Abstract
In this chapter, we consider two families of solutions to the dilemma of foreknowledge: the Open Theism and the Theological Determinism. They can be seen as extreme solutions since they radically reinterpret the notions occurring in the problem. Specifically, open theists redefine the concept of omniscience, while the theological determinists redefine the concept of free will. We advance some criticisms to these views.
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Notes
- 1.
In this chapter, we will mainly refer to Jewish and Christian Traditions. We believe, nevertheless, that many of the proposed analyses could be exported also to the Islamic Tradition, covering, then, the whole spectrum of monotheisms.
- 2.
As we previously said, and as we will see in the following, one can deny the first premise by stating that God does not know in time: therefore, it is not correct to say that yesterday God believed that p (see Chap. 6). The negation of the open theist is more radical since it redefines the very idea of foreknowledge.
- 3.
Sanders (1994, p. 99).
- 4.
One of the most discussed passages is the one where God seems to be sorry about His desire to destroy the city of Nineveh: “‘Who knows? God may yet relent and with compassion turn from his fierce anger so that we will not perish.’ When God saw what they did and how they turned from their evil ways, he relented and did not bring on them the destruction he had threatened” (Jonah 3, 9–10).
- 5.
See Pinnock (1994, pp. 103–105); see also Hasker (1994), who claims: “For us moderns, this preference for permanence over change is scarcely compelling. Indeed, it is arguable that in our intellectual life as well as in our general culture the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction, so that if anything at all remains constant for a while our response is one of boredom and impatience. Be that as it may, the extreme valuational preference for immutability has little hold on our thinking, and the appeal of theological doctrines based on this valuation is weakened accordingly” (p. 129).
- 6.
See Rice (2004, pp. 25–26).
- 7.
Some authors use the term “ontic”; others, “ontological”. Since the alleged difference of these two terms is probably rooted in the obscurities of phenomenology, we will use “ontic” and “ontological” indifferently.
- 8.
Here, it seems that Rhoda is confusing the ontology of time, its dynamics, and its topology. As we have seen in Sect. 2.5, it is possible to accept both Eternalism and branching time. In that case, at time t, there are many complete series of subsequent world states, but no dynamics at all. On the other hand, it is possible to endorse a Moving Spotlight Theory with no branching. However, in the following, Rhoda makes clear that he is thinking about Presentism or the Growing Block view or Erosionism (probably in a version similar to McCall’s) as the metaphysics of time that make the future ontologically open. Let us notice, nevertheless, that the open theist views are compatible also with an eternalist dynamic view of time with an open future: for instance, a Moving Spotlight Theory with many future branches, in which it is not always determined which branch the light will illuminate.
- 9.
Let us notice that the existence of a unique series of future events is compatible with indeterminism and, therefore, with C. For instance, one could endorse a branching Eternalism and state that the events that happen at a certain point of the block do not causally determine those happening at the subsequent points; nonetheless, one could affirm that only one history actually exists, while alternative histories are pure possibilities.
- 10.
- 11.
Given that A ↔E and E →P, it is sufficient to prove the first principle in order to get the other two.
- 12.
As we have seen, this implication is not obvious.
- 13.
As we have seen, this implication is not obvious in light of TRL semantics.
- 14.
- 15.
For this line of argument, see for instance, Flint (1998, ch. 1).
- 16.
For a detailed criticism of the hypothesis of transworld depravity, see De Florio and Frigerio (2013).
- 17.
“God allows the world to be affected by the power of the creature and takes risks accompanying any genuine relatedness. There is a paradox of strength and vulnerability of God according to the Scriptures. Though ontologically strong, God can be vulnerable because of the decision to make a world like this. The Lord of the universe has chosen to limit his power by delegating some to the creature. God gives room to creatures and invites them to be covenant partners, opening up the possibility of loving fellowship but also of some initiative being taken away from God and creatures coming into conflict with his plans” ( Pinnock 1994, p. 115).
- 18.
- 19.
Aquinas conceived God as pure actuality; therefore, this thought is present in the Thomistic and Dominican traditions. See Garrigou-Lagrange (1934):
If the divine causality is not predetermining with regard to our choice (…), the divine knowledge is fatally determined by it. To wish to limit the universal causality and absolute independence of God necessarily brings one to place a passivity in Him, a passivity in the self-subsisting Being, in the self-subsisting intellect. (Garrigou-Lagrange 1934, p. 538)
- 20.
See Zagzebski (1991, pp. 154–162).
- 21.
Fischer’s cases are very similar to Frankfurt’s.
- 22.
- 23.
On this, see Pereboom (2006).
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De Florio, C., Frigerio, A. (2019). Extreme Measures. In: Divine Omniscience and Human Free Will. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31300-5_3
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