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Bootleggers and Baptists in the Garden of Good and Evil: Understanding America’s Entangled Economy

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Book cover Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.

Part of the book series: The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences ((EHES,volume 18))

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Abstract

The U.S. is a regulatory state where major industries and firms throughout the economy are subject to extensive command and control regulation. Put another way, America is an entangled economy where concepts of seperate private from public enterprises and occasional intervention to affect market outcomes no longer apply. There is regulation at every margin. Drawing on the Bootlegger/Baptist theory, this chapter seeks to explain how special interest group demand for command-and-control regulation, as opposed to other forms of regulation, such as the use of performance standards and economic incentives, has accommodated and reinforced the rise of the regulatory state. The chapter traces the evolution of regulation theory to the present and then provides evidence on the rise of regulation and its effects.

The authors are Associate Director of Research at the Center for Politics & Governance and Lecturer at the Economics Department, University of Texas at Austin and Dean Emeritus, College of Business and Behavioral Science, Clemson University and Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Economics, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, respectively.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The ideas in this section originated in Shamoun (2013).

  2. 2.

    People love to drink even though it may offer no material profit; people love to cash checks from their ownership stake in coal-powered electric plants, even though it may offer no psychic benefit.

  3. 3.

    Baptists may be said to use threats/coercion, but not directly. They would refer to eternal damnation, or to catastrophic damage to the environment, or depletion of resources, etc., but these are always external theoretical threats and come as the result of having performed the activity itself, not threats of arbitrary force here and now with the purpose of preventing the activity from taking place.

  4. 4.

    RegData is available at http://regdata.org.

  5. 5.

    This conclusion is adapted from a line by Anthony de Jasay (1985, 7) in The State: “It seems to me almost incontrovertible that the prescriptive content of any dominant ideology coincides with the interest of the state rather than, as in Marxist theory, with that of the ruling class. In other words, the dominant ideology is one that, broadly speaking, tells the state what it wants to hear, but more importantly what it wants its subjects to overhear.”

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Correspondence to Dima Yazji Shamoun .

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Shamoun, D.Y., Yandle, B. (2016). Bootleggers and Baptists in the Garden of Good and Evil: Understanding America’s Entangled Economy. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.. The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_3

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