Abstract
This chapter focuses on monetary policy since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC ), and the subsequent ‘Great Recession ’ (GR). In effect, and since the GFC and GR, monetary policy makers have abandoned the main policy instrument that had been around prior to the GFC. The pre-GFC monetary policy had focused on manipulating the rate of interest to achieve an Inflation Target (IT), the only objective of monetary policy, namely price stability. In view of the rate of interest reduced to nearly zero after the GFC, monetary policy makers introduced unconventional means to achieve their ITs, namely, Quantitative Easing (QE ) along with very low, near-zero and in some cases negative, interest rates . They also introduced financial stability as a new objective, but IT is still around. We discuss these developments in the case of the main economies, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
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Notes
- 1.
Not only because of poor output growth expectations but also because of the imposition of lower leverage ratios, which means that banks could not provide more credit in view of the significant increase in their regulatory capital ratios. Reduction of capital requirements would have been more helpful (Goodhart 2015).
- 2.
Financial frictions, namely stickiness in making transactions, though, have been introduced into the NCM model more recently. King (2012), however, argues that ‘no one of these frictions seems large enough to play a part in a macroeconomic model of financial stability . So it is not surprising that it has proved hard to find examples of frictions that generate quantitatively interesting trade-offs between price and financial stability … overwhelmingly the most important objective remains stabilisation of inflation ’.
- 3.
King (2016) suggests that the DSGE models, which are employed by central banks , ‘afford little role for money or banks, a property that has been a source of embarrassment, both intellectual and practical’ (p. 305).
- 4.
See, also, Arestis and González Martinez 2015, for a discussion of further problems with the NCM theoretical framework and its IT policy implications.
- 5.
A number of Asian countries managed to avoid the most serious aspects of the crisis. Precautionary measures after the 1997 Asian crisis, in the form of buildup of large foreign reserves, reduced exposure to foreign borrowing, and tighter controls over their banking systems, helped greatly. Some of the Latin American countries also managed similarly.
- 6.
The bailout of Citigroup in the US over the weekend of 22–23 November 2008 left a ‘sour taste’ to those who recalled that this financial institution was a prime protagonist in the 1999 repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act (Eichengreen 2015).
- 7.
The FSA was formed in May 1997 to supervise individual financial institutions, with the BoE retaining the overall responsibility. Following the GFC , the FSA became two separate regulatory authorities: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) that regulates the financial services industry and is accountable directly to the Treasury and Parliament. And the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which is part of the BoE and responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms. PRA should also facilitate effective competition in banking and insurance. There is also the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), which is an official committee of the BoE, a new body responsible for macroprudential measures. It focuses on the macroeconomic and financial issues that may threaten long-term growth prospects. The FPC has taken over operational responsibility for managing the financial sector from the FSA, with legislation enacted in 2013. It cooperates and coordinates action with PRA and FCA.
- 8.
An interesting aspect of the UK APF is to avoid intrusion into the fiscal territory. The assets bought are held entirely by the Treasury with the Bank lending money to APF at the policy rate. The interest earned is returned to the Treasury under the terms of the APF dedicated account.
- 9.
Covered bonds are securities issued by credit institutions, and are secured by a protected pool of high-quality assets. They are subject to regulatory authorisation and supervision. Covered bonds typically carry a 2–10 year maturity, and originated in the European bond market. As of 2009, 24 European countries allow covered bond instruments to be issued and sold.
- 10.
A problem, which has arisen recently for the ECB, is in terms of the Contingent Convertible Capital Instruments (CoCos) securities—the latest version is labelled as Additional Tier1 (AT1) bonds. These are securities issued by banks, designed to enhance their capital levels in case of crises (see, for example, Ardjiev et al. 2013); and also to prevent taxpayer bailouts in the case of financial crises. CoCos are capital securities that absorb losses when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain level. They force losses on investors through conversion into equity or be written down, when a bank’s capital falls below the relevant level, typically between 5% and 7%. Under European relative rules, large banks should raise a proportion of their total capital from AT1s to 1.5% of their Risk Weighted Assets by 2019. Recently, these CoCos have caused panic amongst investors in that the rules for CoCos are by far too complicated; and in the case of a financial crisis could undermine a bank’s financial position rather than strengthen it.
- 11.
King (2016) provides relevant QE figures, ‘£375 billion by the Bank of England , almost 20% of GDP , and €2.7 trillion by the Federal Reserve, around 15% of GDP’ (p. 183). In the case of the Central Bank of Japan with the recent ‘QQE’ (see footnote 13), the Bank’s balance sheet is of the same order of magnitude as annual GDP.
- 12.
Asian central banks from China to Singapore and India also pledged more than $685 billion in QEs, with similar attempts in Latin America. The Bank of Japan introduced QE in March 2001; in April 2013, QE was changed to the acronym ‘Quantitative and Qualitative Easing’ (QQE). It is QQE since this framework intends to change the asset composition of the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet and thereby affect asset prices. QQE was changed to ‘QQE with a Negative Interest Rate’ (February 2016), −0.1% on current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank. Again changed in October 2016 to ‘QQE with Yield Curve Control’ for the specific aim to strengthen monetary easing (keep the short-term rate at −0.1% and at zero the ten-year government bond interest rate); the aim is to achieve the price stability target, 2% of CPI. Japan’s interest rates have been extra-low for a long time; they hit zero for the first time in February 1999 to fight deflation.
- 13.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the FPC of the BoE has been given new powers to curb buy-to-let lending. The relevant announcement was on 16 November 2016 to commence early 2017. Under this regulation, banks and building societies must ensure they do not lend more than 15% of residential mortgages at more than 4.5 times a borrower’s income.
- 14.
The Bank of England (2012) report shows that its QE programme increased the value of the relevant financial assets by 26% with 40% of the gains having gone to the richest 5% of holders. The QE has also caused share prices to increase by 20%, which enhances the wealth of shareowners, but may lower it if boosting of house prices occurs. This, though, has not materialised in view of the fact that the owners of the UK ’s shares is the richest 5%, who do not spend this extra wealth but investing it instead in the stock market to benefit from the rising stock prices. Similar results are relevant for the US economy, where the top 5% of wealthiest households own 82% of all individually held stocks and more than 90% of the individually held bonds (Hughes Hallett 2015). In the case of the EMU, Draghi (2016b) argues that the effects of the ECB QE and negative interest rates since mid-2014 have had no distributional effects ‘because house prices within the euro area went up over the period, while bond prices on average rose modestly and stock prices on average actually fell’. A recent Bank of International Settlements study (Domanski et al. 2016) argues that unconventional monetary policy has contributed to rising wealth inequality in advanced economies since the GFC and GR, essentially through increasing equity prices.
- 15.
An interesting recent survey, has been conducted by the Centre for Macroeconomics and the Centre for Economic Policy (available at: http://cfmsurvey.org/surveys/future-central-bank-independence) and canvassed the views of 70 European economists. The survey notes that raising inflation might require active fiscal policy , which could effectively reduce independence. In addition, the new responsibilities taken by central banks , since the GFC , require cooperation with other public authorities, which could influence independence.
- 16.
German and Dutch politicians try to persuade the Governor of the ECB to abandon the policy of negative interest rates . This is not surprising because the citizens of these countries have a great deal of savings accounts and aversion to borrowing; low and negative interest rates is anathema for these citizens.
- 17.
Sovereign debt with negative yields below the −0.4% interest rate is excluded from the ECB’s QE . This is to avoid losses for the ECB.
- 18.
Inflation that does not include energy and food prices was 0.9% in December 2016.
- 19.
The Swiss National Bank set its deposit rate below zero in December 2014 in view of currency appreciation pressures; and pushed its deposit rate further down in January 2015 for similar reasons. The Danish National Bank, in July 2012, set its deposit rate below zero in response to rising capital inflows; and, following the ECB, reduced its rate further in September 2014. Other central banks set negative rates for similar reasons to ECB’s. The Japan Central Bank adopted negative interest rates in February 2016 (see, footnote 13). The Swedish Central Bank introduced negative interest rates in February 2015, and even lower in May and September 2015. The National Bank of Hungary introduced negative interest rates in March 2016. On 11 February 2016, Janet Yellen, the US Federal Reserve Chair, stated at a Congressional hearing that negative rates would be possible in the United States under ‘very adverse’ conditions.
- 20.
The Fitch credit rating agency estimates show that $10 trillion negative–yielding government bonds cost investors annually around $24 trillion (Financial Times, 21 May 2016). It is also the case that German banks have accused the ECB for punishing savers and their business model with negative interest rates ; and Japanese banks raised the issue of ending their sales of government debt to the central bank (Financial Times, 9 June 2016).
- 21.
There is also evidence that negative interest rates have harmed French banks. For example, the French bank Crédit Agricole reported on 15 February 2017 (Financial Times, 16 February 2017) a 67% fall in their 2016 fourth quarter profits. In the United Kingdom, National Westminster Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, and Lloyds Banking Group are the first banks to have warned business customers at negative interest rates on current accounts could be introduced, if the BoE base rate was reduced below 0%. The building society Nationwide blamed low interest rates for a 16% fall in their 2016 profits. The Royal Bank of Scotland, however, is the first UK bank to impose negative interest rates on the deposits of corporate customers, or very wealthy people, as from 22 August 2016. Similar examples are the Bank of Ireland (as from 10 October 2016), and a couple of banks in Germany and Switzerland.
- 22.
Eichengreen (2015, p. 12) suggests that the EMU single currency does not work; what is urgently required is a single supervisor, a single deposit insurance scheme and a single resolution mechanism for bad banks. See, also, Arestis (2016a) where it is argued that a full banking union is urgently required, which would be greatly helped if political integration emerged.
- 23.
The Fed introduced the ‘forward guidance’ strategy in December 2008, and the BoE introduced this strategy in August 2013. The Fed announced that it would keep the federal funds rate low so long as unemployment was above 6.5%. Similarly, the BoE announced that so long as the unemployment rate remained close to 7%, its bank rate would remain low. The purpose of this policy is to increase transparency and influence expected policy rates and inflation expectations. However, by February 2014 in the case of the BoE and by December 2015 in the Fed case, announced that no longer their policies would be linked to a particular economic indicator; more general economic conditions would dictate changes in interest rates .
- 24.
In the United States, there is the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which monitors systemic risk; the Fed, though, lacks appropriate macroprudential powers. In the United Kingdom, there is the FPC and the PRA (see footnote 8). In the euro area, there is the European Systemic Risk Board with national governments having no representation on it; the ECB has no financial stability mandate.
- 25.
The Financial Stability Board (see footnote 29) at its May 2016 meeting proposed the introduction for the ‘global systemically important banks’ (30 in all) and by 2022 a ratio of at least 18% of total loss-absorbing capacity in relation to Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs); or 15% of their total liabilities.
- 26.
These macroprudential instruments are: ‘caps on the loan-to-value ratio, caps on the debt -to-income ratio, ceilings on credit growth , reserve requirements, countercyclical capital requirements and time-varying/dynamic provisioning’ (Lim et al. 2011, p. 4).
- 27.
The Survey is undertaken on a quarterly basis by the euro area countries’ central banks , and is (available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html).
- 28.
The FSB ‘is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system’ (http://www.fsb.org/about/). The progress reports from the FSB (available at: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Implementation-dashboard.pdf) outline definite improvements in stability-enhancing financial regulations in 24 of the world’s largest economies; high marks are given to all 24 countries in implementing the Basel III risk-based capital requirements. However, Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that the Basel III risk-based capital requirements are not sufficiently high.
- 29.
Countercyclical capital buffers, or systemic risk buffers, are part of a bank’s capital, which is held separately from their other operations and to be utilised in the case of financial shocks. They can help banks to continue lending even in times of stress, thereby maintaining stability in the financial system.
- 30.
It is actually the case that US shadow banking between the years 2002 and 2007 not only did it increase in size but also became larger than the traditional banking sector in terms of gross assets. The main reason was because it was free, and still is, of most of the regulations that apply to the banking sector (King 2016).
- 31.
The new President of the United States has repeatedly suggested that the Dodd-Frank will be repealed. This, in this view, is simply because the Act has stopped banks to provide credit where is needed. In fact, the President ordered a review of Dodd-Frank in early February 2017 with a relevant report expected by early June 2017. The Governor of the Fed defended the Dodd-Frank during a testimony to lawmakers on the 15th of February 2017, arguing that there was no evidence that it had hurt banks (Financial Times, 16 February 2017).
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Arestis, P. (2017). Monetary Policy Since the Global Financial Crisis. In: Arestis, P., Sawyer, M. (eds) Economic Policies since the Global Financial Crisis. International Papers in Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60459-6_1
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