Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change pp 59–83Cite as

Reaching Agreement Through Fair Process

  • Chapter

  • 1057 Accesses

Abstract

Chapter 2 showed that there is reasonable disagreement over some of the ends that the UNFCCC should achieve. This chapter builds on this finding by showing that, where there is reasonable disagreement over such ends, fair decision-making processes gain additional importance. That is, this chapter makes a case for the importance of fair procedures in the UNFCCC. It does so in three steps. First, it discusses the relative merits of fair procedures, arguing that, whilst fair procedures are important in themselves, there are sometimes trade-offs between designing a process that is procedurally fair and designing a process to meet other more pressing ends. Second, it argues that, whilst there is disagreement in the UNFCCC, there is also agreement over some of its ends, most importantly, that it should collectively limit emissions to avoid causing dangerous climate change. Further, given certain specific characteristics associated with climate change, achieving this goal requires meeting certain criteria, including stringency, urgency, and voluntary cooperation. This means that it is important to find a way of reaching agreement in the UNFCCC even when there is reasonable disagreement over some of the ends that it should bring about. Third, given these specific characteristics and requirements, and given the existence of reasonable disagreement, I show that fair procedures theoretically provide a way of reaching agreement in the UNFCCC even when there is reasonable disagreement over the ends that it should pursue.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Several theorists hold that procedures are intrinsically important: Beitz 1989; Christiano 1996; Waldron 1999.

  2. 2.

    See: Lange et al. 2007; Bäckstrand 2010, p. 1; Eckersley 2012.

  3. 3.

    For discussion, see: Dubash 2009, p. 8; Bäckstrand 2010, p. 1.

  4. 4.

    See: IISD 2010, p. 3.

  5. 5.

    For example: Agarwal and Narain 1991; Bruce et al. 1995, p. 84; Gupta 2000; Chasek and Rajamani 2003.

  6. 6.

    For more on the potentially catastrophic nature of climate change, see: Schneider and Lane 2006.

  7. 7.

    Not everyone agrees with this view, and some argue that a more stringent temperature target is needed in order to avoid dangerous climate change (see: Heyward 2007; Steinacher et al. 2013).

  8. 8.

    See: UNFCCC 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014; MEF 2009.

  9. 9.

    See also, den Elzen 2010.

  10. 10.

    These points draw from those in Allen et al. 2009a; Stern 2014.

  11. 11.

    For discussion, see: Hare and Meinshausen 2006; Allen et al. 2009a.

  12. 12.

    See: Patz et al. 2005; Human Rights Council 2008.

  13. 13.

    See: Hare and Meinshausen 2006; Rogelj et al. 2011.

  14. 14.

    Several authors argue that argue that the 2 °C target will soon become unachievable: IPCC 2007; Peters et al. 2013, p. 5.

  15. 15.

    Schneider and Lane 2006; For climate change tipping points see: Lenton 2011; Voorhar and Myllyvirta 2012; for abrupt climate change, see: Alley et al. 2005.

  16. 16.

    See: Matthews and Solomon 2013.

  17. 17.

    For discussions of this point, see: den Elzen et al. 2006; IEA 2011; Dirix et al. 2013.

  18. 18.

    Allen et al. make this point, although not in support of Lomborg’s argument (Allen et al. 2009a).

  19. 19.

    See: McCrone et al. 2012; REN21 2013.

  20. 20.

    See: Joshi et al. 2011.

  21. 21.

    Hurd 1999. For discussions relating this point to the UNFCCC, see: Wiener 1999, p. 769; Höhne et al. 2002, p. 10.

  22. 22.

    There is a strong line of literature supporting this premise: Barrett and Stavins 2003; Vogler 2005; Chasek et al. 2006, p. 208.

  23. 23.

    For more on this point: Hoel 1992; Barrett 1994, 1998.

  24. 24.

    I take this point from: Birnie 1988, p. 113.

  25. 25.

    These measures are proposed in Aldy et al. (2001) and Nordhaus (1998).

  26. 26.

    Thomas Franck argues that states obey international laws even when it is not in their interest to do so at least partly on account of the fairness of these laws (Franck 1995, p. 26). Peter Lawrence suggests that states may comply with an agreement if they feel that it is procedurally fair (Lawrence 2014, p. 16). For more on this point, see Barrett 2003.

  27. 27.

    Barrett and Stavins 2003, p. 360.

  28. 28.

    Bottom-up processes involve voluntary mitigation pledges that are defined unilaterally (Bodansky 2012, p. 1).

  29. 29.

    See: Christoff 2006; King et al. 2011, p. 19.

  30. 30.

    For proponents, see: Prins and Rayner 2007; Prins et al. 2010.

  31. 31.

    Waldron suggests that two pragmatic procedures for decision-making might be tossing a coin or nominating one person to act as a leader (Waldron 1999, p. 113).

  32. 32.

    Waldron 1999, p. 113. Note that continued deliberation and minilateralism may also fall short on this point.

  33. 33.

    Thibaut and Walker 1975; Walker et al. 1979.

  34. 34.

    For discussion of perfect procedural justice, see: Kelsen 1955.

  35. 35.

    See, Rawls 1971.

  36. 36.

    For discussion of pure procedural justice see: Kelsen 1955; Rawls 1971, 1999; Nelson 1980; Arneson 2004.

  37. 37.

    In this sense, the outcomes generated by a fair procedure are themselves fair. A related view might hold that, whilst there is disagreement on substantive justice, there is agreement on procedural justice, and that the outcomes generated by a fair process should be accepted as second best alternatives to persistent disagreement. For more on this, see: Arneson 2004.

  38. 38.

    Jeremy Waldron claims that the fact that there is disagreement about an issue does not necessarily imply that there is no objectively right or correct outcome (Waldron 1999).

  39. 39.

    This is similar to Thomas Christiano’s account of ‘moderate proceduralism’, which recognises that democratic processes have intrinsic value whilst also placing limits on the substantive outcomes that these processes can achieve (Christiano 2008, p. 295).

  40. 40.

    David Miller makes a similar argument about the role of deliberative democracy (Miller 2007). Thomas Christiano argues that democracy can provide a way of making decisions that treats each citizen equally when there are disagreements about justice and the common good in society (Christiano 2008, p. 75).

  41. 41.

    Waldron notes that majority rule is not the only way of awarding sufficient respect in a decision-making process (Waldron 1999, p. 111).

  42. 42.

    Richard Arneson takes this view (Arneson 2004).

  43. 43.

    Several authors suggest that there are certain constraints on the outcomes that multilateral institutions should bring about, for example: Buchanan and Keohane 2006.

  44. 44.

    Here I have in mind something along the lines of Gutmann and Thompsons account of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 1996).

  45. 45.

    For instance, Ronald Dworkin argues that reasonable citizens may disagree about what democracy requires (Dworkin 1996, p. 34).

  46. 46.

    For discussions of disagreement over procedural values see: Waldron 1999; Karlsson 2008; Mansbridge et al. 2010.

References

  • Agarwal, A., and S. Narain. 1991. Global warming in an unequal world, a case of environmental colonialism. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aldy, J.E., P.R. Orszag, et al. 2001. Climate change: An agenda for global collective action. Pew: Center on Global Climate Change.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, M.R., D.J. Frame, et al. 2009a. Commentary: The exit strategy. Nature Reports Climate Change 3: 56–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, M.R., D.J. Frame, et al. 2009b. Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne. Nature 458: 1163–1166.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Alley, R.B., J. Marotzke, et al. 2005. Abrupt climate change. Science 299: 2005–2010.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arneson, R.J. 2004. Democracy is not intrinsically just. In Justice and democracy, ed. K. Dowding, R.E. Goodin and C. Pateman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bäckstrand, K. 2010. Democratizing global governance of climate change after Copenhagen. In Oxford handbook on climate change and society, ed. J. Dryzek, R.B. Norgaard, and D. Schlosberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, S. 1994. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46: 878–894.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, S. 1998. The political economy of the Kyoto protocol. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14: 20–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, S. 2003. Environment and statecraft. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, S., and R.N. Stavins. 2003. Increasing participation and compliance in international climate change agreement. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 3: 349–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beitz, C.R. 1989. Political equality: An essay in democratic theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Birnie, P. 1988. International law and solving conflicts. In International environmental diplomacy: The management and resolution of transfrontier environmental problems, ed. J.E. Carroll. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D. 2012. The Durban platform: Issues and options for a 2015 agreement. Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions

    Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D., and L. Rajamani. 2013. Evolution and governance architecture. In International relations and global climate change, ed. D. Sprinz and U. Luterbacher. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bruce, J.P., L. Hoesung, et al. 1995. Climate change 1995: Economic and social dimension of climate change. In Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, A.E., and R.O. Keohane. 2006. The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics and International Affairs 20(4): 412.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chasek, P., and L. Rajamani. 2003. Steps toward enhanced parity: Negotiating capacities and strategies of developing countries. In Providing public goods: Managing globalization, ed. I. Kaul, P. Conceição, K. Goulven, and F. Mendoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chasek, P.S., D.L. Downie, et al. 2006. Global environmental politics. Boulder: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christiano, T. 1996. The rule of the many: Fundamental issues in democratic theory. Boulder/Oxford: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christiano, T. 2008. The constitution of equality: Democratic authority and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Christoff, P. 2006. Post-Kyoto? Post-bush? Towards an effective climate coalition of the willing. International Affairs 82(5): 831–860.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • den Elzen, M. 2010. The emissions gap report. UNEP. http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/.

  • den Elzen, M., M. Meinshausen, et al. 2006. Multi-gas emission envelopes to meet greenhouse gas concentration targets: Costs versus certainty of limiting temperature increase. Global Environmental Change 17: 260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dirix, J., W. Peeters, et al. 2013. Strengthening bottom-up and top-down climate governance. Climate Policy 13(3): 363–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dubash, N.K. 2009. Copenhagen: Climate of mistrust. Economic & Political Weekly XLIV(52): 8–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. 1996. Freedom’s law: The moral reading of the American constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckersley, R. 2012. Moving forward in the climate negotiations: Multilateralism or minilateralism? Global Environmental Politics 12(2): 24–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foti, E., L. de Silva, et al. 2008. Voice and choice: Opening the door to environmental democracy. Washington, DC: Word Resources Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frolicher, T.L., and F. Joos. 2010. Reversible and irreversible impacts of greenhouse gas emissions in multi-century projections with the NCAR global coupled carbon cycle-climate model. Climate Dynamics 39: 1439–1459.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gardiner, S. 2011. A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Global Commission on the Economy and Climate. 2014. The new climate economy. Available at: http://newclimateeconomy.net/content/global-commission

  • Gupta, J. 2000. “On Behalf of My Delegation…” A survival guide for developing country climate negotiators. Published jointly by the Center for Sustainable Development of the Americas and the International Institute for Sustainable Development.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, S., D.A. Tirpak, et al. 2007. Policies, ìnstruments and co-operative arrangements. In Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave and L.A. Meyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gutmann, A., and D. Thompson. 1990. Moral conflict and political consensus. Ethics 101(1): 64–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gutmann, A., and D. Thompson. 1996. Democracy and disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Halsnæs, K., P.R. Shukla, et al. 2007. Framing issues. In Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave and L.A. Meyer (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hare, B., and M. Meinshausen. 2006. How much warming are we committed to and how much can be avoided? Climate Change 75: 1–2.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heyward, M. 2007. Equity and international climate change negotiations: A matter of perspective. Climate Policy 7(6): 518–534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heyward, C. 2010. Environment and cultural identity: Towards a new dimension of climate justice. Doctoral thesis; the Department of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoel, M. 1992. International environmental conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics 2: 141–159.

    Google Scholar 

  • Höhne, N., C. Galleguillos, et al. 2002. Evolution of commitments under the UNFCCC: Involving newly industrialized economies and developing countries. The German Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt).

    Google Scholar 

  • The Human Rights Council. 2008. Human rights and climate change. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/HRClimateChangeIndex.aspx

  • Hurd, I. 1999. Legitimacy and authority in international politics. International Organization 53(2): 379–408.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • IEA. 2011. World energy outlook 2011: Executive summary. Paris: International Energy Agency. http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/executive_summary.pdf.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • IISD. 2010. Earth negotiations bulletin: Summary of the Cancun climate change conference. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12(498): 1–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • IPCC. 2007. Fourth assessment report: Climate change 2007. In Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. Geneva: IPCC.

    Google Scholar 

  • IPCC. 2013. Climate change 2013: The physical science basis: Summary for policymakers. Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joshi, M., E. Hawkins, et al. 2011. Projections of when temperature change will exceed 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. Nature Climate Change 1: 407–412.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karlsson, J. 2008. Democrats without borders: A critique of transnational democracy. In Gothenburg studies in politics, ed. Bo Rothstein. Gothenburg: Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S.I., and J. McGee. 2013. Legitimacy in an era of fragmentation: The case of global climate governance. Global Environmental Politics 13(3): 56–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen, H. 1955. Foundations of democracy. Ethics 66(1): 1–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • King, D., K. Richards, et al. 2011. International climate change negotiations: Key lessons and next steps. Oxford: Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, The University of Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange et al. 2007. On the importance of equity in international climate policy: An empirical analysis. Energy Economics 29(3): 545–562

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawrence, P. 2014. Justice for future generations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lenton, T.M. 2011. Early warning of climate tipping points. Nature Climate Change 1: 201–209.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lomborg, B. 2001. The sceptical environmentalist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mansbridge, J., et al. 2010. The place of self-interest and the role of power in deliberative democracy. Journal of Political Philosophy 18(1): 64–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCrone, A., E. Usher, V. Sonntag-O’Brien, U. Moslener, and C. Grüning. 2012. Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2012. Frankfurt School UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance.

    Google Scholar 

  • McMahon, C. 2009. Resonable disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • MEF. 2009. Declaration of the leaders. The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Declaration-of-the-Leaders-the-Major-Economies-Forum-on-Energy-and-Climate

  • Meinshausen, M., N. Meinshausen, et al. 2009. Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2 °C. Nature 458(7242): 1158.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Metz, B. 2013. The legacy of the Kyoto protocol: A view from the policy world. WIREs Climate Change 4: 51–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. 2007. Deliberative democracy and social choice. Political Studies 40: 54–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, W. 1980. The very idea of pure procedural justice. Ethics 90(4): 502–511.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nordhaus, W.D. 1998. Economics and policy issues in climate change. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oliver, J., G. Janssens-Maenhout, and J.A.H.W. Peters. 2012. Trends in global CO 2 emissions; 2012 Report. The Hague/Ispra: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency/Joint Research Centre.

    Google Scholar 

  • Patz, J.A., et al. 2005. Impact of regional climate change on human health. Nature 438(17): 310–317.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Peters, G.P., R.M. Andrew, et al. 2013. The challenge to keep global warming below 2 °C. Nature Climate Change 3(1): 4–6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prins, G., and S. Rayner. 2007. The wrong trousers: Radically rethinking climate policy. Joint Discussion Paper of the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization, University of Oxford and the MacKinder Centre for the Study of Long-Wave Events, London School of Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prins, G., I. Galiana, et al. 2010. The Hartwell paper: A new direction for climate policy after the crash of 2009. Oxford: Institute for science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. 1999. The law of peoples. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • REN21. 2013. Renewables 2013. Global Status Report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat.

    Google Scholar 

  • Risse, M. 2004. What we wwe to the global poor. Journal of Ethics 9: 81–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rogelj, J., et al. 2011. Emission pathways consistent with a 2 °C global temperature limit. Nature Climate Change 1: 413–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, S.H., and J. Lane. 2006. Dangers and thresholds in climate change and the implications for justice. In Fairness in adaptation to climate change, ed. N.W. Adger, J. Paavola, S. Huq and M.J. Mace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, S., G.-K. Plattner, et al. 2009. Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America 106(6): 1704–1709.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Steinacher, M., F. Joos, et al. 2013. Allowable carbon emissions lowered by multiple climate targets. Nature 499: 197–201.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Stern, N. 2014. The costs of delaying action to stem climate change. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/the_cost_of_delaying_action_to_stem_climate_change.pdf

  • Stocker, T.F. 2013. The closing door of climate targets. Science 339: 280–282.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Thibaut, J., and L. Walker. 1975. Procedural justice: A psychological analysis. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toth, F.L. 1999. Fair weather? equity concerns in climate change. London: Earthscan.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNFCCC. 1992. United Nations framework convention on climate change. Convention Text.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNFCCC. 2009. The Copenhagen accord. Report of the conference of the parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNFCCC. 2010. The Cancun agreements. Report of the conference of the parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNFCCC. 2011. The Durban platform. Draft decision -/CP.17 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNFCCC. 2014 Lima call for climate action. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

    Google Scholar 

  • Unruh, G.C. 2000. Understanding Carbon Lock-in. Energy Policy 28: 817–830.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogler, J. 2005. In defence of international environmental cooperation. In The state and the global ecological crisis, ed. J. Barry and R. Eckersley. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Voorhar, R., and L. Myllyvirta. 2012. Point of no return: The massive climate threats we must avoid. Amsterdam: International Greenpeace.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldron, J. 1999. Law and disagreement. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Walker, L., E.A. Lind, and J. Thibaut. 1979. The relation between procedural and distributive justice. Virginia Law Review 65(8): 1401–1420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weitzman, M.L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1): 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wiener, J.B. 1999. On the political economy of global environmental regulation. Georgetown Law Journal 87: 749–794.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. London, UK

    Luke Tomlinson

Authors
  1. Luke Tomlinson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tomlinson, L. (2015). Reaching Agreement Through Fair Process. In: Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17184-5_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation