119.
Thomas Aquinas, In De anima 2.11, 2.24, 2.26, 3.1 (Leonina 45.1: 111.85–113.199, 168.1–171.195, 180.146–218, 202.63–90, 205.237–274); more generally, see QQ. disp. de anima, art. 13, corp.
120.
Thomas Aquinas, QQ. disp. de veritate, q. 18, art. 5, corp., and ST I, q. 79, art. 3, corp. On the agent intellect generally, and on Aquinas’s polemics against Averroes and Averroism, see Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, and the discussion by Alain de Libera in his French translation in Thomas Aquinas, Contre Averroès; see also de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution.
121.
Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, art. 6, ad 7 (Leonina 22.2.1: 314.277–292), and ST I, q. 84, art. 6, corp. (Leonina 5: 324a).
122.
Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 2, art. 5, corp. (Leonina 22.1.2: 63.286–289): “Illa enim quae est in intellectu nostro est accepta a re secundum quod res agit in intellectum nostrum agendo per prius in sensum.” My translation.
123.
Burnyeat, Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change ’ in Perception, 146. I have discussed Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology in more detail in Sect. 2.2.1 above.
124.
King, Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages, 85.
125.
I treat the “reacquisition” in the possible intellect of the intelligible forms that constitute the intellective habitus as similar to “acquisitive” psychic being-affected. On this “reacquisition” as a condition of “episodic” or “occurrent” thought, see Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
126.
Indeed, Aquinas affirms that there follows upon a sensitive undergoing an activity or “operation ” (operatio), a “judgement” (iudicium) about the proper sensibles (see Thomas Aquinas, Quodl. 8, q. 2, art. 1, corp.; for a different interpretation, according to which Aquinas’s iudicium is “introspective consciousness” and not “perceptual consciousness ,” see Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 138–142). Iudicare, along with discernere, is a translation of Aristotle’s κρίνειν; κρίνει at Aristotle, De anima 2.6, 418a14 is translated as iudicat (trans. James of Venice, ed. Gauthier, 294; trans. William of Moerbeke, ed. Gauthier, 119), whereas at De anima 3.2, 427a11 it is translated as discernunt or discernit (trans. James of Venice, ed. Gauthier, 409; trans. William of Moerbeke, ed. Gauthier, 182). Aquinas discusses the issue in his commentary on De anima (see Thomas Aquinas, In De anima II, lect. 23, 27). However, it does not seem to me that there is in Aquinas any systematization of the notions of iudicare and discernere comparable to those to which κρίσις was subjected by Alexander and the Neoplatonists. For them, it seems to identify the active dimension of all cognitive acts and is at the head of the third class of relations in Met. Δ.15, but it does not seem to me that Aquinas uses iudicium or discretio as the mark of the active aspect of cognition; on discretio in Aquinas, see Thomas Aquinas, In De anima II, lect. 27 (Leonina 45.1: 182.15). Moreover, Aquinas makes no use of these notions to explain the third class in Met. Δ.15.
127.
See Pini, Two Models of Thinking, who argues that the psychic (intellective) action follows upon the undergoing that results from the reception of the form, as does Bonino, in Thomas Aquinas, De la vérité: Question 2, 154. See also de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 3: L’acte de penser, vol. 1: La double révolution, 326–327 and 554.
128.
Thomas Aquinas, In De anima III, lect. 6 (Leonina 45.1: 230.33–34): “Et huiusmodi motus dicitur proprie operatio, ut sentire, intelligere et uelle.” My translation.
129.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, corp. (Leonina 5: 334a): “Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit.” My translation. See Aristotle, Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2.
130.
See Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, 53, 2nd redaction (Leonina 13: 21*a.6–35; Marietti 2: 323a–b). On the different redactions of this chapter, see Geiger, Les rédactions successives de Contra Gentiles I, 53 d’après l’autographe, which I follow for the reading of the text, and Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
131.
See Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
132.
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 85, art. 2, ad 3 (Leonina 5: 334b–335a): “In parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem: et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur.” My translation.
133.
Cajetan, In ST, ad loc. (Leonina 5: 335b): “Occurrit dubium, quia hoc in loco expresse dicitur quod sensus exterior secundum solam immutationem ab objecto operatur; et consequenter pure passive sensus videtur sentire. […] facillime patet ex littera responsio. Non enim ibi dicitur quod aliqua pars sensitiva perficiatur sola immutatione, sed dicitur quod operatur secundum solam immutationem: ubi manifeste praeter immutationem operatio ponitur. Est igitur differentia non in operando active, vel passive; sed in operando secundum solam formam quae producitur ab extra, et secundum formam quam ipsamet virtus sensitiva sibi ipsi parit.” My translation.
134.
One might be surprised that Aquinas affirms that the imagination produces a form both when it imagines a thing that is now absent, and when it imagines something it has never seen. If the cognition of a thing that has never been seen seems really to necessitate the production of a form, that of something that is absent but has already been seen seems able to be entertained simply by recalling a form that lies within the soul , as Aquinas himself seems to maintain in the first redaction of chapter 53 of Summa contra Gentiles 1. See Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53, 1st redaction (Leonina 13: 20*b.2–6 and 24–27; Marietti 2: 322a, b).
135.
This also seems to be maintained in the third redaction of SCG I, c. 53, nn. 2–3.
136.
Thomas Aquinas, De potentia q. 8, art. 1, corp. (ed. Marietti, 215a). See also Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53, 3rd redaction.
137.
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 53 (3rd redaction), n. 3, (ed. Marietti §443): “Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio.” My translation.
138.
De Libera, La querelle des universaux, 274–275.
139.
Amerini, Confused vs. Distinct Cognition. On the distinction between species and concept, see the detailed discussion in Taieb, Intellection in Aquinas, where this question is also treated in connection with Aquinas’s account of habit. See Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 322 and 326–328, who likewise maintains that intellection by means of the intelligible species alone and intellection by means of the concept coexist in Aquinas’s mature work.
140.
Aristotle, Met. 9.8, 1050a34–35. Translatio media, AL 25.2: 179.1–2: “non est aliud quid opus preter actionem.” Recensio Guillelmi, AL 25.3.2: 190.307: “non est aliquod opus preter actionem.”
141.
Augustine, De Trinitate 15.12.2, quoted in Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 7. For the progressive development of the notion of verbum in the thought of Augustine, see Panaccio, Le discours intérieur, 108–118. On all these issues, see also Paissac, Théologie du Verbe.
142.
See Thomas Aquinas, De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, c. 3, and Panaccio, Qu’est-ce qu’un concept?, 9.
143.
See Aristotle, De anima 2.5, 417b24–25, and Thomas Aquinas, In De anima, lib. 2, lect. 12 (Leonina 45.1: 115.37–63).
144.
Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 55, n. 4 (ed. Marietti, §458): “Vis cognoscitiva non cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit intentio.” My translation.
145.
Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 10, art. 2, ad 7 (Leonina 22.2.1: 302.216–226): “nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere nisi convertendo se ad obiectum suum, sicut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem; unde cum phantasma hoc modo se habeat ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in III De anima, quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem apud se intellectus habeat, numquam tamen actu aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem nisi convertendo se ad phantasma.” My translation
146.
Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, 135. See also Hayen, L’intentionnel selon Saint Thomas, 197–198. For a different reading, according to which the act of intentio precedes and “triggers” the turning, see Pini, Two Models of Thinking, 90.
147.
On the concept of intentio in Aquinas, see Simonin, La notion d’intentio dans l’oeuvre de saint Thomas d’Aquin; Hayen, L’intentionnel selon Saint Thomas; Gilson, Le thomisme, 313–319; Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 94–129; Hamesse and Portalupi, Approche lexicographique de l’intentionnalité et de la finalité dans l’oeuvre de Thomas d’Aquin. The Latin word intentio is used for at least two different ideas: (1) volition and (2) concept, the latter meaning arising from the Latin translations of the Arabic ma’nā, a term used by Avicenna especially, as noted in the introductory remarks of Sect. 2.2.3 above. See Engelhardt, Intentio; Knudsen, Intentions and Impositions; de Libera, Intention; Solère, Tension et intention. There is interesting research to be done on the connection between the ethical meaning of intentio, that is, meaning (1), and its cognitive meaning, that is, meaning (2). However, this would go beyond the scope of the present work.
148.
Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 13, art. 3, corp. (Leonina 22.2.2: 424.196–198): “ad actum alicuius cognoscitivae potentiae requiritur intentio, ut probat Augustinus in libro De Trinitate.” My translation. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 11.
149.
Augustine, De Trinitate 11.2.2: “Cum igitur aliquod corpus uidemus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dinoscenda. Primo ipsa res quam uidemus siue lapidem siue aliquam flammam siue quid aliud quod uideri oculis potest, quod utique iam esse poterat et antequam uideretur. Deinde uisio quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus. Tertio quod in ea re quae uidetur quamdiu uidetur sensum detinet oculorum, id est animi intentio.” Trans. McKenna, in On the Trinity, 61–62 (slightly modified). For the influence of Aristotle on Augustine, see Caston, Connecting Traditions, 37–38. For the connections between the Trinity and psychology in Augustine, as well as Aquinas’s interpretation of Augustine, see the discussions in de Libera, Archéologie du sujet, tome 1: Naissance du sujet.
150.
See Caston, Connecting Traditions, 39; Vanni Rovighi, La fenomenologia della sensazione in Sant’Agostino. Note that selective attention is not, according to Caston, the most restricted sense of intentio for Augustine, since this idea is connected above all with the “transcendent” character of cognitive acts , that is, the fact that they can “go beyond themselves” and be about their object.
151.
Augustine, De musica 6.5; Solère, Tension et intention, 76.
152.
Pasnau is not alone in maintaining that intentio in Aquinas is attentional. See Schmidt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 97–98; Hayen, L’intentionnel selon Saint Thomas, 170–174, 195–201; de Libera, Intention, 610–611. A recent detailed analysis of attention in Aquinas is found in Cory, Attention, Intentionality, and Mind-Reading in Aquinas’s De malo 16.8. For a justification of the assimilation of psychic action, intentio, and attention in Aquinas, see the discussion in Taieb, Intellection in Aquinas. On the active dimension of cognition in Augustine, see also Augustine, De Trinitate 11.12.18.
153.
Solère, Tension et intention, 77; Caston, Connecting Traditions, 40.
154.
Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 121; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, CAG Suppl. 2.1: 84.4–6; Plotinus, Enneads 3.6.1. On κρίσις in Alexander and in the Neoplatonists, see Sect. 2.2.2 above.
155.
Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber 5.24, quoted in Solère, Tension et intention, 78–79.
156.
Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium 3.5 (ed. Henry and Hadot, 199.5; ed. Locher, 119.8–33); Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplationiciens, 49.
157.
For this second definition, see Aristotle, Cat. 7, 8a32. For the influence of Aristotle’s theory of relations on the Stoics, see Mignucci, The Stoic Notion of Relatives, 166. For the connections between the Stoics and Augustine, see Caston, Connecting Traditions; see also Solère, Tension et intention, 85, which also partially links Augustine’s concept of intentio with Stoic thought. For the connections between Marius Victorinus and the Stoics, see Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, 236; Pierre Hadot, in Marius Victorinus, Traités théologiques 2, ad Adversus Arium 3.5.12. Note that Augustine’s theory of attention also played an important role in the early Middle Ages, in Abelard in particular, as shown by Rosier-Catach, Understanding as Attending.
158.
See Ilsetraut Hadot, Aspects de la théorie de la perception chez les néoplatoniciens, 55.
159.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 603 (Vat. 3: 356.6–9): “non est enim intelligibile quod sit intellectio vel volitio, et quod non sit alicuius termini; hoc autem competit actioni proprie dictae, ut transeat in aliquid ut in terminum.” My translation.
160.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I. d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 601 (Vat. 3: 354.6–7): “ergo non sunt actiones de genere actionis, sed sunt formae absolutae de genere qualitatis.” My translation.
161.
See Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
162.
John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §27, n. 81 (ed. Alluntis, 481): “Et ita ista distinctio actionis sic intellecta in transeuntem et immanentem non est generis in species, sed vocis in significationes. Nam actio transiens est vera actio de genere actionis, actio immanens est qualitas, sed aequivoce dicitur actio propter conditiones praedictas.” My translation. For similar considerations, see Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. XIII, q. 3, discussed in Côté, L’objet et la cause de la connaissance selon Godefroid de Fontaines, 415.
163.
John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §27, n. 81 (ed. Alluntis, 480–481), and Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 603 (Vat. 3: 355.6–356.2).
164.
John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §25, n. 72 (ed. Alluntis, 477).
165.
On this point, see also Pini, Two Models of Thinking.
166.
On this topic see especially John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 401–553 (Vat. 3: 245–330), and Quodl., q. 15. For a detailed description of the causal process in the psychology of Duns Scotus, see Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 511–543; Boulnois, Être et représentation, 78–88; de Muralt, L’enjeu de la philosophie médiévale, 112–127; Sondag, Introduction, in John Duns Scotus, L’image ; Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter, 185–230; Pini, Two Models of Thinking. For the various protagonists in the story about how to explain the genesis of cognitive acts , see the Sect. 2.2.3.1 on Aquinas just above.
167.
John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §27, n. 81 (ed. Alluntis, 482–483): “Potest actio de genere actionis dividi in actionem immanente, et transeuntem, sicut superius in inferiora. Nam, non solum ad formam inductam per motum in passum aliud ab agente est actio de genere actionis sed etiam ad formam inductam per mutationem in ipsomet agente. Illa enim forma absoluta, cum sit nova, est terminus alicuius actionis proprie dictae per quam accipit esse; quando igitur forma terminans actionem est extra ipsum agens; tunc actio illa transit; quando vero forma illa est in ipso agente, tunc actio est immanens.” My translation.
168.
John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, §28, n. 84 (ed. Alluntis, 482–483), and Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 537 (Vat. 3: 320.15–321.17).
169.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 470 (Vat. 3: 282.13–16).
170.
The reasons that Scotus appeals to for not classifying these acts as passions in general, including passions due to internal processes, are discussed in John Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 6, n. 171 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov, 235–236), and quoted in Pini, Two Models of Thinking, 97n50.
171.
John Duns Scotus, Lect. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 3, n. 392 (Vat. 16: 377.13–18): “Si Deus causaret actum intelligendi, specie non existente in intellectu, necessario adhuc est ibi obiectum praesens ut terminans actum intelligendi, quia includit contradictionem quod sit actus intelligendi et non respectu alicuius obiecti praesentis terminantis, et tamen, per potentiam, non est ibi species inchoans istum actum.” My translation.
172.
John Duns Scotus, In Met. 7, q. 14, n. 29 (OPh 4: 290.1–14): “Nam potentia cognitiva non tantum habet recipere speciem obiecti, sed etiam tendere per actum suum in obiectum. Et istud secundum est essentialius potentiae, quia primum requiritur propter imperfectionem potentiae. Et obiectum principalius est obiectum quia in ipsum tendit potentia, quam quia imprimit speciem. Quod patet: si Deus imprimeret speciem intellectui vel oculo, eodem modo ferretur in obiectum sicut modo, et obiectum ita esset obiectum. Sed Deus non esset obiectum, quia in ipsum non tendit potentia, et tamen ipse imprimit, sicut impressit angelo species creaturarum. Haec ergo est vera ‘cuiuslibet passivi est aliquod motivum per se.’ Sed non oportet in potentiis apprehensivis quod illud motivum sit proprium obiectum potentiae sub ratione qua est motivum, sed oportet quod ipsum, sub ratione qua obiectum, terminet actum potentiae.” My translation, for which I have consulted, here and below, Etzkorn and Wolter’s translation of Scotus’s commentary on the Metaphysics. Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, distinguishes in greater detail between the creation by God of an “occurrent thought” in the Lectura and the creation of a “representational form” in the commentary on the Metaphysics. On the latter text, see also Gilson, Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot, 144–145; Boulnois, Être et représentation, 85; Pasnau, Cognition, 288.
173.
John Duns Scotus, In primum librum Perihermeneias, q. 3, n. 4 (OPh 2: 61.23–62.1): “Quia destructa causa destruitur et effectus; res est causa speciei; igitur destruitur species, destructa re.” My translation.
174.
John Duns Scotus, In primum librum Perihermeneias, q. 3, n. 15 (OPh 2: 65.5–7): “Non-existens potest intelligi per speciem, non quam facit sed quam fecit in intellectu, quia illa species potest manere eadem quae et prius.” My translation.
175.
John Duns Scotus, In Met. 5, q. 11, n. 42 (OPh 3: 580.19–21): “Si tantum considerat, ergo illa in se res est vel fuit, et quandoque movet intellectum sicut rosa, licet nunc non exsistat.” My translation.
176.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 382 (Vat. 3: 233.6–8): “In primo signo naturae est obiectum in se vel in phantasmate praesens intellectui agenti.” My translation.
177.
On the relatio identica, see Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 54.
178.
By De imagine, I mean John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, where Scotus examines in detail questions connected with the theme of intentionality.
179.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481 (Vat. 3: 287.7–11): “Patet enim quod ipsa est causabilis a Deo immediate, ergo ab ipso solo non dependet essentialiter; quando etiam obiectum causat, non dependet identice, quia posset eadem aliunde causari (frequenter etiam est de non-ente).” My translation, following Sondag’s French version, in L’image, 184; for a different interpretation of this passage, according to which the antecedent of ipso in “ab ipso solo non dependet” is Deo and not obiectum, and in which the non is removed, as in the majority of the manuscripts, see Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 58n55.
180.
I take Scotus to exclude God as an alternative cause on this hypothesis, where he seems to turn to cases in which the act indeed bears a relation of natural causality. Moreover, the indeterminacy of aliunde seems to exclude God: would God be counted as the only non-natural cause in a list with “anything else”?
181.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.11–12). For more on the relation of termination , or the intentional relation , in Scotus, see the discussion below; and for the contrast with reference, see Sect. 4.1.2 below.
182.
See John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1 (Vat. 7: 391.4–410.14).
183.
Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, V–X, 5.1 (ed. Van Riet, 228.32–33). My translation.
184.
On the common nature in Scotus, see Owens, Common Nature; Boulnois, Réelles intentions; King, Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia; de Libera, La querelle des universaux, 329–343; Sondag, Universel et natura communis dans l’Ordinatio et dans les Questions sur le Perihermeneias; Tweedale, Scotus vs. Ockham; Noone, Universals and Individuation; Pini, Scotus on Universals.
185.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 32 (Vat. 7: 403.8–10): “Et secundum prioritatem naturalem est ‘quod quid est’ per se obiectum intellectus, et per se, ut sic, consideratur a metaphysico et exprimitur per definitionem.”
186.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 380–381 (Vat. 3: 231.9–232.11).
187.
See especially Husserl, Intentionale Gegenstände.
188.
See John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dd. 36 and 43 (Vat. 6: 271.1–298.15 and 351.1–361.18), and Lect. I, d. 36 (Vat. 17: 461.1–476.7), as well as Quodl., q. 3, §2, n. 7 (ed. Alluntis, 93). On these questions, see Boulnois, Être et représentation, 432–452; Honnefelder, Die Lehre von der doppelten ratitudo entis und ihre Bedeutung für die Metaphysik des Johannes Duns Scotus; Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 45–56.
189.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 36, n. 58 (Vat. 6: 294.21–295.5).
190.
John Duns Scotus, In primum librum Perihermeneias, q. 2, n. 49 (OPh 2: 58.16–21), and In duos libros Perihermeneias I, q. 4, n. 18 (OPh 2: 161.1–2). See also John Duns Scotus, Add. Magnae I, d. 43, §14 (Wadding 11.1: 229b), quoted in Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 109.
191.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 480 (Vat. 3: 287.5–6): “Obiectum potest non esse actu exsistente.” My translation and emphasis, supplying obiectum, which appears in some manuscripts. Thus, the case that Scotus is talking about in the De imagine seems not to be one in which the causal object no longer exists, as in the previously mentioned examples of the rose or the relation, but one in which the causal object never existed in the first place, and is only possible.
192.
Cross, Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species, 148.
193.
On this question, see Pini, Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts.
194.
Pini, Can God Create My Thoughts?, 58.
195.
John Duns Scotus, In Met. 5, q. 11, n. 57 (OPh 3: 585.17–586.7): “Quomodo sumuntur tres modi quos ponit Aristoteles? Responsio: omnis relatio termini et terminati pertinet ad tertium modum. Primo enim refertur terminus, sicut obiectum est terminus actus vel habitus vel potentiae; secundo omnis terminus etiam quantorum et motus. Ad secundum modum pertinet omnis relatio causae et effectus, maxime efficientis et materiae. Ad primum modum: omnis relatio totius cuiuscumque et partis, et universaliter magis et minus.” My translation.
196.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.7–17).
197.
See also Demange, Jean Duns Scot: La théorie du savoir, 209.
198.
This position is defended by Sondag in John Duns Scotus, L’image, ad q. 2, n. 479.
199.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 479 (Vat. 3: 286.17).
200.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 415–416 (Vat. 3: 252.1–253.7). On Olivi’s terminative cause , see the introductory remarks of Sect. 2.2.3 above. On the excitative cause in James of Viterbo, see James of Viterbo, Quodl. I, q. 12, ed. Ypma, 172.521–522; Côté, Introduction, in James of Viterbo, L’âme, l’intellect et la volonté; Côté, Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities.
201.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 478 (Vat. 3: 286.4–6): “Non enim tantummodo intellectio est ab obiecto ut a causa efficiente, totali vel partiali, sed est ad ipsum ut ad terminans, sive ut circa quod ipsa est.” My translation. On the rejection of in quod, see John Duns Scotus, In Met. 5, q. 11, n. 92 (OPh 3: 595.14–596.8). Scotus himself does not always observe these distinctions: see, e.g., In Met. 7, q. 14, n. 29, OPh 4: 290.1–14, and Quodl., q. 13, §11, n. 35 (ed. Alluntis, 459), where he describes the cognitive object as in quod, and especially Rep. I-A, d. 3, q. 6, n. 191 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov, 241–242), where circa quod is used for both cognition and transitive action .
202.
See Sect. 2.1 above.
203.
See Brentano, M 88, Über die Kategorien, 1916, nn. 31008–31011 (Kategorienlehre, 239–242), and M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046 (Kategorienlehre, 275–277). On the fact that in Brentano cognitive “activities” are always passions, see Mulligan, Brentano on the Mind, 70. I thank Guillaume Fréchette for informing me that the edition of the Kategorienlehre made by Alfred Kastil is not trustworthy, since some of the original texts have been altered. Therefore, for quotations from the texts published in the Kategorienlehre I will almost always rely on the original manuscripts. As a precaution, I will do the same for texts drawn from Brentano, Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, which, though it was edited by Stephan Körner and Roderick Chisholm, relies on work begun by Kastil. On Brentano’s Nachlaß, see Mayer-Hillebrand, Franz Brentanos wissenschaftlicher Nachlaß; J.C.M. Brentano, The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano; Binder, Franz Brentanos philosophischer Nachlass. On debates about the editorial choices concerning the posthumous works of Brentano, see Srzednicki, Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano, and A Reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand, along with Mayer-Hillebrand, Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano: A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki.
204.
Brentano, M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046 (Kategorienlehre, 275–277): “[W]ir denken etwas nur so lange, als wir zum Denken bewegt werden.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 195.
205.
See Aristotle, Met. Θ.6, 1048b18–36 and Θ.8, 1050a23–b2, together with the discussion in Sect. 2.2.3.1 above.
206.
Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51001–51002: “Das Vorstellende wird sehr mißverständlich Subjekt genannt; man sollte es das Objektivierende oder Objizierende nennen, denn das Objekt als objektiviertes objiziertes correlatio ist.” My translation.
207.
See Brentano, M 96, Ontologie (Metaphysik), from 1867 onwards, lecture 39, quoted and dated in Chrudzimski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, 79; Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 125n1; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 106n67.
208.
See Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 23–24 (trans. Müller, Descriptive Psychology , 26). See also Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 31–65, and Grundzüge der Ästhetik, 38–40, all quoted in the Introduction (Chap. 1) above. On the possibility that Brentano has an active notion of mental act , but especially on the fact that further inquiry is needed on this topic, see Sheredos, Brentano’s Act Psychology Was Not Aristotelian (Or Else, Not Empirical); in my opinion, this further work will depend to a large extent on the discovery of relevant texts in the Nachlaß.
209.
Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 185; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 150: “die Unterordnung des Begriffspaares, Hören und Tönen, und das des Leidens und Wirkens [ist] gänzlich verfehlt.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 101.
210.
Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 185; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 150: “Der Begriff Ton ist kein relativer Begriff.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 101.
211.
See Antonelli, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionelle,’ 477. On the grasping by inner perception of the whole of which that perception is a part, see Textor, Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness, 425–430. On consciousness in Brentano more generally, see Fugali, Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit des Seienden. On the unity of consciousness, see Dewalque, Brentano’s Mind, and Textor, Brentano’s Mind, 246–272.
212.
Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 185; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 150: “[…] so würde nicht das Hören ein secundäres, sondern mit dem Tone zugleich das primäre Object des psychischen Actes sein […].” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 101.
213.
Brentano, M 32, Vom Relativen, 1889, n. 30285: “They cannot be thought without each other” (my translation: [Sie können] ohne einander nicht gedacht werden). See also Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, 45: “The one not only cannot be without the other, but also cannot be known without the other” (my translation: das Eine [kann] nicht bloß nicht ohne das Andere sein, sondern auch nicht ohne dasselbe erkannt werden), quoted in Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 5.
214.
See Sauer, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, 11: “Der Ton ist primäres Objekt des psychischen Aktes Hören-des-Tones. […] Der gehörte-Ton ist primäres Objekt des psychischen Aktes Hören-des-Tones. […] Das Hören-des-Tones ist primäres Objekt des psychischen Aktes Hören-des-Tones.” See also Antonelli, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, xxxiv.
215.
Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles, 82–83, quoted in Sect. 2.1 above. Trans. George, in The Psychology of Aristotle, 56 (slightly modified).
216.
Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 28; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 35: “Wir haben gesehen, von welcher Art die Erkenntniss ist, welche der Naturforscher zu erringen vermag. Die Phänomene des Lichtes, des Schalles, der Wärme, des Ortes und der örtlichen Bewegung, von welchen er handelt, sind nicht Dinge, die wahrhaft und wirklich bestehen. Sie sind Zeichen von etwas Wirklichem, was durch seine Einwirkung ihre Vorstellung erzeugt. Aber sie sind desshalb kein entsprechendes Bild dieses Wirklichen, und geben von ihm nur in sehr unvollkommenem Sinne Kenntniss. Wir können sagen, es sei etwas vorhanden, was unter diesen und jenen Bedingungen Ursache dieser und jener Empfindung werde; wir können auch wohl nachweisen, dass ähnliche Verhältnisse wie die, welche die räumlichen Erscheinungen, die Grössen und Gestalten zeigen, darin vorkommen müssen. Aber dies ist dann auch Alles. An und für sich tritt das, was wahrhaft ist, nicht in die Erscheinung, und das, was erscheint, ist nicht wahrhaft. Die Wahrheit der physischen Phänomene ist, wie man sich ausdrückt, eine bloss relative Wahrheit.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 14.
217.
Brentano, Psychologie I, ed. Kraus, 250; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 195: “Das aber, worauf sich diese psychischen Thätigkeiten als auf ihren Inhalt beziehen, und was uns in Wahrheit als Aeusseres erscheint, besteht in Wirklichkeit eben so wenig ausser uns als in uns, es ist ein blosser Schein; wie ja eigentlich auch die physischen Phänomene, die uns im Wachen erscheinen, ohne Wirklichkeit sind, die ihnen entspräche, obwohl man häufig das Gegentheil annimmt.” Trans. Rancurello et al., in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 136.
218.
Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, 44: “Wir erkennen etwas nicht, wenn wir es nicht als das, was es ist, also an sich, erkennen. Wer ein Phänomen erkennt, welches die Wirkung einer ihm unbekannten Ursache ist, der erkennt die Ursache gar nicht, das Phänomen aber als das, was es ist, also an sich. Es ist ein Unfug, zu sagen, daß wir, wenn wir das Phänomen erkennen, nicht das Phänomen an sich erkennen, sondern das Ding, welches Ursache des Phänomens ist, und das uns bei seinem Mangel an Ähnlichkeit mit dem Phänomens trotz der Erkenntnis des Phänomens ganz unerkannt bleibt, phänomenal erkennen.” My translation. It is in Auguste Comte, among others, that Brentano finds a theory of the phenomenon opposed to that of Kant; see Brentano, Auguste Comte und die positive Philosophie. On these questions, see Benoist, Le naturalisme de Brentano; Fisette, Franz Brentano et le positivisme d’Auguste Comte; and Seron, Brentano’s ‘Descriptive’ Realism.
219.
Brentano, M 89, Über die Kategorien, 1916, n. 31046 (Kategorienlehre, 276): “In manchen Fällen macht sich das, wovon das Denken bewirkt wird in seiner Besonderheit bemerklich, wie z.B. beim Schliessen, beim motivierten Wollen, bei der Erkenntnis eines Axioms ex terminis, bei der Liebe von etwas, die aus der Vorstellung des Objektes selbst entspringt. Anderemal macht sich dagegen das Wirkende oder Bewegende nur ganz im allgemeinen bemerklich, sodass der Erleidung nur der Charakter eines von irgendetwas Bewirktem anhaftet. So scheint es z. B. beim Sehen, Hören und anderem Empfinden der Fall zu sein. Dass wir von dem, was das primäre Objekt der Empfindung ist, bewegt werden, ist nicht richtig, allein gemeiniglich neigt man zu dieser Annahme, indem man wahrnimmt, dass man von etwas zum Empfinden bewegt wird, und damit das primäre Objekt des Empfindens, das selbst von diesem verschieden ist und zugleich mit ihm erscheint, identifiziert. Sogar nachdem die Erfahrung längst aufs deutlichste gezeigt hat, dass die primären Objekte nicht so wie sie uns erscheinen in Wirklichkeit sind, finden Viele Schwierigkeit sich von dem Wahne freizumachen.” Trans. Chisholm and Guterman, in The Theory of Categories, 195–196 (slightly modified). Brentano’s source here is perhaps Descartes, Le Monde, AT 11: 3.1–4.19, or Locke, Essay, II, 8, 15.
220.
Brentano, Ps 34, Von den Relationen, 1908, nn. 51041–51042: “Das Leidende kann nicht leidend sein ohne Tätiges, wenn es auch denkbar scheint, daß es dasselbe Leidende sei, während das Tätige nicht dasselbe ist. So könnte einer den selben Sinneseindruck, den er von einem [Körper empfangen hat,] gewiß auch von einem anderen Körper und jedenfalls von Gott empfange[n;] das Leidende wäre dann dasselbe, das Tätige aber nicht mehr.” My translation.
221.
John Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 481, Vat. 3: 287.7–11: “Patet enim quod ipsa est causabilis a Deo immediate, ergo ab ipso solo non dependet essentialiter; quando etiam obiectum causat, non dependet identice, quia posset eadem aliunde causari (frequenter etiam est de non-ente).” My translation, following Sondag’s French version, in L’image, 184.
222.
Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, 136: “Offenbar [sind dies], in sich selbst genommen, homogene, ja ununterscheidbar gleiche Erscheinungen. Gemeiniglich [zählt man sie] darum zu den Empfindungen. Und mit recht; besonders vom deskriptiven Standpunkt [sind sie] keine andere Klasse” (editor’s additions). Trans. Müller, in Descriptive Psychology , 146 (slightly modified).
223.
Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntis, ed. Kraus, 54n19; ed. Binder and Chrudzimski, 62n19: “Auch von dieser Lehre finden sich die ersten Keime bei Aristoteles, vgl. insbes. Metaph. Δ 15 p. 1021 a 29.” Trans. Chisholm and Schneewind, in The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, 9n19.
224.
Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, 117: “[Aristoteles] teilte die Relationen in drei Klassen, von denen die eine die komparativen, die andere die kausalen, die dritte die intentionalen Relationen enthielt.” Trans. Chisholm et al., in The True and the Evident, 70.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
Hamid Taieb

Authors

Hamid Taieb
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Taieb, H. (2018). Psychic Causality. In: Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition. Primary Sources in Phenomenology(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_2

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98887-0_2
Published: 29 December 2018
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-98886-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-98887-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics