The Animal Other in Thaddeus Metz’s Modal Ubuntu Ethics

Abstract

In this paper, I have a look at the theoretical perceptions and prescriptions that Thaddeus Metz argues for the animal other in his African modal-relational moral theory. The theory is regarded by the author as an attempt at granting a generous amount of moral consideration to animals based on African ideas, without giving up intuitions about human beings counting more morally. I take up the debate on moral status and moral obligations, considering the question of the “difference” that separates human beings from other animal beings. Metz believes he can ground rights for animals (and duties toward them) on the African value of human communal relationships. A few authors have challenged his theory as anthropocentric and speciesist (Horsthemke, Molefe, Galgut), though he himself considers these accusations unfounded. The pivotal dispute focuses on deciding on the type of definition one should accept that best describes anthropocentrism and speciesism. I argue that Metz’s moral theory can be accused of being anthropocentric in the core principle he endorses, as certain animals are given some moral standing and are part of the moral community in a passive sense, but reliant on a feature (capacity for identity and solidarity with humans) that Metz describes as only fully accessible to humans. But once Metz brings in moral intuitions of difficult trade-offs and cultural (medium) interests of humans, his solutions become more extreme in anthropocentrism and speciesism by applying double standards, considering caring more for a cognitively impaired human being than for an animal of similar cognitive impairment, and taking the possibility to justify unjust human actions to a certain group as a basis for them to be permitted (on some conditions and amendments) in harming animals. In the conclusion I also consider the practical outcomes of his theory if it was applied, which seems to be plausible to most animals that at the moment are sacrificed for trivial human interests.