Abstract
In his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time (1925), Heidegger develops what at first sight could be seen as a masterful presentation of the “three fundamental discoveries” of Husserl’s Phenomenology: intentionality, categorial intuition, and the new conception of the a priori. Nevertheless, closer examination of the text discloses a series of subtle but serious problems. Our interest here will be restricted to Heidegger’s presentation of his understanding of Husserl’s theory regarding the intentionality of perception and of categorial intuition.
In §6 of that work (48/64), we read that Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition means two things. Firstly, it means that there is an experience of objectities in which we also have a simple apprehension of categorial constituents, i.e., of the elements which the tradition, in a “crude” fashion, called “categories” (48/64). Secondly, it means that this apprehension is already present in every experience and, as Heidegger explains a few lines later, according to what he has “already suggested” in his preceding analyses of the fundamental discovery of intentionality (in §5), categorial intuition is found even in every perception (48/64). Heidegger insists on this claim, and at several points of his presentation (see, e.g., §6.b.β), he repeats the idea that the intentional act of perception is, after all, permeated with categorial elements, with “categorial intuition.”
Now, how should we understand this dense and heavy idea? Is it a hidden criticism of Husserl’s views on perception, or is it Heidegger’s sincere understanding of Husserl’s original discovery?
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Notes
- 1.
In the context of this citation, Heidegger tells us that this at first un-highlighted totality of the perceived thing is comprised of the constituents listed before in the context of PHCT, §5. This content is also presented in the following lines.
- 2.
See also Dahlstrom 2001, 79–80.
- 3.
With regard to “being,” see also 70/95. Among such non-sensory elements, Heidegger also mentions “thisness,” “unity,” “plurality,” “or,” etc. (see 58/78). We will discuss these later, in §7.6.3.
- 4.
We will return to this problem in §7.4. The relevant literature is confused on this point. I will try, in §7.4, to apply the principle of charity and disentangle some of these difficulties. In Heidegger’s analyses in the PHCT, however, there is another problem of coherence that cannot be overcome. I refer to Heidegger’s analyses concerning the “three” concepts of truth in Husserl’s Phenomenology and, more particularly, the relation of the third of these with monothetic intentionality. I dedicate a section to this problem (§7.7 of the present chapter).
- 5.
On this occasion, we once again come across a clear statement of the enigmatic idea that we have already seen: “even simple perception, which is usually called sense-perception, is [in its simplicity] already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition” (60/81). See also §§7.7.3, 7.7.4, and 7.7.5.
- 6.
Heidegger had already presented this idea in §5 of the PHCT, where his preparatory analysis of intentionality and perception are to be found.
- 7.
Notice that in §6.c (“Acts of Synthesis”) Heidegger treats the relation between subject and predicate as a part-whole relation without any further specification. More particularly, he presents the subject of a predicative expression as the simply perceived thing in its totality. Bernet, for instance, also explicitly conflates these two radically different kinds of synthesis (1990, 141). This is a very un-Husserlian reading of Husserl’s views regarding the intentional process of substratization and of subjectivation on the basis of the holistically given simply perceived. On this, see also Chap. 5.
- 8.
Heidegger presents the purely sensuously perceived thing in a way that renders it in-visible, un-seen, and non-appearing! It appears and becomes visible only on the basis of its “articulation;” which is categorial (in the sense that it is the form that a predicative assertion imposes upon the—invisible—sensuous ‘material,’ as we will see). We already saw Heidegger saying that we see only what and when we say.
- 9.
See §6.c, and especially 63/85–6, 64–5/87–8.
- 10.
For more concerning this thematic, see also Husserl’s 6th Logical Investigation, §50.
- 11.
See 64/87. See also note 3 above and §7.6.3 of the present chapter. In his Zähringen seminar, now translated in the text that is known with the title Four Seminars (FS), Heidegger also attributes to Husserl the view that in perception we also have a categorial intuition of the substantiality, or of the “is” qua Vorhandenheit, of the perceived-qua-substance (FS, 65–6/112–4). See also Chap. 8 of the present book.
- 12.
See 56ff/77ff, 68/92. See also the penultimate paragraph of §8.3.1 below.
- 13.
Dahlstrom’s reading of the relevant sections of the PHCT suffers from the lack of such a guiding question. Thus, although he makes the observation that Heidegger in fact effaces the distinction between simple perception and the relevant perceptual judgments (2001, 72), he thinks that the only problem here is that Heidegger lets us come to the realization that—as Dahlstrom sees it—something like a sensory perception is an abstraction (2001, 84ff). On this, see also §7.8 below. Further, Taminiaux explicitly says that, as he sees it, Husserl himself corrects his theory of “simple perception” by means of the introduction of the doctrine of categorial intuition. More specifically, Taminiaux argues that there is no act of perception apart from that which is already categorially formed and serves as a “fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation” (1985, 105); “confirmatory” with respect to an at-first empty perceptual judgment. In Chap. 5, we saw that this reading of Husserlian perception is misguided. In the present chapter, this will be further examined and entrenched, with Heidegger’s reading in mind. Øverenget simply passes over the problem of coherence here (1998, 57, 52–3).
- 14.
“Sensuousness is therefore the title for the totality of the constituents of the beings [Gesamtbestand des Seinden] which are given beforehand in their material content [Sachhaltigkeit]. Materiality in general and spatiality in general are sensory concepts […]. This broad concept of sensuousness is really at the bottom of the distinction between sensory [intuition] [sic!] and categorial intuition” (70/96; trnsl. sl. md.). In his Zähringen seminar, Heidegger also insists that, in Husserl, sensuous intuition (read: sensory perception) is strictly speaking not the perception of a thing, but rather the ‘perception’ of sensory givens, that is, the affection by the sensory hyle and its specifications (blue, black, extension, etc.) (see FS, 65–6/113) Of course, if this were the case, Husserl wouldn’t have actually managed to talk about perception as a really intentional act that offers its object in evidence, that lets its object manifest itself. According to Heidegger, the intentional sensory perception (appearance) of a thing is, as we saw above, the result of a categorial forming. On this, see also Taminiaux 1985, 106–7. In Chap. 6, we saw what Heidegger thinks that Phenomenology should maintain with regard to how we are led to this experience of an appearing sensory perceptual thing.
- 15.
As we have already seen, at several points Heidegger calls this merely sensorial perception of, e.g., a color, “sensory intuition” (see, e.g., 58/78, 92/68; emphasis added). Cf., however, 59–60/80, where even a thing-like object is, surprisingly, characterized as sensory-real, despite the fact that a few lines later we read that simple perception is already categorially structured. Heidegger actually never manages to offer a fully coherent, faithful and charitable presentation of Husserl’s teaching regarding perceptual intentionality and the constitution of the perceptual object. Later, in §7.7.3, we will see that Dahlstrom makes a considerable effort to deal with “simple perception” in the slightly different terms of a “single-layered act that offers its object in one stroke.” This, however, does not affect the core of the argument up to this point (or at any other point) of the present chapter.
- 16.
For this see, e.g., 48/65, 57/76–7, 56/75, 62/84, 63/85, 64/87, 65/87.
- 17.
Heidegger seems to make this kind of understanding (as reconstructed just above) more explicit in his Zähringen Seminäre (FS, 64ff/110ff). Dahlstrom’s (2001) understanding of §§5–8 of the PHCT shows that he agrees with these latter points. The same can be said of Øverenget’s account of the relation between perception and perceptual judgment (1998, 42, 58ff, 62); Bernet’s understanding of Heidegger’s interpretation of the text under discussion here (1990, 140–1) also runs along these lines. Philipse takes such views—together with the difficulty of discerning the correlational structure in its two different moments (empty noesis and fulfilled noema) in the already fulfilled perception—as evidence that Husserl anticipated the linguistic turn (1995, 239). This view, however, does considerable violence against the view that whereas this may have been something self-evident in, e.g., Kant and in German Idealism, Husserl is the initiator of the idea of a complete pre-predicative intentional experience. In Chap. 5, we saw what this may mean. In the present chapter, we will further entrench this reading, and direct it against Heidegger’s and Heideggerian views in particular.
- 18.
Tengelyi (2007) adopts this double idea (the first point silently, the second expressly). He suggests that the only difference between a category functioning in sensory perception and its counterpart in predicative language is that between the spatially incongruent counterparts, e.g., the left and the right hand, in Kant’s arguments against the non-conceptuality of intuitions. The context there, however, makes it clear that this is nothing really different from the implicit/explicit schema we already saw in the main text above or, perhaps better, nothing different that the mirroring relation between something original and its (mirror) image. Examining the category “identity” he maintains that in sensory experience it is just “at work,” whereas in our articulated linguistic intentionality this same “identity” has become itself an object (e.g., via a thematizing reflection). Even though I totally sympathize with his serious effort to trace and safeguard the difference under discussion, this choice does not exactly meet Husserl’s caution, in the Ideas I (§124), (of which Tengelyi is, paradoxically, totally aware) to not take the mirroring metaphor (between perception and judgment) too literally. It rather totally succumbs to the latter’s beguilement (see Tengelyi 2007, 194–5).
- 19.
Heidegger would reply that this is a problem for Husserl. Husserl would naturally reply that this is a problem for whoever espouses the theory that creates it. All phenomenologists, I believe, would agree that this is the problem for all pan-glossism, and, first of all, for Carnap’s view of how a linguistic system gets established and institutes experience of beings, and for Quine’s naturalistic view of language learning and experience institution. In any case, it is phenomenologically unintelligible that a community of language users first establishes or acquires a language and only then experiences beings in a world. The simple reason is that all these processes already presuppose that we have perceptual experience of others, of spoken words, of written signs, etc. Of course, an adequate treatment of all this requires another occasion, for which I reserve myself. For the time being, the interested reader may wish to consult the intimately relevant Theodorou 2004.
- 20.
Cf. PHCT, 70.
- 21.
To this, it must be added that even perception can, in a sense, be seen as a categorial act; this is accepted by Husserl, even in his LI (see the remarks at the end of §58 of the sixth LI). I will return to this harmless case below.
- 22.
This forms the core of the problems that Husserl repeatedly tried to accommodate in a clear and tidy way. The results can be found in his Formal and Transcendental Logic and his Experience and Judgment, which also form the background of my approach. The way in which the approach of those works is presupposed here was delineated in Chaps. 4 and 5.
- 23.
Dahlstrom 2001, 84, 99.
- 24.
Dahlstrom 2001, 85.
- 25.
Dahlstrom 2001, 85.
- 26.
See also ibid., 104ff.
- 27.
See also ibid., 105ff, 130–1, 139ff, where the “logical prejudice” is presented as inextricably tied up with the conception of Being as presence (Vorhandenheit). See also §7.6.3 below here.
- 28.
See ibid., 83.
- 29.
Dahlstrom (ibid.) initially agrees on this point, although he is later on led to different conclusions.
- 30.
See notes 18, 36 and §7.6.1 here.
- 31.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Drummond actually comments on this idea by saying that “Hence, we can say that the determinable X as the ‘bearer’ of ‘properties’ is the ‘subject’ of ‘predicates’ ” (2003, 131; emphasis added). Cf. also the double motto of this chapter.
- 32.
These phrases are connected with Heidegger’s reading that, in Husserl, there is no perceptual intuition proper (appearing of transcendent objects) independently of categorial intuition. What appears should already be categorially formed. In Husserl, a purely pre-categorial (qua pre-judgmental) sensory perception is, according to Heidegger, something that can be found only ‘reflectively’; that is, subsequently and abstractively, as an artificial theoretical construct. Heidegger’s phenomenological ‘objectivism’ will also be examined later in the present chapter, as well as in Chaps. 8 and 9. See also the next note.
- 33.
If they were not, the corresponding concepts would lose the objective status that is normally attributed to them; they would acquire, instead, a time-dependent content (which, at least in Husserl and the tradition, is not the case). Dahlstrom makes a similar remark (Dahlstrom 2001, 75–6).
- 34.
Let it only be added here that Heidegger’s objectivist reading of Husserl’s gesture toward assigning special weight on the object side, in his LI elucidation of the foundation of the categories, seems to have been enhanced, if not directly influenced, by Lask’s seminal ‘objective’ (ontological aletheological) twist of the neo-Kantian perspective on the meaning, scope, and content of Transcendental Logic and First Philosophy. Lask himself made this turn under the influence of the relevant ideas of Husserl’s LI. This is basically manifested in Lask’s Die Logik der Philosophie (1911). A lucid presentation of this connection may be found in Crowell 2001.
- 35.
Farber wrote: “between meanings to be expressed, on the one hand, and expressed intuitions, on the other.” The German text reads: “zwischen den ausdrückenden Bedeutungen und den ausgedrückten Anschauungen.”
- 36.
Among the phenomenologists who take the mirror metaphor less metaphorically than they should, Tengelyi is also included (see 2007, 185ff, where he basically deals with “Der Parallelismus von Erfahrungssinn und Ausdrucksbedeutung”; emphasis added). As in most similar cases, the question of what has suddenly happened to simple concrete sensory perception (in the sense discussed in Chap. 5), if a perceptual expression just mirrors an already categorially-predicatively structured perception, is again posed, but answered according to the lines of the foregoing §7.3 (Tengelyi 2007, and especially the transition from pp. 187 to 188). His final conclusion is that “In der sechsten Logischen Untersuchung führt die phänomenologische Analyse des stetigen Wahrnehmungsverlaufs bis zu dem Punkt, andem ein sich fortbildender gegenständlicher Sinn greifbar wird. Husserl erfaßt jedoch diesen Sinn nicht. Deshalb kennt er, wie wir gesehen haben, keinen anderen Begriff von Gegenstand als einen kategorialen. Dieser Mangel entzieht eigentlich seiner ganzen Gegenüberstellung zwischen sinnlicher und kategorialer Wahrnehmung den Boden” (Tengelyi 2007, 195; emphases added). We should, however, also take into consideration the reference to his work in note 18 above. Melle (1990) also appears to belong to this circle of understanding. For him, Husserl showed that only the “logisch-erkennenden, die intellektiven Akte” (1990, 36) are objectivating. That is, we have our experience of intentional objects in our judgments.
- 37.
It is true that even though Husserl had indeed made a distinction between a wider and a narrower sense of “perception,” he wasn’t totally coherent in the corresponding description of the difference between these. Thus, in the LI we read the following. “[O]ne also speaks of ‘perceiving,’ and in particular of ‘seeing,’ in a greatly widened sense, which covers the grasping of whole states of affairs […]. In the narrower sense of perception (to talk roughly and popularly) we perceive everything objective that we see with our eyes, hear with our ears […]. In ordinary speech, no doubt, only external things and connective forms of things (together with their immediate qualities [Merkmalen]) can count as ‘perceived by the senses’ ” (LI, 781/138). See also §46 of the 6th LI. This talk of “qualities” referring to the simply perceived thing may easily be misunderstood as referring to “properties” that have been already implicitly predicated in or of the thing.
- 38.
Husserl devoted a large number of especially dedicated lecture notes and research manuscripts to these constitutions. They have for long been available in the Husserliana volumes Ding und Raum and Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. See also Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 of this book. On this issue, Lohmar’s discussions in his relevant series of publications (see, e.g., Lohmar 2002) are also helpful. A detailed treatment of the matter regarding the nature of the multifarious perceptual syntheses and of the way they are meant by Husserl to found our predicative-categorial consciousness of their correlates is to be found in Vassiliou’s recent doctoral thesis (Primordial Perception, Linguistic Thematization, and Scientific Idealization in E. Husserl’s Phenomenology, 2014; in Greek).
- 39.
On this, see PHCT, 43/58.
- 40.
In the literature, however, no proper attention is paid to this. See, e.g., Øverenget 1998, 58ff.
- 41.
It is a common mistake among scholars who read Husserl through Heidegger’s eyes (see, e.g., earlier in Sects. 7.4.2 and 7.4.3) to think that nominal acts presuppose and are derived from synthetic categorial acts. For the Husserlians, however, it is almost a commonplace that, in the LI, simple pre-predicative perceptual objects can be nominalized without alternation in their original constitution.
- 42.
For a more detailed analysis of this process, and of the way the whole complex correlate appears to the suitably modified consciousness, see Theodorou 2010b.
- 43.
In the same context, moreover, Husserl explicitly equates his analyses concerning categorial forms and categories (LI, 784/141). And if the latter, existential “being,” is not the categorial form of the copula, then it is obvious that this existential “being” is, in Husserl’s mind, also a category! The situation is of course complex, but not beyond accountability. We will return to this issue in Chap. 8.
- 44.
See PHCT, 49/66–7, 60–1/81–2, 61/83, 59/80, 61/82–3.
- 45.
This is the case throughout the 2nd LI and, e.g., Ideas I (Hua III.1, 12, 15, 115ff, and §5). Heidegger is clear enough on this (see 115–6/160–1). Øverenget rejects the possibility of having non-categorial intentionality, e.g., in monothetic acts like naming. However, he is not clear on what he means by “categoriality” here (e.g., predicativity, identity, unity, etc.,) and, in addition, he claims that Heidegger clearly rejects the possibility (1998, 55). Heidegger, however, is very cryptic on this particular issue (see foregoing notes 3, 11).
- 46.
See, however, also Chap. 6, §6.3.1 and especially note 17, which offers an additional simple reason in favor of the thesis maintained in the present chapter and in the current section.
- 47.
See 48/64.
- 48.
See 49/66–7.
- 49.
See 66–7/71.
- 50.
The first is produced by Heidegger’s claim that even simple perception is categorially qua predicatively formed, but also that perceptual assertions cannot be fulfilled on the face of simple perception. We saw that this was dissolvable, if we accept the analyses in Sects. 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5. Meanwhile, we also confronted another potential contradiction. We saw that Heidegger claims both that the simply perceptual thing is constituted out of partial adumbrations (and other such parts), and that it is constituted according to a subject-and-predicate synthesis. We explained the point (pp. 225–6), so can let it pass here.
- 51.
I have shown this concept of truth in Husserl in Chaps. 4 and 5. See also §7.7.5 below. To be sure, we will see below how Dahlstrom suggests a “simple perception” understood as a single-layered act that offers its object in one stroke (see §7.7.3). It will turn out, though, that his suggestion doesn’t work. See also Chap. 8, §8.3.1, of the present book.
- 52.
See 55/73. See also Chaps. 4 and 5 here. Regarding the importance of the issue under discussion here (monothetic perceptual intentionality in its relation to polythetic judgmental intentionality) for the development of Heidegger’s treatment of the question concerning the meaning of Being, see Chaps. 8 and 9 of this book.
- 53.
Again, see below (§7.7.4). Dahlstrom suggests that a “simple perception” should be understood as a single-layered act that offers its object in one stroke. See the following sub-section.
- 54.
On this, see also his 2001, 105ff, 131, 139ff. This means that according to Heidegger and Dahlstrom, Husserl was caught in the web of the understanding of Being as constant presence, i.e., as Vorhandenheit. In order to be accurate here, I must say that Dahlstrom does express some reservations with regard to Husserl’s supposed entrapment within the understanding of Being as presence, as on-handness (e.g., 2001, 140). However, he does not work out any clear account of a Husserlian answer to the corresponding criticisms of Heidegger. On the contrary, time and again, Dahlstrom decisively follows Heidegger in attributing the “logical prejudice” to Husserl.
- 55.
See, e.g., 2001, 74.
- 56.
See 2001, 84ff. We see, then, how important an adequate understanding of Husserl’s concepts of truth is, and especially his concept of truth as being, which is intimately connected with what is truth in the sphere of monothetic acts like perception and naming. It is on this, precisely, that we can base our understanding of the role categorial intuition seems to have played in Heidegger’s development. But to this (and on its hermeneutic nature) we will return in Chaps. 8 and 9 (see also §7.7.4 below).
- 57.
Dahlstrom 2001, 80ff. For this view, Heidegger refers us to Husserl’s LU II/2, 145ff (PHCT, §6.b.β).
- 58.
- 59.
See especially his Chap. 2. On the hermeneuticity of Husserl’s account of the intentionality of perception, we also find remarks made by Dastur. However, she suggests that the structure of perceiving is already in itself hermeneutical because it demands a surplus of meaning, which, as she sees it, is a surplus of “categorial forms” (1991, 50). According to our presentation here, though, this ‘surplus’—necessary for the constitution and appearing of the perceptual thing—is not categorial; at least not in the sense that the “logical prejudice” would be willing to maintain.
- 60.
EJ, 248/296–7; see also ibid., §43.d. See also the reference in note 37 above.
- 61.
Things with Husserl are of course always hard. What, in his third LI (in the analyses concerning the connection between color and surface), Husserl calls “categorial form” (i.e., not real, sensorial) has nothing to do with what this very expression means in the context of his sixth LI, where he contraposes categorial and sensuous forms (what has been projected by a thematizing linguistic consciousness). On this, see also Chap. 6, §6.3 and, more specifically, note 17.
- 62.
Recall Heidegger’s urgent forewarning for Phenomenology’s necessity of a new Grammar at the close of §7 in BT. It is interesting that this understanding of the whole issue is also transferred to Being and Time, where it creates difficult problems; for one, at the point where Heidegger has to keep apart the ways in which ready-to-hand and present-at-hand beings are structured. For him, the perceptual field is already permeated by the cognitive judgmental linguistic form “S is p,” which reflects the corresponding understanding of “Being” in terms of constant presence. (We saw Dahlstrom including this in “the logical prejudice.”) The field of tool-givenness, on the other hand, is structured in a different mode corresponding to the concernful hermeneutic “as.” How should a phenomenologist testify or report the content of these two very different experiences? For the former, he can use familiar categoric-predicative language. But in what language can someone ‘speak the’ latter experience and what happens in it? For Heidegger’s attempted solution, see also Chaps. 8 and 9.
- 63.
This chapter is based on a paper I presented at the Husserl Circle meeting of 2007 that was held in Prague. I would like to thank the participants of the session for their patience and their questions, from which I have benefited a lot. I especially thank Steven Crowell, for his meticulous commentary and his erudite remarks.
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Theodorou, P. (2015). The Question of ‘Categoriality’ in Husserl’s Analysis of Perception and Heidegger’s View of It. In: Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 83. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16622-3_7
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