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The Linear Complementarity Problem in Static and Dynamic Games

  • Conference paper
Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications

Abstract

It is known that the linear complementarity problem (LCP) and matrix game theory problems have interesting connections. Raghavan derived a number of LCP results using Kaplansky’s theorem. We supplement this by demonstrating more connections between LCP and matrix games. A new result is obtained in which it is shown that if a matrix game is completely mixed with value 0 and if the payoff matrix is a U-matrix, then all the proper principal minors of the payoff matrix are positive. A cursory mention is made regarding the applications of LCP in solving stochastic games.

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Murthy, G.S.R., Parthasarathy, T., Sriparna, B. (2000). The Linear Complementarity Problem in Static and Dynamic Games. In: Filar, J.A., Gaitsgory, V., Mizukami, K. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 5. Birkhäuser, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_16

  • Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7100-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-1336-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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