Abstract
My aim in this chapter is to give a genetic account of self-reflection based on phenomenology and other related cognitive sciences. When dealing with the body in its relationship to the self, the traditional phenomenological approach emphasizes the subjective aspect of the body: “I” perceive the world through and from my body, and “I” act in the world through and with my body. In general, this embodied self is invoked to explain how the self is deeply rooted in pre-reflective actions. In this chapter, however, I attempt to elucidate how the embodied and pre-reflective self begins to reflect itself through bodily experiences. My view is that the origin of reflection is found not in contemplation by the detached mind, but in experiences of one’s own body as an object. One’s own body appears not only as a subject of perception and action but also as an intentional object (“body-as-object”). This ambiguity of the body precedes and underpins psychological experiences of self-reflection. In addition, the body-as-object appears as an object not only for oneself but also for others. Thus, self-reflection is not intrapsychically limited but has extended aspects in intersubjectivity and social cognition. Drawing on arguments by Husserl and Sartre, I explore experiences of empathy and social anxiety as socially extended experiences of self-reflection. This analysis suggests that it is only the self-reflective agent who can truly serve as the social agent and vice versa.
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Notes
- 1.
Thompson (2007, pp. 235ff) refers to the phenomenological distinction of the Körper (material body) and the Leib (lived body) as the body-body problem: How can the same body be both a material thing and a living subject of experience? Here, I explore another body-body problem: How can the same lived body be disclosed in experience as both a subject and an object? Using the term body-as-object , I focus on the body’s objectivity, which appears not as a material or physiological object like Körper, but as an object of perception and action.
- 2.
On the basis of Husserl’s argument, Waldenfels (2000) lists five features that distinguish the body from other material objects: (1) permanence, (2) double sensations, (3) affectivity, (4) kinesthetic sensations, and (5) the organ of the will.
- 3.
According to Veale (2000), satisfaction ratings (range 0-10) after surgery averaged no higher than 3.5 (n=46). Certainly, the outcomes of cosmetic surgery for individuals with BDD are more frequently dissatisfactory than satisfactory.
- 4.
In the early stages of development, we become aware that the other’s gaze involves an evaluative attitude. Around 2.5 years of age, this awareness facilitates toddlers’ development of secondary emotions, such as embarrassment, shame, and pride. See Fuchs (2013) for details.
- 5.
Husserl (1973a, pp. 324ff) also described a similar kind of person as a sort of eidetic variation of the other-person experiences, asking whether the spirit of the other could appear without a perceivable body in the publicly shared world. I do not take up his argument further since his concern is rather directed to the intersubjective constitution of the objective world.
- 6.
An earlier version of this work was presented at the research colloquium of the University of Heidelberg, Center for Psychosocial Medicine (hosted by Prof. Thomas Fuchs). I thank all the participants for their invaluable comments. This work was supported by JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Number 15KK0057, 15H03066, 15K12634).
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Tanaka, S. (2019). Bodily Origin of Self-Reflection and Its Socially Extended Aspects. In: Silva-Filho, W., Tateo, L. (eds) Thinking About Oneself. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 141. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_9
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