Abstract
Security is a major concern for a large fraction of sensor network applications. Douceur first introduced the notion of Sybil attack [5], where a single entity (node) illegitimately presents multiple identities. As the nodes in sensor networks can be physically captured by an adversary, Sybil attack can manifest in a severe form leading to the malfunction of basic operational protocols. It is also pointed out in [5] that Sybil attack could be prevented if each honest identity possesses an unforgeable certificate issued by a trusted authority. The identity is mandated to produce the certificate as a proof of authenticity before it takes part in any network activity. Since ordinary certification schemes are not suitable for sensor networks due to some typical incompatibility features, we propose a symmetric key based threshold certification scheme specially designed to defend Sybil attack in sensor networks.
Most of this work were done when the authors were with HTSL, Bangalore during 2004 - 2006.
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Notes
- 1.
A (t, n) threshold scheme is perfect if the probability of guessing some secret with \((t-1)\) or less number of partial information about the secret is identical to the probability of guessing the secret with no information.
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Banerjee, S., Mukhopadhyay, D., Roy, S. (2015). A New Threshold Certification Scheme Based Defense Against Sybil Attack for Sensor Networks. In: Jajoda, S., Mazumdar, C. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9478. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26961-0_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26961-0_35
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