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Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management pp 1–7Cite as

Bonuses (Employee for Performance)

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Synonyms

Additional compensation; Benefits; Extra compensation; Fringe benefits; Incentive system; Performance-based compensation; Premium; Special compensation; Variable compensation; Variable income; Variable payment

Definition

Bonuses are variables payments assigned to employees upon reaching some predefined goals. The bonus pays are usually tied to company outcomes (e.g., profits, share price, sales, customer satisfaction) as well as linked to specific employee’s area of responsibility so as to allow the identification of the individual efforts and results. Bonuses pays could be tied to the achievement of short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term goals.

Introduction

Over the last decades, firms have radically changed their pay practices, especially at managerial level, where employees are given much greater benefits for the services they provide, and a much larger portion of their pay is based on the firm performance or deemed “at risk” (Magnan and Martin 2019).

Indeed, it is...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Management, Institutions, University of Naples “Federico II”, Naples, Italy

    Fabrizia Sarto

Authors
  1. Fabrizia Sarto
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Correspondence to Fabrizia Sarto .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. London Metropolitan University, Guildhall Faculty of Business and Law London Metropolitan University, London, UK

    Samuel Idowu

  2. Cologne Business School, Ingolstadt, Germany

    René Schmidpeter

  3. College of Business, Loyola University New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, USA

    Nicholas Capaldi

  4. International Training Centre of the IL, International Labor Organization, Turin, Italy

    Liangrong Zu

  5. Department of Economics, Society and Politics, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy

    Mara Del Baldo

  6. Instituto Politécnico da Guarda, Guarda, Portugal

    Rute Abreu

Section Editor information

  1. Zagreb School of Economics and Management, Jordanovac, Zagreb, Croatia

    Kristijan Krkač

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Sarto, F. (2020). Bonuses (Employee for Performance). In: Idowu, S., Schmidpeter, R., Capaldi, N., Zu, L., Del Baldo, M., Abreu, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4_880-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4_880-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-02006-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-02006-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Business and ManagementReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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