Abstract
This chapter focuses on the fitness-contribution theory of function, which holds, roughly, that the function of a trait consists in its typical contribution to the fitness of the organisms that possess it. I begin by surveying several different theories within this family, and I show why any plausible version must include a statistical element. I then pose three questions that any proponent of the fitness-contribution theory must answer. First, is fitness a relative notion? When one says a trait “contributes to fitness,” is one saying it contributes to fitness better than some alternative? If so, when we attribute a function to a trait, how do we specify the relevant alternatives? Second, is fitness relative to specific environments? If so, then when we attribute a function to a trait, how do we specify the relevant environments? Third, what precisely must a trait contribute to in order to have a function? Is it survival, reproduction, inclusive fitness, or something else? I then critically assess a major argument in its favor, namely, that it coheres well with the way biologists actually use the term. I consider three different interpretations of this claim and I argue that it does not, in fact, provide an advantage over the selected effects theory in this regard. I close by considering how well it satisfies the adequacy conditions set out in Chap. 1. Theorists disagree about whether the fitness-contribution theory can make sense of the explanatory and normative aspects of function and I survey those disagreements.
Keywords
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Amundson, R., & Lauder, G. V. (1994). Function without purpose: The uses of causal role function in evolutionary biology. Biology and Philosophy, 9, 443–469.
Bechtel, W. (1986). Teleological function analyses and the hierarchical organization of nature. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Current issues in teleology (pp. 26–48). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1987). Functions. Journal of Philosophy, 84, 181–196.
Boorse, C. (1976). Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85, 70–86.
Boorse, C. (1977). Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science, 44, 542–573.
Boorse, C. (2002). A rebuttal on functions. In A. Ariew, R. Cummins, & M. Perlman (Eds.), Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology (pp. 63–112). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boorse, C. (2014). A second rebuttal on health. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 39, 683–724.
Buller, D. J. (1998). Etiological theories of function: A geographical survey. Biology and Philosophy, 13, 505–527.
Canfield, J. (1964). Teleological explanation in biology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14, 285–295.
Canfield, J. (1966). Introduction. In J. Canfield (Ed.), Purpose in nature (pp. 1–7). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Caro, T., et al. (2014). The function of zebra stripes. Nature Communications, 5, 3535.
Craver, C. (2013). Functions and mechanisms: A perspectivalist view. In P. Huneman (Ed.), Function: Selection and mechanisms (pp. 133–158). Dordrecht: Springer.
Frankfurt, H. G., & Poole, B. (1965). Functional analyses in biology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17, 69–72.
Garson, J., & Piccinini, G. (2014). Functions must be performed at appropriate rates in appropriate situations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65, 1–20.
Griffiths, P. E. (2009). In what sense does ‘nothing make sense except in the light of evolution’? Acta Biotheoretica, 57, 11–32.
Hardcastle, V. G. (1999). Understanding functions: A pragmatic approach. In V. G. Hardcastle (Ed.), Where biology meets psychology: Philosophical essays (pp. 27–43). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hausman, D. (2011). Is an overdose of paracetamol bad for one’s health? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 657–668.
Horan, B. (1989). Functional explanations in sociobiology. Biology and Philosophy, 4, 131–158.
Kingma, E. (2010). Paracetamol, poison, and polio: Why Boorse’s account of function fails to distinguish health and disease. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61, 241–264.
Kraemer, D. M. (2013). Statistical theories of functions and the problem of epidemic disease. Biology and Philosophy, 28, 423–438.
Lehman, H. (1965). Functional explanation in biology. Philosophy of Science, 32, 1–20.
Lewens, T. (2004). Organisms and artifacts: Design in nature and elsewhere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mayr, E. (1961). Cause and effect in biology. Science, 134, 1501–1506.
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst’s defense. Philosophy of Science, 58, 168–184.
Prudic, K. L., et al. (2015). Eyespots deflect predator attack increasing fitness and promoting the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 282, 201415.
Rosenberg, A., & McShea, D. W. (2008). Philosophy of biology: A contemporary introduction. New York: Routledge.
Ruse, M. E. (1971). Functional statements in biology. Philosophy of Science, 38, 87–95.
Ruse, M. E. (1973a). A reply to Wright’s analysis of functional statements. Philosophy of Science, 40, 277–280.
Ruse, M. E. (1973b). The philosophy of biology. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Sarkar, S. (1996). Ecological theory and anuran declines. BioScience, 46, 199–207.
Sarkar, S. (2005). Molecular models of life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tinbergen, N. (1963). On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 20, 410–433.
Walsh, D. M. (1996). Fitness and function. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 553–574.
Walsh, D. M., & Ariew, A. (1996). A taxonomy of functions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, 493–514.
Weber, M. (2005). Philosophy of experimental biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1972). Teleology and the logical structure of function statements. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 3, 1–80.
Wimsatt, W. C. (2013). Evolution and the stability of functional architectures. In P. Huneman (Ed.), Function: Selection and mechanisms (pp. 19–41). Dordrecht: Springer.
Wouters, A. G. (1995). Viability explanation. Biology and Philosophy, 10, 435–457.
Wouters, A. (2003). Four notions of biological function. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 34, 633–668.
Wouters, A. G. (2005). The functional perspective in organismic biology. In T. A. C. Reydon & L. Hemerik (Eds.), Current themes in theoretical biology (pp. 33–69). Dordrecht: Springer.
Wouters, A. G. (2013). Biology’s functional perspective: Roles, advantage, and organization. In K. Kampourakis (Ed.), The philosophy of biology: A companion for educators (pp. 455–486). Dordrecht: Springer.
Wright, L. (1972). A comment on Ruse’s analysis of function statements. Philosophy of Science, 39, 512–514.
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139–168.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Garson, J. (2016). Function and Fitness. In: A Critical Overview of Biological Functions. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32020-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32020-5_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-32018-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-32020-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)