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Disagreement and Proceduralism in the Perspective of Legisprudence

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The Rationality and Justification of Legislation

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 1))

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Abstract

It is generally insisted that the mission of legisprudence is to reduce disagreements in a society. However, disagreements are inevitable in law-making even when based on rationality. This can be explained in the context of proceduralism: Substance-based Proceduralism, Procedure-centered Proceduralism, and Disagreement-respecting Proceduralism. Most proceduralists, especially substance-based proceduralism and procedure-centered proceduralism, presume the conception of “pure procedure”. They try to find a way to reduce disagreements, but there ultimately occurs the exclusion of others. On the contrary, disagreement-respecting proceduralism denies the concept of the tangible pure procedure. This type of proceduralism acknowledges that there can always be disagreements which cannot be removed and also infinite regression in legislative argumentation. In this perspective, legisprudence should aim not to pursue the only rational law-making or remove disagreements, but to find a way of cohabitation among value disagreements. At this point, legisprudence holds the academic autonomy or distinction from other traditional legal dogmatics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In these kinds of proceduralism, except for John Rawls whom will be explained below, there are Benhabib (1996: 69), Bohman (1998: 401), Dahl (1989: 175) and Barry (1979: 156–157).

  2. 2.

    See Ackermann (1991: 3–35).

  3. 3.

    In this respect, Lamore (1987: 53) suggests the concept of “a neutral justification of political neutrality”.

  4. 4.

    In here, James Bohman names the Rawls’s proceduralism as impure proceduralism. See Bohman (1996: 7).

  5. 5.

    In these kinds of proceduralism, except for Jürgen Habermas whom will be explained below, there are Cohen (1997: 72–91), Dworkin (1996: 23–24) and Tribe (2000: 1367).

  6. 6.

    See also Tushnet (1980: 1047).

  7. 7.

    In these kinds of proceduralism, except Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson whom will be explained below, there are Bellamy (2007) and Waldron (1999).

  8. 8.

    They suggest the principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability as regulating conditions for deliberative procedure, and the principles of basic opportunity and fair opportunity as regulating conditions for deliberative outcome or substance.

  9. 9.

    See Galstone (1999: 39) and Simon (1999: 49).

  10. 10.

    See Bellamy (2007: 5) and Waldron (1999: 107–108).

  11. 11.

    Relating to the limitations of Toulmin’s argumentation model, see Freeman (1991), Macoubrie (2003) and Walton (1996).

  12. 12.

    See Habermas (1984).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National Assembly Research Service, 1 Uisadang-ro, Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul, 150-703, South Korea

    Woomin Shim

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  1. Woomin Shim
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Correspondence to Woomin Shim .

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  1. Professor of Law and Jurisprudence, University Brussels/University Leuven, Stormstraat 1, Brussels/Leuven, 1000, Belgium

    Luc J. Wintgens

  2. , Department of Law, University of La Rioja, Campus UR (Edificio Quintiliano), Logroño, 26004, Spain

    A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana

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Shim, W. (2013). Disagreement and Proceduralism in the Perspective of Legisprudence. In: Wintgens, L., Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) The Rationality and Justification of Legislation. Legisprudence Library, vol 1. Springer, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00062-6_7

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