Abstract
In this last chapter, we consider the timeless solutions to the dilemma of foreknowledge. In particular, in the first part, we present the Timeless Eternalist view, in which a timeless God eternally sees a world as it is described by a B-theory of time. In the second part, we develop an original account, which we call Perspectival Fragmentalism: this view adopts a particular perspectival framework for the interpretation of the propositions, and it assumes a robust, dynamic, conception of time. The background metaphysics is inspired by Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism.
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- 1.
For a collection of papers that discuss the timeless and temporal conception of God, see Tapp and Runggaldier (2011).
- 2.
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, IV, 6.
- 3.
See, for example, Rogers (2007b).
- 4.
- 5.
This point is neglected by Cyr (2018), who alleges that the basic move to rebut the theological fatalist argument is to grant that divine beliefs depend on free human choices. For the sake of this rebuttal, it matters little whether divine beliefs are temporal or timeless. So, the timeless solution has no advantage over the temporal solution because the timeless solution also must grant this dependence. However, Dependence has a different cost than the temporal solutions: the latter must say that the past depends on the future, which is metaphysically peculiar. By contrast, on the timeless view, it suffices to say that a temporal fact depends on another fact that is in a certain sense simultaneous with it—in the sense of ET-simultaneity. Obviously, any advantage of the timeless solution would disappear if between divine timeless beliefs and times there were not a relation of ET-simultaneity but another relation in light of which it would be difficult to see how the timeless reality can be determined in some way by the temporal reality.
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- 7.
For some support for this thesis, see the careful scrutiny of Plantinga’s objection contained in Leftow (1991b).
- 8.
The different positions of timeless and temporal solutions regarding the determination of the past have been acknowledged by Widerker himself in a later paper: see Widerker (1994).
- 9.
The combination between timeless God and Eternalism has also been advocated by Paul Helm in Helm (1988) and MacBeath and Helm (1989). However, Helm rejects Libertarianism and embraces a compatibilist conception of freedom. For the aims of this essay, Rogers’ position, which tries to reconcile human freedom in strong sense and divine omniscience, is more interesting.
- 10.
- 11.
Kretzmann’s argument is foreshadowed by Prior (1962), who states that a timeless God cannot “know that the 1960 final examinations at Manchester are now over; for this isn’t something that He or anyone could know timelessly, because it just isn’t true timelessly” (p. 116).
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- 13.
See Kvanvig (1986, p. 158):
The sentences “It is now raining” and “It was then raining” have different meanings, but we have already noted that the proposition expressed by a sentence ought not be confused with the meaning of that sentence; we should not infer that there are different propositions that are the objects of belief when one person (today) believes what is expressed for him by “It is now raining”, and another person (tomorrow) believes what is expressed for him by “It was then raining”.
- 14.
Zagzebski (1991, pp. 52–56) similarly distinguishes between the content of knowledge and the mode of knowledge. Indexical sentences express both a propositional content and a certain perspective. She argues that God, being infinite, cannot have the same perspective that finite beings have and concludes that if God is not required to assume a certain spatial perspective on the world to know the truth of spatial propositions, then He is also not required to assume a certain temporal perspective on the world to know what time is.
- 15.
It might be argued that the perspective one has on one’s own thoughts and states of mind is privileged over the perspectives the other subjects can have on these mental contents. A complete analysis of this problem should investigate the nature of mental contents, the way through which we have access to these contents, and the question of whether there are first-person facts. This is beyond the scope of this book, but see Zagzebski (2013).
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Using this framework, Leftow can hinder the arguments in favour of the thesis that the timeless view does not present any advantage over the temporal views (Ockhamism and Molinism) more effectively than Stamp and Kretzmann. Indeed, it is untrue in 1995 that God timelessly believes that Emma drinks a beer at the party in 2019. A sentence like this states that in a certain temporal frame it is the case that a certain event occurs in the timeless frame. Being that the frames are incommensurable, this sentence is obviously untrue. See Leftow (1991b).
- 19.
The idea of a perspective or context of evaluation circulates in the branching time semantics in very different forms. The model of Belnap et al. (2001) uses the parameter of the context, and that of Malpass and Wawer (2012) employs the parameter of the context of use. Here we adopt a notion of perspective close to that of MacFarlane (2003, 2014). According to MacFarlane, every proposition must be evaluated at two different times, which he calls the context of assessment and the context of evaluation. In our proposal as well, the evaluation occurs at two different times. In De Florio and Frigerio (2019), we consider the differences between these approaches and ours.
- 20.
Developing this interpretation of counterfactual propositions seems to be a very fecund path of inquiry. Here, however, we do not take that into account. See De Florio and Frigerio (2019) for a proposal for the treatment of counterfactual propositions.
- 21.
Alternatively, and more plausibly, eternalists can maintain that one of the branches of the tree is the actual world, while the other branches are not real, but only representations of possible alternative scenarios. In Sect. 6.3, we have adopted this solution. However, this view is at odds with perspectival semantics, according to which all future contingents are indeterminate. If there is an ontologically privileged future, then future tensed sentences are not indeterminate, but have a truth value: Fφ is true if φ is true in the unique existing future.
- 22.
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De Florio, C., Frigerio, A. (2019). The Timeless Solution. In: Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31300-5_6
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