Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

The Normative Force of the Factual pp 65–77Cite as

The ‘Normative Force of the Factual’: A Positivist’s Panegyric

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 1281 Accesses

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 130))

Abstract

Georg Jellinek’s concept of a ‘Normative Force of the Factual’ offers a powerful explanation as to how normality and normativity interrelate. This essay discusses the problems underlying the transition from fact to norm and shows how this phenomenon may be aligned with Kelsensenian positivist theory; notwithstanding the strict separation of “Is” and “Ought” essential to it.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a closer analysis see Grimmer (1971), pp. 11–12.

  2. 2.

    See Lepsius’s essay in this volume.

  3. 3.

    I.a the “Two-Sides”-Theory, questions of the state’s self-imposed commitment or the constitutional law perspective, in general.

  4. 4.

    For this position see i.a. Gálvez (2014), p. 43. For a closer analysis of Kelsen’s position see Nicoletta Bersier’s contribution to this volume.

  5. 5.

    For this point also see Klatt in this volume who introduces the ‘regarded-as-normative power of the factual’.

  6. 6.

    For a careful analysis of von Wright’s critique of Searle’s approach see Klatt in this volume.

  7. 7.

    Academic honesty, of course, requires not to leave Emile Durkheim’s seminal contribution to the concept of normality unmentioned (Durkheim 1895; for a concise introduction see Horwitz 2008).

  8. 8.

    Sellars (1980), p. 138 hit the nail right on the head by stating: “To say that man is a rational animal is to say that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules. When God created Adam, he whispered in his ear, ‘In all contexts of action you will recognize rules, if only the rule to grope for rules to recognize. When you cease to recognize rules, you will walk on four feet’”

  9. 9.

    The norm’s emancipation from the fact, thus taking effect within the individual, allows Jellinek—without contradiction—to exhibit factual recurrences at one point as actuality and at another—close to Kelsen’s understanding—as an interpretative scheme by observing that “[a]ll law is an evaluative norm, and thereby never coincides with the state of affairs that is being evaluated.”

  10. 10.

    Supra § 5.

  11. 11.

    Supra § 3.

  12. 12.

    See Lepsius in this volume.

References

  • Arendt H (2003) Was ist Politik? Piper, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Aspers P, Godart F (2013) Sociology of fashion: order and change. Annu Rev Sociol 39:171–192

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Augsberg S (2008) Der “naturalistische Fehlschluß” als juristische Argumentationsfigur. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 94:461–476

    Google Scholar 

  • Bear A, Knobe P (2017) Normality: part descriptive, part prescriptive. Cognition 167:25–37

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Canguilhem G (1978) [1966] On the normal and the pathological. Reidel, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Durkheim E (1982) [1895] The rules of sociological method. The Free Press, New York

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich E (1967) Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, 3rd edn. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Forst R (2015) Normativität und Macht: Zur Analyse sozialer Rechtfertigungsordnungen. Sukrkamp, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault M (1995) [1975] Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, 2nd edn. Vintage Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gálvez J (2014) Der Positivismus von Kelsen. In: Aliprantis N, Olechowski T (eds) Hans Kelsen: Die Aktualität eines großen Rechtswissenschafters und Soziologen des 20. Jahrhunderts, pp 39–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Grimmer K (1971) Die Rechtsfigur einer “Normativität des Faktischen”. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (2003) Interpreting the fall of a monument. Constellations 10:364–370

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegel GWF (2008) [1820] Outlines of the philosophy of right. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger M (1996) [1927] Being and time. State University of New York Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Heller H (1934) Staatslehre. Sijthoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirschfelder G, Pollmer P (2018) Ernährung und Esskultur: Kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven. Aktuelle Ernährungsmedizin 43:41–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoerster N (2006) Was ist Recht? Beck, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwitz A (2008) Normality. Contexts 7:70–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jabloner C (2013) Kein Imperativ ohne Imperator. In: Olechowksi T, Zeleny K (eds) Methodenreinheit und Erkenntnisvielfalt. Manz, Wien, pp 1–22

    Google Scholar 

  • Jellinek G (1900) Allgemeine Staatslehre. Häring, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Jellinek W (1951) Über die normative Kraft des Faktischen. Juristenzeitung, 347–348

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1934) Reine Rechtslehre. Franz Deuticke, Wien

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1960) Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. Franz Deuticke, Wien

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1965) Was ist juristischer Positivismus? Juristenzeitung:465–469

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1979) Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. Manz, Wien

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersten J (2000) Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Loughlin M (2010) Foundations of public law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Luhmann N (1969) Normen in soziologischer Perspektive. Soziale Welt 20:28–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Möllers C (2015) Die Möglichkeit der Normen. Suhrkamp, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore GE (1993) Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Musil R (1953) [1943] The man without qualities, vol I. Secker & Warburg, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Nietzsche F (1913) [1887] The geneaology of morals: a polemic. In: Levy O (ed) The complete works, vol XIII. Noulis, Edinburgh

    Google Scholar 

  • Numark-Sztainer D, Perry S (1999) Factors influencing food journal of the choices of adolescents: findings from focus-group discussions with adolescents. J Am Diet Assoc 99:929–937

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paulson S (2005) Zwei radikale Objektivierungsprogramme in der Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens. In: Paulson S, Stolleis M (eds) Hans Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp 191–220

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowan R (2014) So now!: On Normcore. e-flux 58:01/16

    Google Scholar 

  • Rozin P (1997) Why we eat what we eat, and why we worry about it. Bull Am Acad Arts Sci 50:26–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt C (2004) Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, 8th edn. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle JR (1964) How to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. Philos Rev 73:43–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Searle JR (2011) Making the social world: on the structure of human civilization. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars W (1980) Language, rules and behavior. In: Sichatascerado J (ed) Pure pragmatics and possible worlds: the early essays of wilfrid sellars. Ridgeview, Atascerado

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmel G (1995) [1905] Philosophie der Mode. In: Behr M, Krech V, Schmidt G (eds) Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe, vol X. Suhrkamp, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmel G (1910) Soziologie der Mahlzeit, Der Zeitgeist, Beiblatt zum Berliner Tageblatt 41 vom 10 Oktober 1910

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith A (1774) The theory of moral sentiments, 4th edn. Straham, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Stolleis M (1992) Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol 2. Beck, München, pp 1800–1914

    Google Scholar 

  • von der Pfordten D (1993) Sein, Werten, Sollen. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphialosophie 79:48–69

    Google Scholar 

  • von Jhering R (1866) Der Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, vol I, 2nd edn. Breitkopf & Härtel, Leipzig

    Google Scholar 

  • von Wright GH (1985) Is and ought. In: Bulygin E, Gardies JL, Nilniluoto I (eds) Man, law and modern forms of life. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 263–281

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinberger O (1981) Normentheorie als Grundlage der Jurisprudenz und Ethik. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This essay is based on the author’s inaugural lecture at University of Graz on May 12th 2017. Many thanks to my team: Myriam Becker, Christa Pail, Jürgen Pirker, Renate Pirstner-Ebner, Susanne Rufer and Hannah Schöffmann for their support in organizing the event and for immensely facilitating my transition to University of Graz, Faculty of Law.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Graz, Graz, Austria

    Christoph Bezemek

Authors
  1. Christoph Bezemek
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christoph Bezemek .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Thémis Institute, Genève, Switzerland

    Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac

  2. Institute of Public Law and Political Science, University of Graz, Graz, Austria

    Christoph Bezemek

  3. School of Law, University of Virgina, Virgina, VA, USA

    Frederick Schauer

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Bezemek, C. (2019). The ‘Normative Force of the Factual’: A Positivist’s Panegyric. In: Bersier Ladavac, N., Bezemek, C., Schauer, F. (eds) The Normative Force of the Factual. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18929-7_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18929-7_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18928-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-18929-7

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation