Abstract
The evolution of Husserl’s thought did not follow a linear route. Time and again, crucial changes were taking place in its course. The content of fundamental concepts was shifting; successive discoveries of new thematics were happening; incessant expansions of the ever-under-rework teachings to new fields of application were being developed. The evaluation of Husserl’s work in its entirety becomes, thus, an extremely difficult task. The huge bulk of the writings, the multifariousness of their thematics, and the successive reforms and shifts in it make the understanding of even the overall plan wherein the intermediate findings fall very difficult. One thing, though, is certain. In order to overcome all these obstacles to approaching Husserl’s work, we must first deepen our understanding of his method, the phenomenological method of philosophizing. Whatever is said in Husserl’s Phenomenology makes sense and has its value only to the extent that it is a result of ‘the’ phenomenological reduction.
The idea that phenomenological philosophy is possible only on the basis of a phenomenological reduction occurs for the first time in 1905, in the so-called “Seefelder Blätter,” and publicly in 1907 with the Idea of Phenomenology. According to Husserl’s own personal estimation of the situation, from 1913, his understanding of the reduction did not become clear until 1908. Until the end of his life, however, Husserl was in fact talking about a multitude of reductions, which, since they are used in Phenomenology, can all be considered “phenomenological.” Moreover, even though Husserl does not explicitly talk in all cases about this or that reduction, he in fact constantly presupposes one. What makes things even harder is that even before 1905, when he was not yet using the term “reduction,” he had already silently put into play some version of phenomenological reduction.
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Notes
- 1.
See his “Draft,” 59-60/338.
- 2.
Among the rare exceptions of commentators who explicitly make this distinction, we must include, e.g., Diemer (1965), Kockelmans (1972, 1987, 1994), and Crowell (1990). We also find explicit mention of the distinction in e.g., in Scanlon (1972) and Sokolowski (2000); the latter, however, refers to them only in order to claim that, in the end, the distinction is merely terminological. And it is still a fact that even in the more recent works, see, e.g., Alweiss 2003, Luft 2004a, b, 2012, no full justice has yet been done to the core of our concerns here. As I see it, the foundation for the correct reading of this distinction was first set out by Fink in his famous “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik,” (Kant-Studien, 1933; here 1970) (authorized by Husserl himself), and later on by De Boer in his unjustifiably forgotten work (1966; here 1978). These latter works also function as the starting point for the view that is going to be developed in this and the following chapter. As will become apparent, though, there are considerable folds in their stories with regard to which I will differentiate myself.
- 3.
Especially the marginalia and the enthetic pages found in the so-called “D copy” (1929) had the task of highlighting, within the Ideas I, a contrast between a latent Phenomenological Psychology and an explicit Transcendental Phenomenology. See also the editor’s (Schuhmann’s) Introduction in this second edition of the Ideas I (and especially Hua III.1, lii-liii). See also note 45 below.
- 4.
The difficultly everybody faces with the thematic and method of ‘the’ reduction is clearly explained by the editor of the latest (2002) Husserliana volume (XXXIV) on this issue: “One will not find one definitive systematic exposition of the reduction in Husserl’s oeuvre. Part of the confusion this method causes to this day lies in the fact that Husserl never (to his dismay) produced a comprehensive and completely satisfying account of his central methodological tenet.” (Luft 2012, 244). On the other widely known reduction, the eidetic one, which is itself another crux interpretum and is also connected to the very possibility of phenomenological philosophical analyses, see here §2.6.1.
- 5.
See below, especially §2.7.
- 6.
I do not, of course, mean that with this realization Husserl undertakes the task of constructing from scratch two separate new Phenomenologies. What happened was rather a regressive self-interpretation of his course. In order to refer only to his post 1900 works (and until 1929), a number of steps had intervened: the Logical Investigations (1900–01), his personal and professional crisis of 1905–06, the painful integration of the transcendental turn of 1907, the essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” for the journal Logos (1910–11), the Ideas I (1913), and countless pages of research manuscripts on the phenomenological method. All that work demanded a classification and an overall look, through which Husserl could make clear,—firstly to himself—the route of a multifarious work, extending along many years.
- 7.
Rudolf Boehm, editor of Husserl’s First Philosophy (1923–24), the second part of which bears the subtitle “Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction” (Hua VIII), informs us that the manuscripts dealing with the theme of phenomenological reduction reach the amazing number of 8.000 pages, 4.500 of which are dedicated to the special problem regarding the “ways” leading to Transcendental Phenomenology (Hua VIII, xli n. 2). Some more such research manuscripts have meanwhile been edited and published also in the more recent Hua XXXIV.
- 8.
For these expressions, see Ideas I, 111/105 (in all the following, references to the English translations are followed by mention of the corresponding original text, which can be seen in the List of Abbreviations).
- 9.
The Scholastics used the term intentio as a translation of Aristotle’s terminological expression “form, without the matter.” According to the latter, our soul takes on or receives the form of the outer objects, without, of course, taking in itself also their matter (“To have a sensation is to receive the species [or form] of what is sensed, albeit without its matter [Ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἂνευ τῆς ὓλης];” De Anima, 424a17-19; trnsl. mine). This “form without the matter” is contained in the sensory organs, or in the intellect or mind, not as something having extensio, but only as something characterized by intensio or intentio (both writings were in use). This, then, is what characterizes mental phenomena: they contain within themselves intensions or intentions (somehow as their objects or referents). Of course, this first realization has since led to a host of accounts and problems in epistemology and in ethics (theory of action).
- 10.
The issue regarding the difference in the ways Husserl and Brentano understood the notion of intentionality is very complex, and would demand a separate treatment. The reader, however, may consult LI, 557ff/370ff.; see also (Mohanty 1970, 101, 104; Mohanty 2008, 43; Moran 2000a, 40; Moran 1996, 6; Spiegelberg 1976, 120–1; De Boer 1978, 6ff.; McAlister 1976, 151–9; Vassiliou 2013).
- 11.
In the following brief passages we come across some characteristic descriptions reflecting the general way in which Husserl treated the traditional epistemological issue. “[C]onsciousness ([intentional] experiences) and real beings are anything but coordinate kinds of beings which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become ‘related to’ or ‘connected with’ one another.” (Ideas I, 111/105; trnsl. sl. md.). “[E]xperience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness.” (FTL, 132/239). Also, “Neither the world nor any other existent of any conceivable sort comes ‘from outdoors’ (θύραθεν) into my ego, my life of consciousness” (FTL, 250/257). Later in this chapter, we will see that, especially for the purposes of these introductory remarks, the fact that we have cited passages from both the pre-transcendental and the transcendental period of Husserl’s Phenomenology is not an insuperable problem. On Husserl’s understanding of intentionality in terms of animating interpretation and appearing, see LI, 355/129 , 356/129 , 537/349, 565–7/381–3, 591–2/418–9, 607–8/439–441, 610/443, 630/470, 637/478, 733–4/82–3, 741–2/91–3; especially 199/194, 309/74, 310/76, 339/109, 568/385, 607/439, where the term Deutung (but also Interpretation) is used and also suggested as synonymous with Auffassung and even Verstehen; The Idea, 56–7/71–2; Hua X, 117; PTP, 179/137–8. For a possible limitation of the validity and scope of this content-interpretation schema of intentional constitution, as it has been thematized in the Husserlian scholarship, see §10.4 n. 12.
- 12.
It is especially questionable that Heidegger, who, in his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time, devotes plenty of pages to introducing his students and readers to the three fundamental concepts of Husserlian Phenomenology (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the new conception of the a priori), does not present Husserlian intentionality in the terms presented above. On the contrary, he normally insists in talking about it in the rather Brentanian terms of directedness (sich richten aus), reference (Bezug, Verweisung), and relation (Beziehung) of immanent contents with their transcendent ‘counterparts.’ Thus, Heidegger scholars, as well as Husserl scholars who have been influenced by Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, talk about intentionality qua appearance and manifestation of beings in the world with reference only to Heideggerian intentionality. This, however, is a mistake. On these issues, much more will be said in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7. With regard to the here mentioned “world,” see note 42 below.
- 13.
To be sure, the real story is much more complicated. In the first edition of the 5th LI, §7, Husserl actually attempts a Brentanian unjustified claim that Physics actually accesses the real object behind the appearances; that the thing in its (realistic) reality is the object of investigation for the science of Physics—not of Phenomenology. In the second edition (1913) this section was excised. The reasons for this can be found, e.g., in his Ideas I, §52, and their basis will be understood in what follows; see also §§3.5 and 3.6. Regarding my use of “Being” in the context of Husserl’s Phenomenology, see note 20 below.
- 14.
See previous note.
- 15.
It is important to remember that already in his “Intentional Objects” (1894–95) and more systematically in The Idea of Phenomenology (1907), Husserl explicitly distinguished between two senses of the expression “in consciousness” or “in the sphere of the psychic.” The first refers to the reel or descriptive contents that are lived-through within the immanent time-stream of living consciousness. This is the sense of “contained within.” The second refers to the intentional objectities transcendently appearing with respect to the just mentioned stream. This is the sense of “being given to consciousness,” of “consciousness’ being aware of what appears to it,” or of “consciously appearing within the sphere of the transcendent phenomena.” See also the last part of §2.5 below and Chap. 4 note 8.
- 16.
See, e.g., Spiegelberg 1994, 82–3.
- 17.
See also The Idea of Phenomenology, 13/17; Ideas I, §§30–31, 39, 39, 62.
- 18.
The “natural attitude” (natürliche Einstellung) must not be confused with either the “naturalistic” (naturalistisch) or the “physicalistic” (physikalisch) attitude (as they appear, e.g., in the Ideas II). In Phenomenology, the naturalistic attitude simply means taking into account only pre-scientific, a-personal or a-spiritual nature (inanimate extended matter in time, and animate beings). Generally, it may also mean to accept as existent only the objects of the natural sciences. The physicalistic attitude is the attitude from which the ontology accepted by Physics, in particular, is recognized as the sole ontological ground. The problem in this latter case is not how the two separate ontological spheres, res cogitans and res extensa, are bridged, but how we should treat intentional phenomena on the basis of physicalistic terms (e.g., reductively, eliminatively, etc.). Normally, the “natural attitude” should not be confused with what is ‘natural’ from the phenomenological attitude (psychological or transcendental)—there are cases, however, in which Husserl’s ‘official’ use of the term may be confused with the latter use. Moreover, the naturalistic attitude may not only be a methodological or metaphysical stance within the natural attitude, but also a methodological (not a metaphysical) stance within the phenomenological attitude (psychological or transcendental). Even though the same can be applied to the physicalistic attitude, the latter standardly has the meaning of a metaphysical stance within the natural attitude.
- 19.
On the references here to a “world,” and not merely to beings or to their sum, see note 42 below.
- 20.
By the terms “Being” and “meaning of Being” I do not mean to usurp any Heideggerian thematic and inelegantly transplant it into the Husserlian corpus. Husserl himself uses the terms many times (especially in the Ideas I) and he generally means by them, respectively, that “something is” (that it is a being) and “what we mean when we say that something is.” The capital letter in “Being” just shows here that we should not read it as the infinitive of the copulative “is,” but as the infinitive of the so-called existential “is” (but still in a neutral way that has not yet decided in favour of either metaphysical realism or before-handness or presence-at-handness in the Heideggerian sense, respectively, of Zuhandenheit and Vorhnandenheit—nor, for that matter, of any other sense). The psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological meanings of Being will be further clarified in what follows.
- 21.
See also the following sections, especially §2.4.
- 22.
This, however, as Husserl self-consciously remarks, does not mean a Berkeleian idealism; reality is not reduced to an idea of the psychic sphere (Ideas I, 129ff./120ff., 241–2/230). Husserl also calls Berkley’s idealism “subjective idealism,” “psychological idealism,” “psychomonism,” (Ideas III, 63/74) and even “immanent idealism” (immanenter Idealismus) (Crisis, 231/234; CM, §40–41). We will see below what kind of idealism it is.
- 23.
In Husserl scholarship, and especially in the so-called “Fregean” or “West-Coast Interpretation,” it is a typical mistake to equate Sinn with Noema. Husserl constantly uses the terminological expression “noematischer Sinn” together, of course, with the corresponding “noetischer Sinn.” This distinction and these expressions make it necessary (not only terminologically but also substantially, as will become evident) to keep Sinn apart from Noema (and Noesis). More specifically, Sinn should be understood as the system of the specifications regulating the constitution of an intentional object or state of affairs (Sachverhalt)—more generally: of an objectity (Objektität or Gegenständlichkeit). On the one hand, these specifications are first set in our empty aimings (at the limit, already in perception; but most clearly in signitive intentions connected with our thinking or talking about an objectity). On the other hand, these specifications are at work on the side of intuitional givenness, when the objectity happens to be capable of being given or it is actually being given in intuition. In such a case, what was at first only emptily intended in a Noesis now intuitionally appears as a Noema. The empty prescriptions (Sinn) that were first set in the empty Noesis have now taken within themselves their ‘material,’ which proved capable of being structured (constituted) according to these prescriptions, and indeed appears as a whole (prescriptions and ‘material’) in fullness as the correlate Noema. See also bellow, and Chaps. 4 and 5.
- 24.
At the time of the Crisis (1936) and in a section dedicated to the “difficulties of the psychic ‘abstraction,’” Husserl retrospectively recognizes that, even though in his Logical Investigations he “was already pulled into the epoché, so to speak, […] it was not until four years after concluding [that work, the LI, i.e., in 1905] […] that I arrived at an explicit but even then imperfect self-consciousness of its method” (Crisis, 243/246). Husserl was progressively becoming more and more self-conscious with regard to the non-linear way in which his though was maturing: “For me, the passing from the first articulation of important theories to their complete intelligibility is always a great step. It takes a lot of time before the various thought-itineraries become friends with one another” (Ingarden 1968, 151; trnsl. mine). This non-linearity in the development of Husserl’s thought creates, of course, a host of problems in our understanding of his philosophy. Nevertheless, we must always take it into consideration.
- 25.
See note 15 above, and the last part of §2.5 below.
- 26.
- 27.
It is Ehrenfels (1859–1932), also a student of Brentano’s, who is considered the pioneer of this Psychology. Nevertheless, Spiegelberg considers it as a case of simultaneous discovery (Spiegelberg 1994, 133). Husserl, for his part, claims exclusive priority in the discovery of the basic notions of Gestalt Psychology (LI, 480/282). Heidegger too accredits this discovery to Husserl (PHCT, 66).
- 28.
- 29.
Initially the text read: “[…] as ground that is understood in realistic positivity or as realistically posited [Boden der realen Positivität]” (Hua IX, 596). According to Husserl, the science of Phenomenological or Pure or Rational Psychology is, in some way, a relatively easily accessible mathesis, which can function as a propaedeutic step toward the heights of the philosophical—or, perhaps, scientifically-philosophical—Transcendental Phenomenology. Phenomenological Psychology, however, is a science, and since like all the other sciences, it is built and developed on the basis of the ontological prejudices of the natural attitude, it is a positive mathesis that remains in need of transcendental clarification and grounding, as regards the meaning and the truth of its propositions. See also what follows here.
- 30.
With the move of the transcendental reduction, a doublication of the ego seems to arise. On the one side, we speak about a psychological ego. On the other side, a transcendental ego is now introduced. Husserl, however, immediately remarks that this is only a seeming doublication. Without entering here into the specific issues of the Husserlian egology (in the original eidetic phenomenological-psychological LI, Husserl does not even acknowledge something like an ego), it suffices at present to say that the psychological ego is the ego as seen from the point of view of the psychological reduction, whereas the transcendetal ego is the ego as seen from the point of view of the transcendetal reduction. See also §2.7 below.
- 31.
In Husserl’s descriptions of the natural attitude, there is no clear distinction between a general thesis positing the known empirical reality as independently existing (self-subsisting) and another positing some unknown metaphysical reality as existing in itself. Both may be meant in Husserl’s treatment of the ontology of the natural attitude. It seems to me, though, that the second alternative makes better sense and is better justified as a problem. For more, see note 36 below.
- 32.
See PTP, 129ff/274ff, 170ff/290ff.
- 33.
See also below, with regard to the role of the so-called “world-annihilation experiment” (§2.4). See also note 42.
- 34.
See Fink’s equally clear statement that “the transcendental ‘noema’ is the world itself […] this being itself” (1970, 124), i.e., the actual world with its beings in their actuality understood as intentional correlate of transcendental consciousness.
- 35.
Cf. also Diemer 1965, 21ff., 84ff., where, on the one hand, the transcendental reduction comes close to the idea found in De Boer’s passage just above, whereas the analyses concerning the Noema present it as the residue of what was here described as psychological-phenomenological reduction. The bracketing of a realistic being (or of the realistic ‘substratum’ of a being) must be kept clearly apart from the realistic interpretation of a being. For Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, it is only the latter that may also lead to posit something like the former.
- 36.
In the psychological reduction, metaphysical reality can just stay in suspension, waiting, as it were, for the possibility of a kind of scientific-realist theoretical insight or theoretical-hypothetical interpretation of its constitution. In the transcendental reduction, metaphysical reality as well as empirical reality is definitely deprived of the meaning “existing in itself;” an ontological meaning like this is no longer legitimate. There is no sense of speaking about a metaphysical reality in itself, and an empirical reality is intentionally constituted in its complete being. There could, however, be some kind of higher-order theoretical hypothesis positing some ‘metaphysically real’ dimension in order to explain the appearances (phenomena). To the extent that such an explanation is successful, it might be said that there is also a higher-order experience with some kind and degree of evidence (even a mediate one) that this is how things ‘at bottom’ are. This theoretically posited and theoretically experienced reality, however, should now also be understood as being transcendentally constituted as an interpretation of what appears as experiential being. On this issue, which lies at the frontiers of the debate between scientific realism and constructive empiricism, see also Chap. 10 and Theodorou 2010b, 2012b.
- 37.
On the problem and meaning of the constitution of the nature-thing or natural thing (Naturding) in transcendental consciousness, see Chap. 5.
- 38.
See, e.g., Crisis, 154–5/157–8; also Hua VIII, 164.
- 39.
This concept of “absoluteness,” in Husserl, has an ontological rather than a mere epistemological sense; it is used in order to determine not that which contains certainties, but that whose existence does not depend on something else. On the persuasiveness of the world-annihilation experiment and on the absoluteness of transcendental consciousness, see also §2.7 in this chapter, and Chap. 10.
- 40.
See, e.g., CM, 48/85, 54/90, 64/99; Crisis, 112–3/114–6, 182ff/185ff.
- 41.
On this, see note 15 above here (transcribing the relevant points into the present transcendental milieu); also here, §2.6.
- 42.
“I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination.” (CM, 157/183). Especially with the notion of the world, an important point showing that Husserl had a good understanding of it qua horizon of givenness of beings that inhabit it, according to its form or essence (worldliness), is Ideas I, §§27–30. There, Husserl describes the phenomenology of the givenness of the world in the natural attitude. However, since the reduction basically transforms the meaning of Being of the world and of what is given in it, without annihilating or losing it itself in any worrying sense, what is said there holds—mutatis mutandis—equally well for the reduced world. Fink especially has particularly emphasized not just the equiprimordiality of the (regional and specific) forms of beings and the world-form, but—probably under the influence of Heidegger—the absolute priority of the world-form as something ‘co-extensive’ with the constituting possibilities of the absolute transcendental consciousness. See Fink [1970], 140–1, 110–1, 135ff., and especially 137–8. See also Chap. 3, note 33.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
More specifically, in the publications of the Ideas I, which appeared when Husserl was still alive, the distinction between the two reductions under discussion wasn’t explicit. Only in the 1925 and 1929 marginalia on his personal copies of that work does Husserl seem to come closer to a clearer distinction of the one “phenomenological” reduction into a phenomenological-psychological and a phenomenological transcendental reduction. Biemel’s Husserliana publication of Husserl’s Ideas I (Hua III) incorporated some of these marginalia in a rather unsuccessful and confusing way. It was Schuhmann’s Husserliana re-publication of the original Ideas I (Hua III.1), together with a separate volume containing Husserl’s marginalia and supplemental manuscripts (Hua III.2), that prepared the ground for a better re-interpretation of “the” phenomenological reduction. In addition, the texts that are immediately or mediately related with the notorious “Britannica Article” project make this complicated issue much clearer (see what follows). For the restoration of the complete picture on the issue discussed here, the reader should, nonetheless, be patient until the closing of §2.7 of the present chapter.
- 46.
This can be also seen in the strictly relevant research manuscripts from that period, now contained in Hua XXXIV, 3–5, 110ff, 119–20, but also from later ones, ibid., 132ff, 148ff, 394ff.
- 47.
As Husserl had wanted his Phenomenology to be (see the fourth part of Ideas I).
- 48.
See also EJ, 49–50/48–9, where this doublicity of the transcendental reduction in particular is described on the basis of the discovery of the lifeworld: transcendental reduction leads, on the one hand, to the primordial, pre-predicatively given lifeworld and, on the other hand, to the constituting transcendental subjectivity. The same doublicity is described also in many other passages in the Crisis. Levinas nicely condenses the meaning of the transcendental reduction as follows: “[Transcendental] phenomenological reduction is a purification of the concrete life [of intentional consciousness] from any naturalistic interpretation regarding its existence, but also the awareness of the fact that the origination of Being is accomplished in the concrete life of [intentional] consciousness” (Levinas 1973, 93; trnsl. md.). Nowhere do we find something like an exclusive entrapment in a self-enclosed immanence that has lost its intentional relatedness to a world and its beings. For more on the latter, see §2.7 and Chap. 3.
- 49.
On the problematic meaning of this, however, see also §2.7 below.
- 50.
- 51.
With these, however, not everything has been yet explained. We will come to this issue, i.e., to the idea that transcendental consciousness is an absolute all-inclusive sphere of intentional time-syntheses in §2.7 below.
- 52.
On this, see also De Boer (1978), 305ff.
- 53.
See, for instance, a condensed account in Theodorou 2012b, note 18. Cf. Sowa’s—Fregean and Popperian or, more generally, empiricist-analytic, I would say—lemmata “Eidos” and “Eidetics and its methodology” (Sowa 2010a, 2011), where, e.g., the difference between the analysis of phenomena and the analysis of concepts, as well as the difference between the (accepted) contingency of inductive generalization and the (at least claimed) necessity of essential universalization, is not taken into consideration; a fact that creates considerable disorientation (in particular, e.g., 2011, 258–9). For more on the just mentioned difference, which has tantalized philosophy (the status of philosophical research and the possibility of philosophical knowledge) since at least the time of Ockham, see Chap. 3, §3.3. The introduction here of the difference under discussion is my way of approaching the problem that Heffernan (2013, 2014) and Hopkins (2007, 2014) have with the situation regarding the meaning, place, and function of essence or eidos in the context of Husserlian Phenomenology, as presented by Husserl interpreters such as Zahavi (2003), Sowa (2010b), and Beyer (2013). See also Hopkins 2011, where parts of the history of philosophy like Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of universals and Husserl’s eidetic Phenomenology are examined together in a rather elucidatory way. Moreover, even though the distinction between meaning species and intuitional species (see, e.g., the Introduction to the second LI) is generally ignored, despite its great importance for understanding the method and aim of Husserl’s Phenomenology, will only be hinted at here. The analysis that follows focuses basically on the intuitional eidos or species. Its relevance and importance, however, shows up later in §8.8.1.
- 54.
See also the beginning of §2.4 and §2.7.2. In his later writings, Husserl also distinguishes between various kinds of evidence in the givenness or intuition of essences, as well as various kinds and levels of essences. There is also some disagreement with regard to the actuality and weightiness of the difference between essence (Wesen) and eidos (Eidos) or species (Spezies). For our purposes, the terms will be taken as equivalent.
- 55.
- 56.
Similar remarks are found, e.g., in CM, 32–3/71. Caution is needed, of course, due to the fact that in the Idea, Husserl does not fully and clearly control the method of transcendental reduction. What he seeks to achieve, however, is sometimes there too.
- 57.
To be sure, as De Boer has so profoundly observed, Husserl’s presentation of the transcendental reduction in the Idea still retains a “psychological flavour,” (1978, 305 n. 1, 309). The same can be maintained, though, even with reference to Husserl’s “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911); it is not totally clear there whether Husserl presents us with the science of Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology or with the philosophy of Transcendental Phenomenology. The meaning of this remark, though, will be decisively clarified later, in §2.7. As I have already said, I think that the situation becomes progressively clear to Husserl only during the late 1920s, especially on the occasion of the challenge that the “Britannica Article” (1927) in so many ways represented for him. But even in his “Amsterdam Lectures” (1928) the issue somehow always remains in suspension.
- 58.
See Drummond 1990, §§9–10.
- 59.
Thus, see Drummond’s sincere and honest aporia, when he refers to the comment “No!” that Husserl wrote in the margin of one of his personal copies of the Ideas I, next to the point where the original text was connecting neutralizing reduction with the reduction “[about] which we have earlier spoken so much,” i.e., basically with the transcendental reduction in that work (see Drummond 1990, 53, 58 n. 10).
- 60.
For Drummond, the natural attitude is the attitude in which we have the experience of actualities directly presented in our intentional acts (1990, §§9-10 and, especially, 50, 84, 115, 118). Phenomenological reduction (thus unspecifiedly) supposedly transfers the phenomenologist from the natural attitude to the philosophical-phenomenological attitude. This becomes possible because the reduction releases the phenomenologist from accepting the actuality of the appearing objectities and gives him or her the possibility and the right to turn the gaze, directing it now upon the very act in which the thing appears (instead of living in the direct intentionality that is turned upon the appearing thing). This combination of reduction and reflection is seen as a methodological move that gives us the thing not as actual—as Drummond thinks they are given in the natural attitude—but as some abstract, non-actual constituent of intentional consciousness. See Drummond 1990, 52, 58 n. 9. The same holds for Sokolowski (1984, 1987, 2000, especially 47ff., 57ff.). Husserl, however, even in 1933, was trying to free Transcendental Phenomenology from the misinterpretation that the transcendental reduction was some “‘abstraction’ from the concrete world-life [Weltleben]” (Hua XXXIV, xlv).
- 61.
At a certain point, Drummond himself remarks that “The neutrality-modification, in fact, does not necessarily involve a departure from the natural attitude” (1990, 52). For him, however, this happens only because the neutrality modification, understood now just as a first step of doubt, does not on its own amount to “the [full] performance of the phenomenological reduction, [but] it is merely the precondition for any kind of reflection” (ibid.). For Drummond and Sokolowski “the” reduction must be completed with the philosophical reflection that has the specific character of being phenomenological; a character that consists in turning our concern from the object to its abstracted meaning or sense, qua way of our being conscious of the object (see also the following §2.6.3). The reader can also consult the relevant lemmas in the more recent Drummond 2007.
- 62.
As we already saw transiently in the previous note, for Sokolowski and Drummond, “the” phenomenological reduction leads us, reflectively, to an intentional act, with our interest being directed upon the neutralized—from the point of view of “actuality” (vaguely understood)—intentional objectity that the act was previously aiming at in its direct mode. In order to arrive at the residua of the full reduction, i.e., at the intentional objects as senses or meanings, they suggest that we have to make a further move, i.e., transfer ourselves to the logical attitude. The latter consists in a combination of neutralization applied to the intentional objectity and to the act that is aiming at it, plus reflection upon the so-modified objectity (but no longer also upon the act in which the latter appears). The logical attitude, then, presents us with corresponding meanings. See Drummond 1990, 51, 54, 58 n. 11. Consult also the relevant lemmas in Drummond 2007.
- 63.
See Crowell 1990, 504, 508.
- 64.
See ibid., 503ff.
- 65.
See ibid., 514–5. On the partial truth of this view see, however, also §2.7 in the present chapter.
- 66.
See ibid., 507–8, 515. See also Mohanty 1985, ch. 13 and, especially, pp. 192, 202. The view that Phenomenology is the “analysis of meanings” is quite widespread among Husserlians, especially among those who show particular interest in establishing communicative channels with analytic philosophers. A stance like the latter is praiseworthy; and would have been fruitful if it enjoyed mutual trust and esteem. Be that as it may, Husserl himself opposed his interpreters who saw his Phenomenology as a mere analysis of meanings (see, e.g., “Draft” §10). Phenomenology is intuitional research into the essential structures of phenomena (in correlation to the empty meanings or—in case of pre-linguistic intentionality—senses by which they were or are being aimed at); it is not any usual discursive analysis of meanings. And what is most curious, for Phenomenology, even the empty aiming meanings (and senses) are seen as phenomena to be analysed or rather—as it generally pertains to phenomena—elucidated in evidence.
- 67.
See Ideas I, §88.
- 68.
See PTP, 252/295.
- 69.
See Carnap (1967), 101ff.
- 70.
- 71.
See especially his very important Carnap 1950. Surprisingly, let me add here, Quine’s more radical pragmatist response to Carnap could, I think, be read as parallel to what was here reconstructed as the ontological point of view, enabled by Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological reduction. Under certain conditions that have to do with questions of primordiality with reference to language learning over pre-linguistic perception (and vice versa), Quine’s view (1951) can be read in this way. We read there that from a strictly epistemological point of view, i.e., based on what is given to the mere senses, we can say that, e.g., the ontological claims of nuclear Physics are not superior to these of ancient Greek mythology, etc. That is, to put it simply, from within the corresponding experiential frameworks, protons in the nuclear laboratory are understood as no more real than goddess Athena in her interventions during the Trojan battles. To put it more phenomenologically, what I experience as real (read: actual) depends in each case on the level of intentional functionings (primordial or founded) and on the internal consistency of the intentional constitutions, based on the ways consciousness interprets its relevant reell contents. See also the references in the next note.
- 72.
Regarding Husserl’s interesting influence on Carnap’s philosophical thinking, see also the important Haddock 2008, especially 50ff.
- 73.
- 74.
To be sure, Husserl had already recognized that work as (Eidetic) Descriptive Psychology, i.e., as science, from the time of its first publication. See 5th LI of the 2nd ed., §16 first note. See also, however, the “Draft” (1913), §11.
- 75.
See Hua IX, 267.
- 76.
- 77.
From this point of view only, this a priori laying-of-the-ground for the building of the specifically empirical research of a science may also be considered as the philosophical or metaphysical part of this science. In this part, the a priori philosophical work constitutes the object domain even of an empirical science, i.e., it forms the metaphysics of the object that the empirical research will investigate further. Otherwise, empirical research would be blind, stumbling accidentally, as it were, one time on this and another on that being, without having any clue about how to avoid, e.g., mixing cases that resemble each other only superficially (not essentially). Additional information is given in Chap. 3, n. 18, of the present book. In my Ph.D. thesis, after the development of an interpretation of the ground tenets in Husserl’s Phenomenology, I defended the view that the above philosophical preparation of the object domain of Physics as an empirical science is being accomplished in what is known as scientific “thought experiments” (see Theodorou 2000). Some points concerning this fundamental idea, presented in connection with the possibility and meaning of science’s historicization, can be found in Theodorou 2010b.
- 78.
An important remark must be made at this point. Until now, we have been seeing Phenomenological Psychology as a Pure or Philosophical Psychology, functioning as a founding mathesis for any empirical psychological research. We have also been saying that Phenomenological Psychology has a merely epistemological value and function. These two ideas, however, do not exhaust the character of Phenomenological Psychology and thus may, in their partiality, create a problem of consistency. In order to arrive at a clearer view we must also say this: in its founding function, Phenomenological Psychology at the same time fixes and posits its own subject matter, the psyche or the psychic phenomena, in their essential make up, and then proceeds to a host of additional a priori researches regarding further details, interconnections, etc., of these phenomena. It thus provides empirical psychological research—in our day this could be the so-called Cognitive Science—with the possibility to further know what it tries to experiment with, in the empirical-natural research of what it is trying to locate, etc. In this, i.e., in fixing and positing the psychic in its essential constitution, Phenomenological Psychology acts metaphysically. Once this sole metaphysical move is made, it immediately turns to epistemological issues. More on the issue of Phenomenology as science and as philosophy will be said in Chap. 3 of this book, especially with regard to how Heidegger understood it.
- 79.
See also, e.g., Hua IX, 240-4.
- 80.
See §2.6.1 above.
- 81.
See also Hua XXXIV, 481–6; Hua VI, §§52–54. Fink, in fact, bases his whole presentation of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology exclusively on this (later) idea of an unintelligibility as arising in the context of the transcendental reduction (1970, 101, which is, however, developed in 114ff.). In the end, this is a problem regarding the phenomenologically justified content of a Phenomenological Egology, a problem with which Fink was deeply acquainted, and with which he had already struggled in his collaboration with Husserl for the so-called “Sixth Cartesian Meditation”; an effort that would solve the impasses that had blocked Husserl’s further development of the Phenomenological Egology contained in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (1929). Here, a more transparent story is being presented. We will come back to the importance of this “unintelligibility” and to its connection with the quarrel between Husserl and Heidegger in Chap. 3, §3.10.
- 82.
- 83.
See Schuhmann’s Husserl-Chronik (1977). For more details on Husserl’s adoption of basic Leibnizean schemes of thought, from “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” to his research manuscripts of 1937, see (Cristin 1990; Mertens 2000; MacDonald 2007). On the difficulties and the impasse that this mature, monadological, transcendental turn signals, see also Chap. 10, §10.4.
- 84.
See also Fink 1970, 133ff., 139f.
- 85.
- 86.
To be sure, as must have already appeared, a ‘milder’ version of “unintelligibility” could be projected in the context of a Phenomenological Psychology referring to an intentional consciousness qua (mundane) psyche, which is intentionally constituting either according to the eidetic constituting model of the LI (Materie/instance in the act) or according to that of the Ideas I (time field of ‘transcendetal’ syntheses). I mean by this the—either way suspended—psycho-physical connection: whence the reell contents and whereupon the constituting functions? See also Chap. 10.
- 87.
Naturally, this dimension of Husserl’s itinerary sheds a new light on the first round of elucidations and distinctions that were made above, in §§2.2–6.
- 88.
See Fink 1970, 74ff, 145 n. 1, and especially, 92ff, 96f.
- 89.
On Natorp’s influence upon Husserl after the publication of the Ideas I, see also Kern 1964, §31 and, especially, 348ff.
- 90.
See Kern 1964, 350 n. 4.
- 91.
A line of reconstruction that is present also in De Boer (1978), cf. also Ricoeur 1967, 14–5, 24ff. To be sure, Fink makes an allusion to the fact that there is something problematic in the presentation of the transcendental reduction in Ideas I, but he considers this a matter of “inadequacy,” “inappropriateness,” “equivocality,” or “provisionality” and not of “literally negligence” (1970, 114, 120, 122, 130, 135, 136). A detailed and unprejudiced examination of the matter, however, shows that it is much more complicated. Moreover, as can be seen from Husserl’s self-corrections on his personal copies of the Ideas I (see Hua III.2), we are not dealing with mere mistakes in the presentation of clearly discovered ideas and phenomena, but with an incomplete and problematic conception of that early transcendental phenomenological methodology, which only later gets corrected in another direction. After all, Husserl was struggling to properly cope with the idea of the reductions even as late as 1936 (see his letter to his son Gerhart from February 20, 1936, where he says that only in the Crisis had he achieved the first lucid, all-sided, and clear presentation of “the” phenomenological reduction)! With all this, also, I do not mean to claim that Phenomenology can only be done in its monadological transcendental sense, and that we have to accommodate ourselves in its context. See also Chap. 10 in this book.
- 92.
See Ideas I, 115, n. 46/Hua III.2, 500. That, in the 1920s, Husserl corrected the Ideas I so as to upgrade them to a fully monadological transcendental level may be seen also from his corrections in §51 and elsewhere. The term “mundane” moreover, appears just once in the Ideas I (Hua III.1, 109; the English translation has it as “worldly”) and refers to a totally irrelevant subject matter. In all likelihood, this absence signifies that at that time, Husserl hadn’t yet arrived at a clear-cut distinction between the mundane and the fully monadological transcendental (but only to that between the natural and the—unknowably so—mundane transcendental).
- 93.
This is the story developed in Ideas I, §§27–31.
- 94.
- 95.
Cf., however, Fink 1970, 112.
- 96.
See Ideas I, 193ff./182ff., 283f./273f.
- 97.
De Boer, mostly following Fink (1933), sees only one mundaneity, connected with the psychological intentional consciousness of Phenomenological Psychology, the psychological psyche (see De Boer 1978, 168, 175, 245–6, 410). We have seen, however, that mundane may also be the transcendentally functioning or synthesizing intentional consciousness. Otherwise put, the transcendentally functioning, mundane psyche is, properly speaking, nothing else than a (post-eidetic) psychological psyche, the psyche of the Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology that now constitutes otherwise. And this was the case in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology before the 1920s. De Boer gives us excellent description of the final transcendental reduction and of its outcome: “[What] remains after the transcendental reduction is being itself. It is not the correlate of a mundane consciousness regarded as a region; it is rather the correlate of an a-regional consciousness that is the origin of all regions.” (1978, 431; emphasis added). He, however, projects this later post-1920 view even back on the Ideas I. In the Ideas I, though, Husserl still refers to transcendental consciousness as a residuum, as a sphere of Being, and even as a region of Being or generally as some kind of remainder or leftover (see also Ideas I, title of the third chapter and §§33, 42, 49, 55, 57, 61, 76). Even at his best, Husserl defines there transcendental consciousness as a primal region (Urregion) (Ideas I, 171/159), i.e., still in terms of regions, of a region—and not as plainly and simply a-regional field of constitutions as De Boer, echoing Fink (1970, 122), wants it.
- 98.
It is probably this unnoticed transition that makes De Boer actually notice that, at least in the Idea (1907), the reduction has a “psychological flavour” (see above note 57). Something analogous, however, must be said even for the “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911), where, in fact, Husserl uses for the first time the term “monad,” and the Ideas I (1913). Especially with regard to the view that by “Rigorous Science” Phenomenological Psychology is actually meant, see a further confirmation in Hua XXXIV, 4.
- 99.
See Ideas I, 110/104.
- 100.
For a moment of relative clarity on this, see, e.g., Hua IX, 253.
- 101.
See also Fink 1970, 119ff., where we can excavate such a distinction between Phenomenological Psychology as a regional science of the mundane psychic and Transcendental Phenomenology as an all-encompassing First Philosophy.
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Theodorou, P. (2015). The Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl’s Phenomenology. In: Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 83. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16622-3_2
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