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Codes for Detection of Limited View Algebraic Tampering

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Book cover Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10143))

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Abstract

Tamper resilient cryptography has recently gained attention, and novel coding solutions have been proposed. One such solutions is Tamper Detection (TD) codes that are used to detect tampering with a codeword when the tampering function belongs to a specified family of functions. We consider TD codes when the class of functions consists of functions where the adversary first selects a subset of size \(\rho n\) of the codeword components to see, and then uses this view to choose a noise vector that will be added (algebraically) to the codeword (n is the codeword length). We show it is impossible to construct codes that protect against tampering of all functions in this class. By removing the set of bad functions from the class, we obtain a subset of this family for which tamper detection codes exist, and give a construction of tamper detection codes for this subset. We discuss our results and directions for future work.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The study in [7, 9, 16] are specific to \(q=2\)..

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada

    Fuchun Lin, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini & Pengwei Wang

Authors
  1. Fuchun Lin
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  2. Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
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  3. Pengwei Wang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fuchun Lin .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Science, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China

    Kefei Chen

  2. Institute of Information Engineering, SKLOIS, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  3. Snapchat Inc., Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Lin, F., Safavi-Naini, R., Wang, P. (2017). Codes for Detection of Limited View Algebraic Tampering. In: Chen, K., Lin, D., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-54704-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-54705-3

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