Skip to main content

Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Collaboration in Large-Scale Transportation Networks

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Large Scale Optimization in Supply Chains and Smart Manufacturing

Part of the book series: Springer Optimization and Its Applications ((SOIA,volume 149))

  • 1096 Accesses

Abstract

The importance of collaborative logistics is getting widely recognized in recent years. However, strategic revealing of private information and disagreements on how savings are split would make any efforts of collaboration unsuccessful. The large-scale nature of real-life transportation networks further complicates the implementation of collaboration, as the associated optimization problems are usually NP-hard. The academic community has developed a variety of methodologies by using operations research tools and algorithmic mechanism design to resolve these issues. We summarize the state-of-the-art progress in the literature and introduce the iterative mechanism design theories. The iterative mechanism design models consider private information and propose decentralized approximation algorithms to achieve a system-wide objective while eliciting truthful information through the iterations. Hence, iterative mechanism design effectively reduces computational and communication difficulties. We then apply the methodology to a truckload pickup-and-delivery collaboration problem as an example. Numerical results on large-scale instances are reported, verifying the effectiveness of the methodologies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 19.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 29.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 29.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Agarwal R, Ergun Ö (2010) Network design and allocation mechanisms for carrier alliances in liner shipping. Operations Research 58(6):1726–1742

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Agarwal R, Ergun Ö, Houghtalen L, Ozener OO (2009) Collaboration in cargo transportation. In: Optimization and Logistics Challenges in the Enterprise, pp 373–409

    Google Scholar 

  3. Barbara R, McQuarrie N, Schrum E, Teo T (2012) Collaborative distribution: an analysis for the environmental defense fund. http://mitsloan.mit.edu/actionlearning/media/documents/s-lab-projects/EDF-report-2012.pdf, accessed December 10, 2016

  4. Barrera J, Garcia A (2015) Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion. Operations Research 63(1):151–165

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Berger S, Bierwirth C (2010) Solutions to the request reassignment problem in collaborative carrier networks. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 46(5):627–638

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Chen H (2016) Combinatorial clock-proxy exchange for carrier collaboration in less than truck load transportation. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 91:152–172

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Cleophas C, Cottrill C, Ehmke JF, Tierney K (2018) Collaborative urban transportation: Recent advances in theory and practice. European Journal of Operational Research URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.04.037

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Creemers S, Woumans G, Boute R, Beliën J (2017) Tri-Vizor uses an efficient algorithm to identify collaborative shipping opportunities. Interfaces 47(3):244–259

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Cruijssen F, Dullaert W, Fleuren H (2007) Horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics: a literature review. Transportation Journal pp 22–39

    Google Scholar 

  10. Dai B, Chen H (2011) A multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration. Logistics Research 3(2-3):101–120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Dai B, Chen H, Yang G (2014) Price-setting based combinatorial auction approach for carrier collaboration with pickup and delivery requests. Operational Research 14(3):361–386

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Dughmi S, Roughgarden T (2014) Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design. SIAM Journal on Computing 43(1):312–336

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Feigenbaum J, Shenker S (2002) Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions. In: Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications, ACM, pp 1–13

    Google Scholar 

  14. Gansterer M, Hartl R (2016) Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations. OR Spectrum 38(1):3–23

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Gansterer M, Hartl RF (2018a) Collaborative vehicle routing: A survey. European Journal of Operational Research 268(1):1–12

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Gansterer M, Hartl RF (2018b) Centralized bundle generation in auction-based collaborative transportation. OR Spectrum 40:613–635

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Green J, Laffont JJ (1979) Incentives in Public Decision Making. North-Holland

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Guajardo M, Rönnqvist M (2016) A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation. International Transactions in Operational Research 23(3):371–392

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Houghtalen L, Ergun Ö, Sokol J (2011) Designing mechanisms for the management of carrier alliances. Transportation Science. 45(4):465–482

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Kalagnanam J, Parkes DC (2004) Auctions, bidding and exchange design. In: Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis, Springer, pp 143–212

    Google Scholar 

  21. Krajewska M, Kopfer H (2006) Collaborating freight forwarding enterprises. OR Spectrum 28(3):301–317

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Lai M, Cai X, Hu Q (2017) An iterative auction for carrier collaboration in truckload pickup and delivery. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 107:60–80

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Lai M, Xue W, Hu Q (2019) An ascending auction for freight forwarder collaboration in capacity sharing. Transportation Science. 53(4):1175–1195. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2018.0870

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Li J, Rong G, Feng Y (2015) Request selection and exchange approach for carrier collaboration based on auction of a single request. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 84:23–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  26. Narahari Y, Garg D, Narayanam R, Prakash H (2009) Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions. Springer-Verlag, London.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  27. Nisan N, Ronen A (2001) Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior 35(1-2):166–196

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  28. O’Reilly J (2013) Transportation & distribution: Geared to demand. http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/transportation-distribution-geared-to-demand/, accessed December 10, 2016

  29. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics (2009) Best practices for transportation management. http://www.ohl.com/sites/ohl/files/casestudy/best-practices-transportation.pdf, accessed December 10, 2016

  30. Parkes D, Ungar L (2000) Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In: Proceedings of American Association for Artificial Intelligence 2000, pp 74–81

    Google Scholar 

  31. Ropke S, Pisinger D (2006) An adaptive large neighborhood search heuristic for the pickup and delivery problem with time windows. Transportation Science 40(4):455–472

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. SINTEF Applied Mathematics (2017) Li & Lim benchmark. https://www.sintef.no/projectweb/top/pdptw/li-lim-benchmark/, accessed July 1, 2017

  33. Terry L (2015) Collaborative distribution: Taking off the training wheels. http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/collaborative-distribution-taking-off-the-training-wheels/, accessed August 10, 2016

  34. Transeu (2019) Trans for carriers (tfc). https://www.trans.eu/en/carriers/, February 20th, 2019

  35. Verdonck L, Caris A, Ramaekers K, Janssens GK (2013) Collaborative logistics from the perspective of road transportation companies. Transport Reviews 33(6):700–719

    Article  Google Scholar 

  36. WTransnet (2019) Freight exchange. https://www.wtransnet.com/en/freight-exchange/, accessed February 20th, 2019

  37. Xu SX, Huang GQ, Cheng M (2016) Truthful, budget-balanced bundle double auctions for carrier collaboration. Transportation Science 51(4):1365–1386

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Zheng J, Gao Z, Yang D, Sun Z (2015) Network design and capacity exchange for liner alliances with fixed and variable container demands. Transportation Science 49(4):886–899

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This research is partially supported by Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71531003, 71501039, 71432004), Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (No. T32-102/14), the Leading Talent Program of Guangdong Province (No. 2016LJ06D703), and the Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Committee (Grant No. ZDSYS20170725140921348).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xiaoqiang Cai .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendices

Appendix 1: The TL Pickup-and-Delivery Model

We model an individual carrier’s TL pickup-and-delivery problem using a two-index formulation.

For ease of exposition, we introduce a dummy request (D i, D i) denoted by 0 for each carrier i, i.e., o 0 = D i and d 0 = D i. Define binary variable \(x_{kl}^{i}=1\), if a truck of carrier i travels from the delivery node d k of request k to the pickup node o l of request l, where k ≠ l. That is, request l is picked up by a truck which has just delivered request k or left the depot.

Define \(f_{l}^{i}\) to be the travel distance from the depot D i to the delivery node d l of request l and \(t_{l}^{i}\) to be the delivery time of request l by a truck of carrier i. For convenience, the distance from d k to o l is redefined as

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} a_{kl}= \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} a_{(d_{k},o_{l})}, & \text{if }d_{k}\neq o_{l}\text{;} \\ 0, & \text{if }d_{k}=o_{l}\text{.} \\ \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, write \(a_{l}:=a_{(o_{l}, d_{l})}\). The travel time between requests k and l is then equal to \(T_{kl}:= \frac {a_{kl}} {\gamma }\).

Each variable \(x_{kl}^{i}\) is associated with a cost parameter \(c_{kl}^{i}=c_{i}\cdot a_{kl}\), representing the traveling cost. By default, variable \(x_{kl}^{i}\) and its cost parameter \(c_{kl}^{i}\) are valid only for k ≠ l through the paper and thus we do not particularly state k ≠ l any more in the models. After arriving at o l, the truck further travels a distance of \(a_{(o_{l}, d_{l})}\) to deliver request l. The profit in the delivery of request l ∈ L i excluding the empty traveling cost is \(p_{l}^{i}:=r_{l}^{i}-c_{i} \cdot a_{(o_{l}, d_{l})}\).

If not participating in the collaboration, carrier i must deliver all the freight requests l ∈ L i using his own trucks. The individual optimization problem of carrier i, denoted by \(P_i^0\), is formulated as below.

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} \varPi_{i}^{*}(L_{i}) = \max &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{l \in L_{i}} p_{l}^{i}- \rho_{i}\cdot \sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}}\sum_{l\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}} c_{kl}^{i}x_{kl}^{i} \\ {} (P_{i}^{eval})\quad \text{s.t.} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}}x_{kl}^{i}=1, \quad \forall\, l\in L_{i}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(10)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}}x_{kl}^{i}-\sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}} x_{lk}^{i}=0, \quad \forall\, l\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(11)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{0}^{i}=0; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(12)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{k}^{i}+a_{kl}+a_{l}-M \cdot (1-x_{kl}^{i}) \leq f_{l}^{i}, \forall\,k\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}, l\in L_{i};\qquad \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(13)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{l}^{i}+a_{l0}-M \cdot (1-x_{l0}^{i})\leq F, \quad \forall\, l\in L_{i}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(14)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{l}^{i}\leq F, \quad \forall\, l\in L_{i}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(15)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle t_{0}^{i}=0; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(16)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle t_{k}^{i}+T_{kl}+T_{l}^{S}-M(1-x_{kl}^{i})\leq t_{l}^{i}, \; \forall\, k\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}, l\in L_{i}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(17)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle T_{l}^{P}+T_{l}^{S}\leq t_{l}^{i} \leq T_{l}^{D}, \quad \forall\, l\in L_{i}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(18)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle x_{kl}^{i} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \forall\, k,l\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}; \\ &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{l}^{i}, t_{l}^{i}\geq 0, \quad \forall\, l\in L_{i}. {} \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(19)

In the above model, M is a sufficiently large positive number. Constraints (10) require that each request must be served. Constraints (11) impose the degree balance condition for each request and the depot, implying that if a truck enters the pickup node of a request, it must leave from delivery node of this request. Constraints (12)–(15) track the travel distance of each truck, where the big number M is used to maintain the feasibility, and the total travel distance cannot exceed F. Constraints (13) imply the subtour-elimination condition Ropke and Pisinger [31], Li et al. [24], and hence the route of each truck must start from the depot and end at the depot. Constraint (16) sets the departure time of a truck starting from the depot, (17) enforces the time precedence relationship between consecutively served requests, and (18) states the feasible time for serving request l. Constraints (19) impose the integrality of variables \(x_{kl}^{i}\).

The objective is to maximize the profit of carrier i. Since each request must be fulfilled and the total revenue is a constant, the objective is equivalent to minimizing the total empty traveling distance. After delivering request k, if there is a request l with o l = d k, then a kl = 0; that is, the truck does not travel empty when going to pickup request l in this case.

Appendix 2: The Optimal Request Selling Problem

Define binary variables \(y_{l}^{i}\) that equals to one if request l ∈ L i ∩ L b is selected to be sold and zero otherwise. Variables \(x_{kl}^{i}\) and \(f_{l}^{i}\) are defined as in problem (\(P_{i}^{eval}\)). Given the selling prices π l and the demanded requests in L b at the current iteration, we formulate the seller’s problem of carrier i as below.

$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} \max &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{l\in L_{i}\setminus L^{b}} p_{l}^{i}+\sum_{l\in L_{i}\cap L^{b}} p_{l}^{i}\cdot (1-y_{l}^{i}) + \sum_{l\in L_{i}\cap L^{b}} \pi_{l} \cdot y_{l}^{i}- \\ &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \rho_{i} \cdot \sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}} \sum_{l\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}} c_{kl}^{i} x_{kl}^{i} \\ {} (P_{i}^{sell}) \quad s.t. &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{l\in L_{i}\cap L_{j}^{*}} y_{l}^{i} \leq 1, \quad \forall\, j\in N \setminus\{i\}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(20)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}} x_{kl}^{i}=1-y_{l}^{i}, \quad \forall \, l\in L_{i}\cap L^{b}; \\ &\displaystyle &\displaystyle \sum_{k\in L_{i}\cup \{0\}} x_{kl}^{i}=1, \quad \forall \, l\in L_{i}\setminus L^{b}; \\ &\displaystyle &\displaystyle ~\mbox{(11)}-\mbox{(18)}, \quad \forall\,k\in L_{i}\cup\{0\}, l\in L_{i}; \\ {} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{l}^{i}\leq F\cdot (1-y_{l}^{i}), \quad \forall \, l\in L_{i}\cap L^{b}; \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(21)
$$\displaystyle \begin{aligned} \begin{array}{rcl} &\displaystyle &\displaystyle (T_{l}^{P}{+}T_{l}^{S})\cdot (1{-}y_{l}^{i})\leq t_{l}^{i} \leq T_{l}^{D}\cdot (1{-}y_{l}^{i}), \, \forall\, l\in L_{i}\cap L^{b}; \\ &\displaystyle &\displaystyle x_{kl}^{i}, \, y_{l}^{i}\in \{0, 1\}; \\ &\displaystyle &\displaystyle f_{l}^{i}, \, t_{l}^{i}\geq 0. {} \end{array} \end{aligned} $$
(22)

In the above model, \(L_{j}^{*}\) is defined as the set of requests in \(L_{j}^{b}\) where carrier j is the highest bidder among all. Since each bidder can only be allocated with at most one request and the auction will allocate the request to the highest bidder, it is futile to sell more than one request to the same highest bidder. Thus, constraints (20) ensure that the seller can only sell one request to each highest bidder, and the number of selling requests is no more than the number of bidders. Constraints (21)–(22) state that if request l is sold, then the request is not fulfilled and hence \(f_{l}^{i} = t_{l}^{i} =0\).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Lai, M., Cai, X. (2019). Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Collaboration in Large-Scale Transportation Networks. In: Velásquez-Bermúdez, J., Khakifirooz, M., Fathi, M. (eds) Large Scale Optimization in Supply Chains and Smart Manufacturing. Springer Optimization and Its Applications, vol 149. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22788-3_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics