Abstract
If we understand patient adherence as to the performance of a therapeutic action , we can now propose an ‘intentionalist ’ model of adherence, establishing a certain hierarchy of mental states in which emotions play as vital a role as knowledge , beliefs , skills , etc. In this model, emotions play this role in inducing revisions of beliefs , expectations, and preferences of patients’ various desires . It is obvious that non-intentional factors (such as pain or pleasure) , can have a motivational role—indeed, sometimes overwhelmingly so. Events can intervene as a substratum of new beliefs, or by provoking the emergence of emotions. Exogenous factors, such as the presence or absence of resources can intervene in encouraging or limiting patient adherence. It is important to recognize that a fundamental gap exists between therapeutic actions and their results. For not only do actions not assure a desired result, they may only play a partial role if the desired result does happen. At best, our actions are only partly responsible for what happens to us. For example, a patient may increase her insulin dose to reduce her blood sugar after dinner. But it is misleading to say that her action was to ‘normalize her blood sugar’. This does not mean, of course, that by adjusting her insulin dose, the patient does not try to normalize her blood sugar (and that her doctor must not do everything in order to convince her to try to do it).
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Notes
- 1.
This aspect of willful action is important in criminal law—for acts which lack willfulness are not punishable. Most legal definitions of insanity, for example, include the idea that the insane person was unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law, so that regardless of the damage wrought by the behavior, the insane defendant is not held responsible. The criminal law struggles with liminal cases such intoxication, delusional insanity, actions committed by sleepwalkers, and so forth, where a great deal hinges on whether an action was willful or not. I am grateful to John Meyers for this comment.
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Reach, G. (2015). An Intentionalist Model of Patient Adherence. In: The Mental Mechanisms of Patient Adherence to Long-Term Therapies. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 118. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12265-6_4
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