Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Is God the Best Explanation of Things? pp 53–70Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

On Finitude, Topology, and Arbitrariness

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

The present chapter aims to address Rasmussen’s reasonable concerns regarding the possibility of a foundation that is at least partly material. Those concerns center around three main issues: (i) whether a partly material foundation is compatible with the grounds for a finite past, (ii) whether a partly material foundation is compatible with the grounds for it having a non-geometrical nature, and (iii) whether a partly material foundation is compatible with the grounds against arbitrary limits. I offer reasons for an affirmative answer on all three counts. The chapter, therefore, aims to incorporate Rasmussen’s important insights into a plausible theory of foundational reality that is friendly to both theism and naturalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for example, Oppy (2014) and Draper and Schellenberg (2017).

  2. 2.

    For a recent sampling, see, e.g., Buckareff and Alter (2016).

  3. 3.

    It also seems epistemically possible that the finite, temporal portion of the universe in our scenario above is a necessary consequence of the timeless portion of the universe, in which case it would be a necessary dependent being, as defined in Chapter 3.

  4. 4.

    Consider any arbitrary carving up of the stretch of time of a given object’s existence into equal intervals of finite, nonzero duration, and ordered according to the “earlier than” relation. As I’m using the expression, an object has a temporal beginning of its existence just in case any such carving up includes an earliest temporal interval.

  5. 5.

    I’ve addressed these issues in much more detail in Leon (2019).

  6. 6.

    For a recent exposition and defense of both a priori and scientific arguments for a finite past , see Craig and Sinclair (2009). For a systematic critique of both, see, e.g., Leon (2019).

  7. 7.

    For a recent exposition and defense of both a priori and scientific arguments for a finite past, see Craig and Sinclair (2009). For representative criticisms, see, e.g., Morriston (1999, 2002a, b, 2003, 2010, 2013), Oppy (2006), Craig and Smith (1993), Draper (2008), and Leon (2019).

  8. 8.

    Cf. Morriston (2002a) and Draper (2008). For related worries regarding the Hilbert’s Hotel argument, see Morriston (2003) and Oppy (2006).

  9. 9.

    Craig and Sinclair (2009, 121–122).

  10. 10.

    Craig (1985).

  11. 11.

    This counterexample is Tony Roy’s (personal communication).

  12. 12.

    For related criticism, see Morriston (1999, 2002b). For other criticisms of this argument and other arguments against the possibility of traversing actual infinites, see, e.g., the references in fn. 6, as well as Leon (2011) and Cohen (2015).

  13. 13.

    Craig and Sinclair (2009, 124).

  14. 14.

    Cf. Morriston (2000, 2002b, c, d).

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    For other arguments to the conclusion that naturalistic accounts of the origin of the universe fare at least as well as theistic accounts, see Oppy (2009, 2010, 2013a, b).

  19. 19.

    It should also be mentioned that a significant number of naturalist philosophers of physics are inclined toward wave function realism, according to which the three-dimensional world of our experience is ultimately grounded in a massively higher-dimensional configuration space, where these dimensions aren’t “spatial” in any familiar sense of the word. Indeed, I myself am inclined toward such a view. On this sort of view, see, e.g., Albert (1996), Ismael and Schaffer (2016), Lewis (2004), Loewer (1996), Ney (2012, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019), and North (2013).

References

  • Albert, David. 1996. “Elementary Quantum Metaphysics.” In Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, edited by J. T. Cushing, A. Stock and S. Goldstein, 277–284. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Buckareff, Andrei, and Tornin Alter, eds. 2016. Alternative Concepts of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, Yishai. 2015. “Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Philosophical Papers 44 (2): 165–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig, William Lane. 1985. “Review of Time, Creation and the Continuum.”International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (3): 319–326.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, and Quentin Smith. 1993. Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, and William Sinclair. 2009. “The Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, 101–201. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Draper, Paul. 2008. “A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, edited by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea, 5th ed., 45–50. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, and J. L. Schellenberg, eds. 2017. Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ismael, Jenann, and Jonathan Schaffer. 2016. “Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground.” Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1201-2.

  • Leon, Felipe. 2011. “Moreland on the Impossibility of Traversing the Infinite: A Critique.” Philo 14 (1): 32–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2019. “Causation and Sufficient Reason: Atheism.” In Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited by Joseph W. Koterski and Graham Oppy, 281–300. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, Peter. 2004. “Life in Configuration Space.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 713–729.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loewer, Barry. 1996. “Humean Supervenience.” Philosophical Topics 24: 101–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morriston, Wes. 1999. “Must the Past Have a Beginning?” Philo 2 (1): 5–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2000. “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?” Faith & Philosophy 17 (2): 149–169.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002a. “Craig on the Actual Infinite.” Religious Studies 38 (2): 147–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002b. “A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In God Matters, edited by Martin and Christopher Bernard, 95–108. New York: Longman.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002c. “Creation Ex Nihilo and the Big Bang.” Philo 5 (1): 23–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002d. “Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: Reply to Craig.” Faith & Philosophy 19 (2): 233–244.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2003. “Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?” Faith & Philosophy 20 (3): 288–306.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2010. “Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite.” Faith & Philosophy 27 (4): 439–450.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013. “Doubts About the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” In Debating Christian Theism, edited by J. P. Moreland, Chad V. Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ney, Alyssa. 2012. “The Status of Our Ordinary Three Dimensions in a Quantum Universe.” Noûs 46 (3): 525–560.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013. “Ontological Reduction and the Wave Function Ontology.” In The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, edited by Alyssa Ney and David Z. Albert, 168–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015. “Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Coherence: A Defense of Wave Function Realism.” Synthese 192 (10): 3105–3124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2017. “Finding the World in the Wave Function: Some Strategies for Solving the Macro-object Problem.” Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1349-4.

  • ———. 2019. “Locality and Wave Function Realism.” In Quantum Worlds: Perspectives on the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics, edited by Olimpia Lombardi, Sebastian Fortin, and Federico Holik. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, Jill. 2013. “The Structure of a Quantum World.” In The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, edited by Alyssa Ney and David Albert, 184–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oppy, Graham. 2006. Arguing About Gods. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. “Cosmological Arguments.” Noûs 43 (1): 31–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2010. “Uncaused Beginnings.” Faith & Philosophy 27: 61–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013a. The Best Argument Against God. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013b. “Ultimate Naturalistic Causal Explanations.” In The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt. Abingdon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2014. Reinventing Philosophy of Religion: An Opinionated Introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. El Camino College, Torrance, CA, USA

    Felipe Leon

Authors
  1. Felipe Leon
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Felipe Leon .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Leon, F. (2019). On Finitude, Topology, and Arbitrariness. In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation