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Exploitation of HART Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Features to Verify Field Device Identity and Infer Operating State

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Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8985))

Abstract

Infusion of Information Technology (IT) into Industrial Control System (ICS) applications has increased Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) challenges. A layered security strategy is addressed that exploits Physical (PHY) features to verify field device identity and infer normal-anomalous operating state using Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) features. The goal is inferential confirmation that Human Machine Interface (HMI) indicated conditions match the system’s true physical state. Feasibility is shown using Wired Signal DNA (WS-DNA) from Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) enabled field devices. Results are based on experiments using an instrumented Process Control System (PCS) with smart field devices communicating via wired HART. Results are presented for two field devices operating at two different set-points and suggest that the WS-DNA technical approach is promising for inferring device physical state.

The rights of this work are transferred to the extent transferable according to title 17 U.S.C. 105.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, US Air Force Institute of Technology, Dayton, OH, USA

    Juan Lopez Jr., Michael A. Temple & Barry E. Mullins

Authors
  1. Juan Lopez Jr.
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  2. Michael A. Temple
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  3. Barry E. Mullins
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Juan Lopez Jr. .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cyprus , Nicosia, Cyprus

    Christos G. Panayiotou

  2. University of Cyprus , Nicosia, Cyprus

    Georgios Ellinas

  3. University of Cyprus , Nicosia, Cyprus

    Elias Kyriakides

  4. University of Cyprus , Nicosia, Cyprus

    Marios M. Polycarpou

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Lopez, J., Temple, M.A., Mullins, B.E. (2016). Exploitation of HART Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Features to Verify Field Device Identity and Infer Operating State. In: Panayiotou, C., Ellinas, G., Kyriakides, E., Polycarpou, M. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8985. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31664-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31664-2_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31663-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31664-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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