Abstract
The adequate point of view to evaluate if Husserl and Peirce’s philosophy are compatible or not, diverging or not, is clearly indicated by Husserl and Peirce themselves: interpreting their apparently common and opposite statements from their respective guiding principles. In order to do so, it is important, first, to list and understand their reciprocal cross-references in order to see if obvious or possible divergences do not rest on bare misunderstandings. Secondly, one should discern common theoretical issues, concepts and methods. It seems that they focus on the setting-up and reform of logic and, in close connection with it, the development of a logic of probability. Lastly those parallel projects must be related their leading principles, which are, respectively, the pragmatic maxim and the paradoxical presupposition-less principle of transcendental phenomenology.
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Notes
- 1.
In a conference published in Chap. 6 of Diagrammatology; An Investigation of the borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology and Semiotics. p. 141, Stjernfelt argues: “It is a strange fact that so little comparison between Husserl and Peirce has been undertaken. Probably the historical reason is that the two philosophers both stand on the initial edge of the analytical/continental split and ended up as founding fathers for each their main currents in philosophy—phenomenology and pragmatism/semiotics, respectively. Seemingly rooted in each their specific tradition, the large bulk of common ideas and interests in their works has been ignored. Distorted parodies of the two—Husserl the transcendental solipsist, Peirce the pan-semiotician—have added to preclude a closer Auseinandersetzung between the two” (Stjernfelt 2007: 140) See the “Auseinandersetzung” of Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2006) with Professor Stjernfelt.
- 2.
For conjectural and geographical reasons, in the first version of his pioneering paper, Spiegelberg fully ignores the obvious and explicit cross-references. He mentions some of them in the second version of his paper, before concluding that they scarcely change his general conclusion.
- 3.
G. Deledalle (1994), for diametrical opposite reasons, tends to reduce to naught and a mere homonymies terminological coincidences.
- 4.
Cf. Dallas Willard’s note on Husserl’s semiotic: “See especially Logical Investigations, I (subsections 9–14, 20 & 23), III (subsection 15), V (Appendix to subsections 11 & 20), and elsewhere. The striking similarity between the views of C. S. Peirce and Husserl on the basic sign phenomenon should not go unnoted”. A similarity, which Peirce would not have accepted: “ I have often thought that if it were not that it would sound too German (and I have an utter contempt for German logic) I would entitle my logic-book (which is now coming on) ‘Logic considered as Semeiotic’ (or probably Semeotic without the i), but everybody would think I was translating als Semeiotik betrachtet, which I couldn’t stand » (CP 8.377, Peirce (1958). Emphasis mine, except for the title of the Book and the German expression). Other important contributions in that direction are Dougherty (1980; 1983) and Haaparanta (1994).
- 5.
Cf. Husserl about Hobbes in Hua 37: 58. (For all Husserlian references we adopt the following convention: Hua 37 = Husserliana, Vol. 37). Or Peirce (1958) in CP 8.92 about the “outer clothing of geometry” and Peirce in CP 3.559, about the function of diagrams as a stripping; or else CP 7.540 about Hume’s empiricist clothing (CP = Collected Papers of Peirce).
- 6.
This is due to the mediation of Brentano’s Lectures on the Doctrine of Correct Judgment, held between 1874 and 1895, and 1884–1885, to which Husserl attended, and published as Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil, F. Meiner, 1977. See Brentano (1977), Sects. 3 and 26.
- 7.
- 8.
See. Frederik Stjernfelt (University of Aarhus) in Diagrams and Categorial Intuition—Parallels between Late Peirce and Early Husserl, in 2009, Conference held in Helsinki, which claims that “The parallels and connections between late Peirce and early Husserl have not been much researched. This paper reviews the factual connections between the two and argues that there is a series of overlooked parallels between their philosophies, in particular with regard to the epistemological access to ideal objects. Here, Peirce’s notions of ‘diagram’ and ‘diagrammatical reasoning’ and Husserl’s notion of ‘categorial intuition’ play similar roles in the overall structure of their theories”.
- 9.
Both are mentioned at the same place as essential references by Weyl (1949: 63): “Peirce Charles S., ‘Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole’s Calculus of Logic’, Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 9 (1870), pp. 317–378. Husserl, E., Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Max Niemeyer, 1901. Red. Elmar Holenstein, La Haye, Nijhoff, 1975 (Husserliana XVIII).”
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
See declaration in the Baldwin’s Dictionary, at the article “Symbolic Logic”: “An algebra of Logic enables us to disengage from any subject matter the formal element which gives its necessary (apodictic) force to reasoning; it is therefore nothing but an exact logic, that is to say, the complete realization of the purpose of formal logic (cf. proposition)”. Baldwin's (1901–1902).
- 16.
The Deductive Calculus and the Logic of Contents, first published in Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, vol. 15, 2, 1891, pp. 168–189. Republished in Husserliana XXII, pp. 44–66.
- 17.
See about this division, Husserl’s Prolegomena, Sects. 69 and 72, which should be compared to Peirce’s division between mathematics and empirical sciences.
- 18.
Baldwin’s Dictionary: 641.
- 19.
Baldwin’s Dictionary: 645. We should compare Husserl’s theory of epistemological technologies (and of semiotic technics) as a necessary but not exclusive underpinnings (or Fundament) of science to Peirce’s acute knowledge of both.
- 20.
Baldwin’s Dictionary: 646.
- 21.
Hua 22: 395–6; trans. Willard 438.
- 22.
Hua 22: 54, Willard: 102.
- 23.
Hua 22: 90, Willard: 138.
- 24.
After Charles Hartshome (Letter to Husserl, 1 8. IX. 1928, in Husserl, BW Die Freibürger Schüler) Husserl (1994b: 122), Stjernfelt (Diagrammatology) notices the “striking temporal coincidence between Peirce’s use of the term ‘phenomenology’ (1902–1906) and his Husserl references. When Peirce discusses the origin of the concept, he refers to Hegel only, but this simultaneity points to the possibility of Peirce having borrowed the term from his—probably—cursory readings in LU”. But “As to Peirce’s explicit references to Husserl, they are rather few—twice he is mentioned only as part of lists of German logicians (‘Minute Logic’, 1902; ‘Review of John Dewey’s Studies in Logical Theory’, The Nation 79, Sept 15, 1904, 219–20; 8.188)”. Stjernfelt (2007: 144).
- 25.
Peirce, CP 8.189.—For other appreciations of the English tradition, see for instance CP 3.199.
- 26.
We find a similar critic in Husserl’s account of some representatives of this trend. “As ultimate criterion we must accept the direct consciousness of Evidence which accompanies necessary thought. (p. 199) This consciousness is to be characterized as a qualitatively peculiar feeling, which is to be thought of as analogous to the so-called “feeling for language” (Sprachgefühls). As the correctness of linguistic expression is not, in the usual case, governed by a conscious knowledge of grammatical laws, but rather by an immediate feeling of correctness that arises with increasing practical exercise in the language, so thinking is governed by, so to speak, a “feeling for thought” (Denkgefühl). Certainly this consciousness of Evidence also can turn up in the individual case without the judgment realized being objectively valid.”. Hua 22, 203–204, trans. Willard 248–249. According to Husserl they are affiliate to a Sund German Branch of the German School, the theological Catholic School. These authors are “C. Braig, Vom Denken: Abriss der Logik, Freiburg i. Br., 1896. C. Frick, Logica in usum scholarum, Freiburg i. Br., 1896. E. Commer, Logik. Als Lehrbuch dargestellt, Paderborn, 1897. Elemente der ogik. Nach Dr. Stöckls Lehrbuch der Philosophie (Course for students of Catholic theology, Vol. 1), Mainz, 1899. Th. Elsenhans, “Das Verhaltnis der Logik zur Psychologie,” Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Vol. 109, 1897, pp. 195–212”. (ibid.)
- 27.
Peirce, CP 2.19. See also Peirce: CP 2.152.
- 28.
CP 8.377. Same contrast and same nuances hold for his position regarding German philosophy. CP 1.5.
- 29.
CP 2.163. Peirce adds, without presenting it as a consequence or a corollary of this premise: “Now a most singular phenomenon characterizes all the German logics of the nineteenth century which I have examined--certainly, considerably over fifty of them–and distinguishes them from those of the English. It is that every one of them somewhere falls into a logical fallacy”.
- 30.
“Suffice it to say that I seemed to myself to be blindly groping among a deranged system of conceptions; and after trying to solve the puzzle in a direct speculative, a physical, a historical, and a psychological manner, I finally concluded the only way was to attack it as Kant had done from the side of formal logic” (CP 1.563).
- 31.
This reduction is retraced in Peirce: CP 1.563.
- 32.
Peirce: CP 2.17 (Emphasis mine).
- 33.
CP 2. 170.
- 34.
CP 2.152.
- 35.
Peirce: CP 2.17.
- 36.
See Matthew E. Moore’s Preface excuse: “In order to keep the volume of manageable length, it has been necessary to limit its scope to the metaphysical and epistemological issues that have come to dominate the philosophy of mathematics as we know it. As a result there is nothing here about probability, a major preoccupation of Peirce’s and an area in which his importance is widely acknowledged. Philosophers of mathematics have largely ceded probability to the philosophy of science, so there is some justification for this omission in the (arguably misdrawn) boundaries that divide these specializations. In any case Peirce’s writings on probability deserve a volume like this one, all to themselves.» (Philosophy of Mathematics, Preface, page x). Among many other instances, see Peirce’s critic of the teaching of logic in American universities (PW, Vol 5, p. 354).
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
For references in Hua 17, Hua 30, Hua 28, Hua 07, 08 and Hua 20, see Lobo former note.
- 40.
Hua 22, 446, trans. Willard 495.
- 41.
Hua 22, 446, trans. Willard 496.
- 42.
Such as Felix Belussi Modaltheoretischen Grundlagen der Husserlschen Phänomenologie, 1990 and Olav Wiegand, Interpretationen der Modallogik, Ein Beitrag zur phanomenologischen Wissenschaftstheorie, Springer, 1998. For a more specific approach to the question, see Albino Lancian (2012). The contributions of Oskar Becker should also be taken into account (Becker 1930, 1952) and the illuminating essay of Weyl (1940).
- 43.
We shall find those critics in Peirce and in Husserl. For detailed references see below text and notes from 70 to 74.
- 44.
The limits of this parallelism emerges slowly in Peirce and Husserl, but through different routes. CP 2.676, CP 2.697, CP 7.21, CP 7.43. In Husserl, see Lettre à Natorp du 29.3. 1897, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie, Texte aus dem Nachlass (1886–1901), Husserliana Vol. 21, Kluwer/ Nijhoff, La Haye, 1983, p. 392.
- 45.
Hua 22, 9, trans. Willard, 59.
- 46.
In Hua 28, Hua 03, Hua 17, Hua 30.
- 47.
Hua 24, 162, trans. 160. Same position in Hua 30, 248–249.
- 48.
Hua 22, 40, Willard 88.
- 49.
Hua 22, 40, Willard 88, and trans. Willard 441.
- 50.
Hua 17, 203; Trans. Cairn, 78. “We must not let ourselves be deceived, it seems, by the fact that syllogistics also admits of being treated algebraically and, when so treated, has a theoretical appearance similar to that of an algebra of quantities or numbers—nay more: that, according to George Boole’s brilliant observation, the calculus of arithmetic (considered formally) becomes reduced to the ‘logical calculus’, if one thinks of the series of cardinal numbers as limited to zero and one. Apophantic analytics and formal ontological analytics seem to be two different sciences, separated by their provinces.”
- 51.
Willard 84, Hua 22, 35–36. Similar objection by Venn and similar answer from Husserl. “Also, that the Boolean method so frequently utilizes senseless symbols does not yet in itself serve as the basis for a logical objection. We can only object, rather, that that method does not adequately justify the use [399] of such symbols”, trans. Willard 398–399.
- 52.
Hua 22, 40, trans. Willard 88.
- 53.
Hua 22, 42, trans. Willard 90.
- 54.
Hua 22, 40, trans. Willard 88.
- 55.
Hua 22, 42, Willard 90. “As a rule they are of such a simple type that to solve them by means of the calculus would be the most laughable of detours”.
- 56.
“This latter, which coincides formally with the former, can indeed be profitably applied in many particular fields of mathematics- for example, in the theory of functions, where manifolds of values of arguments frequently come into consideration. Likewise in the calculation of probabilities, where sets of chances make the application possible. Beginnings have already been made in these matters, but here too we do not have sufficient results definitively to decide the question about practical value. But I would in no case wish to cast doubt upon the extraordinary theoretical interest that belongs to the algorithmic treatment of the theory of pure deductions, as well as of pure set theory”.
- 57.
Hua 17, 203.
- 58.
See Studies in Logic and Probabilities, and especially p. 239, which reformulates retrospectively the purpose of the Laws of Thought. Boole (2004).
- 59.
Hua 30, 272.
- 60.
Hua 30, 271.
- 61.
Hua 30, 273. This represents a strong opposition to Peirce, who considers all mathematical reasonning as hypothetical. (See. For instance Baldwin’s Dictionnary).
- 62.
Lessons on Logic and epistemology, published under the title Vorlesungen über Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Husserliana 30 Hua 30 and Alte und New Logik, Husserl, Mat. 6.
- 63.
Hua 03, Ideas I, §§ 133–134. See Lobo (2011).
- 64.
Hua 23: 418.
- 65.
Hua 30; 250–251. Hua 17, note Sects. 35 and 50. Lobo (2018).
- 66.
Hua 30, 250.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
To be compared with Hausdorff, Beiträge zur Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, from 1901, in Hausdorff (2005) Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 5, pp. 531–532, and compare to Husserl (Hua 30, § 51–52) and Peirce (Probable Inference, Baldwin’s Dictionary, 354).
- 70.
On Laplace’s rationalism, see Husserl, Hua 06, 214.
- 71.
As Jayne’s claims, the position vis-à-vis Laplace is a marker in the controversy which arose at the turn of the 19th Century. The attacks from Boole and Venn were certainly not motivated by mere ignorance or mathematical incompetence from the part of the former. And the perspectives opened by Peirce and Husserl certainly do not belong to the “new group of workers” who could not digest and measure Laplace’s mathematical grandeur. If it is true that, in the case of Peirce, there was a concern about Darwin’s theory, this is certainly untrue for Husserl. See Jayne’s Historical Background in his Probability. Logic of Science, p. 315 sq.
- 72.
Hua 24, 132, Eng. Trans. 130–131. “Further aid is then given by induction, with its probability-inferences, which themselves come under that apodictic principles of probabilities, such as Laplace’s famous principle. Thus an Objectivity valid cognition has been excellently taken care of. But unfortunately this is only theory from the high. For what the theorist has meanwhile forgotten to say to himself is this: Since the actuality and likewise the possibility - the conceivability- of something existent of any sort derives the originality of its sense only from actual or possible “experience” I must ask experience itself, or clearly phantasied possible experiencing, what I have in it as something experienced. (Hua 17, 247–248, FTL, Trans. Cairn, 280)
- 73.
In Hua, 08, 214: “Das rationalistische Ideal des Laplace’schen Geistes ist falsch.”; Hua 06, 268 “But for the world as a world which also contains spiritual beings, this “being-in-advance” is an absurdity; here a Laplacian spirit is unthinkable”. See also Hua 29, 136. Or else Hua 29: 25, 148, 172, 183sq.
- 74.
For instance CP 2.761, CP 2.764, CP 2.785, CP 5.169, CP 8.219, CP 8.220, CP 8.221, CP 8.224.
- 75.
Op. cit. pp. 354–355.
- 76.
CP 3.45.
- 77.
CP 1.15.
- 78.
Published in CP 3.620.
- 79.
CP 3.620.
- 80.
CP 1.70. The methods of reasoning of science have been studied in various ways and with results which disagree in important particulars. The followers of Laplace treat the subject from the point of view of the theory of probabilities. After corrections due to Boole and others, that method yields substantially the results stated above.
- 81.
CP 4.326.
- 82.
CP 3.619.
- 83.
CP 3.618.
- 84.
CP 3.61.
- 85.
See Introduction to PW, Vol.2, p. xliii.
- 86.
Peirce: CP 4.4 “Besides, Boole’s algebra suggested strongly its own imperfection. (…). But the immense superiority of the Boolean method was apparent enough.”
- 87.
CP 2.747.
- 88.
Ibid.
- 89.
On relative terms (vs. absolute), and relative and average numbers, see “On the Theory of Errors of Observations, Coast Survey Report 1870, 200–224”, There are many problems in probabilities, which, being solved, give a relative number composed of two terms, one known and the other unknown. Such an indeterminate result shows that a wider “universe” must be adopted for one of the terms of the relative number. (…) The importance of average numbers arises from the fact that all our knowledge really consists of nothing but average numbers; for all our knowledge is derived from induction, and its analogue, hypothesis. (…) probability is itself only an average number (…) but the difficulty will be in great measure removed if we consider how it is that the knowledge of average numbers becomes useful in particular cases (…) There are many problems in probabilities, which, being solved, give a relative number composed of two terms, one known and the other unknown. Such an indeterminate result shows that a wider “universe” must be adopted for one of the terms of the relative number” (in PW, Vol III, p. 117).
- 90.
Peirce, PW, Vol. 2, p. 19
- 91.
Venn V The Logic of Chance7 P 21: North American Review 105 (July 1867):317–21, in Peirce’s Writings. Vol. 2, pp. 98–102.
- 92.
PW, Vol. 2, p. 100.
- 93.
“Let ba denote the frequency of b’s among the a’s. Then considered as a class, if a and b are events ba denotes the fact that if a happens b happens.” (CP 3.14).
- 94.
Ibid.
- 95.
This notion of strength is of course to be compared to Husserl’s notion of weight and loaded possibilities, in Hua 30, 252 sq.
- 96.
On the Logic of Quantity, 1895, in Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics, 2010, p. 47.
- 97.
On an Improvement in Boole’s Calculus of Logic, P 30: Presented 12 March 1867. Collected Writings, Vol. 2. pp. 21–23.
- 98.
F. Hausdorff’s Beiträge zur Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung from 1901. Hausdorff (2005, 527–589).
- 99.
Logic of Relatives, from 1870, (see CP 3.198).
- 100.
CP 3.449, Text from 1896; The Regenerated Logic, Monist, 1896, The Monist Volume: 7 Issue: 1 Pages: 19–42, here page 36.
- 101.
CP 3.450.
- 102.
On Fechner Peirce (1976: 96–98).
- 103.
And if any kinship should be established, it is surely on this particular point, as does M. Shafiei (2018), pp. 145–161.
- 104.
- 105.
- 106.
Rather than a “holding-to-be-so”, “we have the inconvenience of denying its name to the perceptual representation [wahrnehmende Vorstellung] as it naturally presents itself, for what we in fact have in such cases is a holding-to-be-so [Fürwahmehmen] of what is represented (even if only inauthentically) in the perceptual ‘representation”. Hua 22, 102, trans. Willard: 149.
- 107.
Vierteljahrsschrift ftir wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. 18, 1894, pp. 162–195, Willard (181).
- 108.
Die Grundprobleme der Logik, second and completely revised edition, Berlin, 1895. See Husserl (1994a), 230.
- 109.
Hua 22, 185, trans. Willard, 230.
- 110.
Not to be confused, as this frequently occurs, with “physical phenomena” in Brentano’s sense, i.e. sensuous and emotional data.
- 111.
Hua 22,186, trans. Willard, 231.
- 112.
Hua 22, 186, trans. Willard 231.
- 113.
Hua 22, 185–186, trans. Willard 231.
- 114.
Hua 22, 226, trans. Willard, 280.
- 115.
See in Vol III, Logic of Chances, p 278 and elsewhere. Probability reasoning as a part of logic of deduction, is « probable deduction » . See also in Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce's article on Probable inference.
- 116.
Early notes in from 1885 on Categories in W, Vol. 5 page, 241: For Quantitative logic see, New elements of Mathematics; Carnegie Application, p. 37 sq.
- 117.
See The First rules of Logic, 1898.
- 118.
56 [exact reference].
- 119.
Ibid.
- 120.
CP 2.19.
- 121.
W, Vol 3, Logic, Truth, and the Settlement of Opinion MS 179: Winter-Spring 1872. Emphasis mine.
- 122.
Fixation of Belief, p. 107, Popular Science Monthly, 12, November 1877, 1–15. Emphasis mine.
- 123.
Chapter 1 (Enlarged abstract) MS 182: Winter-Spring 1872 …
- 124.
Baldwin’s Dictionary and also CP 2.589.
- 125.
Hua 8, 32. Hua 8, 125–126: “Leitprinzip absoluter Rechtfertigungals Leitprinzip absoluter Rechtfertigun”.
- 126.
Hua 8, 309.
- 127.
See De Morgan too. [A (B)].
- 128.
All clearly introduced and justified in Ideas I, from § 79 and sq.
- 129.
Ideas I, § 76, Trans. Kertens, p. 171.
- 130.
We use the word “objectively”, into inverted commas, as Husserl does, in order to let room to axiological correlates or noemas (such as values, goals, goods, etc.) which are not subjectively orientated but not properly speaking objectified either.
- 131.
Williams James (1907), Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, New York and London, Longmans, Green & Co.
- 132.
Baldwin’s Dictionary, Article Pragmatic, Pragmatism, pp. 321–323.
- 133.
About the refutation of ethical skepticism, see Hua 28, 19–35. And about difficult relations between ethical reduction, ethical épokhè, universal ethical épokhè and phenomenological and transcendental épokhè, see. Hua 08, 155-163 and the notes pp. 316-318. An attempt at clarifying this situation in Lobo (2008, pp. 151–153)
- 134.
According to Stjernfelt “logic is founded upon it; it is a study that includes all kinds of possible experiences, including dreams and abstract thought; and it is a study—almost an outline of a Peircean phenomenological reduction—bracketing whether the phenomena it studies exists or not. Of course, Peirce does not share the later Husserl’s basing phenomenology on a study of conscious acts, but this difference seems more a difference of emphasis within a field than it is a foundational difference” (op. cit. p .142).
- 135.
Will find in Hua 28, 90, analog of probabilities in the domain of axiology and practice—and analog formulas using symbols from (modified Schröder’s/Boole’s symbol) to express them.
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Acknowledgements
I want to thank the editors, Mohammad Shafiei and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, for their invitation to contribute to this volume, which goes to the roots of the actual philosophical debates. A special thank to Nino Guallart for his empathic and acute reading and for the improvements he suggested to the text.
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Lobo, C. (2019). A Receding Parallelism: Husserl and Peirce from the Perspective of Logic of Probability. In: Shafiei, M., Pietarinen, AV. (eds) Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics and Cognition. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25800-9_8
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