Abstract
Backsliding on the rule of law and control of corruption in several EU countries is a threat to EU cohesion. It not only undermines solidarity between EU member states, but also puts a brake on investment and economic growth. Such developments reinforce the centrifugal forces of popular dissent with the EU. To counter these disintegrating forces, the EU member states need to engage in new measures to counter negative developments in governance. One such measure would be to give individuals the right of appeal in European courts. However, any move towards better governance in the EU would require treaty changes, as the existing tools (Article 7, in particular) are not effective.
Gratefully acknowledging the comments from Joris van Bergen, Thomas Conzelmann, Holger Hinte, Milena Nikoleva and Ellen Vos on an earlier version. Margard Ody provided excellent assistence in the literature search and Mueid Al Raee made the figures 2 and 3.
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- 1.
Here Papajoannou (2016) could also have mentioned countries like Bulgaria and Romania.
- 2.
After the mad cow (bse) crises in 1996 and other food scandals there was for example a huge trust and credibility problem for the eu in relation of science-based decision-making which led tot he creation oft he Europea Food Safety authority; precisely to (re) gain trust in EU decision- and rule making (see also Löfstedt 2005).
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Measured by the Eurobarometer answers to the question: Do you feel your country is better off in the EU? Negative answers are interpreted as “Eurosceptic.”
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The Venice Commission is an advisory body of the Council of Europe, composed of independent experts in the field of constitutional law. It was created in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin wall, at a time of urgent need for constitutional assistance in Central and Eastern Europe. The Commission's official name is the European Commission for Democracy through Law, but it is usually referred to as the “Venice Commission”, where sessions take place four times a year.
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The Dutch parliament rejected, for example, a European prosecutor’s role for fraud with European subsidies in 2016.
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Appendix: How to Control Corruption (from: EU, European Commission First Anti-Corruption Report, 2009)
Appendix: How to Control Corruption (from: EU, European Commission First Anti-Corruption Report, 2009)
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1.
Control Mechanisms
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Use of preventive policies (e.g. ethical rules, awareness-raising measures, easy access to public interest information). There are large differences between Member States concerning prevention of corruption. For some, effective prevention has contributed to a strong reputation of little corruption; others have implemented preventive policies in an uneven way and with limited results.
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External and internal control mechanisms. In many Member States, internal controls on procedures within public authorities (particularly at local level) are weak and uncoordinated.
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Conflicts of interest. Rules on conflicts of interest vary across the EU and the mechanisms for checking declarations of conflicts of interest are often insufficient. Sanctions for violations of rules are rarely applied and often weak.
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2.
Prosecution and Punishment
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Criminal law making corruption a crime is largely in place, in line with the standards of the Council of Europe, UN and EU legislation. Still, EU Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector has been transposed by Member States into national law in uneven way.
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The efficiency of law enforcement and prosecution in investigating corruption varies widely across the EU. Outstanding results can be seen in some Member States. In some others successful prosecutions are rare or investigations lengthy.
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Comprehensive corruption crime statistics are missing in most Member States, complicating comparison and assessment. Procedural rules, including rules on lifting immunities of politicians, obstruct corruption cases in certain Member States.
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Political Dimension
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Political accountability. Integrity in politics remains an issue for many EU States. For instance, codes of conduct within political parties or elected assemblies at the central or local level are often missing or lack teeth.
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Financing of political parties. Although many Member States have adopted stronger rules on party financing, considerable shortcomings remain. Dissuasive sanctions against illegal party funding are rarely imposed in the EU.
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Risk Areas
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Within Member States, corruption risks are generally higher at regional and local levels, where checks and balances and internal controls tend to be weaker than at the central level.
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Urban development and construction as well as health care are sectors vulnerable to corruption in a number of Member States.
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Some shortcomings exist regarding the supervision of state-owned companies, increasing their vulnerability to corruption.
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Petty corruption remains a widespread problem only in a few Member States.
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Public Procurement: An Area Vulnerable to Corruption
The Report includes a special chapter on public procurement. This is a very important area for the EU economy, as approximately one fifth of the EU’s GDP is spent every year by public entities buying goods, work and services. It is also an area vulnerable to corruption.
The Report calls for stronger integrity standards in the area of public procurement and suggests improvements in control mechanisms in a number of Member States. Detailed information and specific points suggested for further attention can be found in the country chapters.
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Ritzen, J. (2017). In Europe We Trust. In: Ritzen, J. (eds) A Second Chance for Europe. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57723-4_4
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