Abstract
This paper discusses the idea that some of the causal factors that are responsible for the production of a natural phenomenon are explanatorily irrelevant and, thus, may be omitted or distorted. It argues against Craig Callender’s suggestion that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, in Michael Strevens’ sense, as a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See Strevens (2008).
- 3.
An optimized model is called “canonical” in Strevens (2008), but I will not follow that terminology here.
- 4.
See Callender and Menon (2013), 210.
- 5.
“The idealized model can therefore be understood as the conjunction of the optimized model and certain further, false claims about reality.” (Strevens, 2008, 325)
- 6.
“[B]ecause it replaces ranges with definite values, [an idealized model] is also often simpler than the [optimized] model.” (Strevens, 2008, 321) “Better to think of the [idealized] model as formed by way of a structural simplification of the [optimized] model, and more particularly, by a kind of concretization of certain of its abstract aspects, achieved by the substitution of particular values for specified ranges.” (324)
- 7.
To be sure, in the standard explanation of phase transitions, surface effects are considered to be zero. But this is not because their actual value does not make a difference to the occurrence of phase transitions. Rather, they are considered to be zero despite their difference-making property, and because the actual value stands in the way of the (non-causal) standard explanation.
- 8.
As John Norton recently put it: “One might casually speak of ‘an infinitely large sphere’ as the limit system. But that talk is literally nonsense. A sphere is the set of points equally far away from some center. An infinitely large sphere would consist of points infinitely far away from the center. But there are no such points. All points in the space are some finite distance from the center.” (Norton, 2012, 213)
- 9.
For a discussion of such explanations, see Callender and Menon (2013).
- 10.
For an extensive discussion, see Toader (2011).
- 11.
See Toader (2013), for more details.
- 12.
For discussion, see Toader (2015).
- 13.
Objectivity, Nagel wrote, “is not the test of reality. It is just one way of understanding reality.” (Nagel, 1989, 26) He believed that, for most x, the more objectively x is viewed, the better x is understood. By contrast, the Weylean skeptic believes that, for most x, the more objectively x is viewed, the less well understood it is; and vice-versa, the better it is understood, the less objectively it is viewed.
References
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Acknowledgements
This paper was presented at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest and the University of Bucharest. Thanks to both audiences and especially to Balázs Gyenis, Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Mircea Flonta, and Ilie Pârvu, for helpful questions and suggestions. Thanks also to Sorin Bangu for comments on a previous draft. For numerous discussions, during my Notre Dame years, on philosophy of science and mathematics, and more particularly on Weyl’s views, I am greatly indebted to Paddy Blanchette, Mic Detlefsen, Don Howard, Chris Porter, and Sean Walsh. Financial support for writing the paper was provided through the 7th European Community Framework Programme Marie Curie Actions (CIG 293899 and EU-IAS-FP 246561), the University of Bucharest, and the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University in Budapest.
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Toader, I.D. (2015). Against Harmony: Infinite Idealizations and Causal Explanation. In: Pȃrvu, I., Sandu, G., Toader, I. (eds) Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 313. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16655-1_18
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