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A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule

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Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 5))

Abstract

A continuous-time version of the multivariate stopping problem is considered. Associated with vector-valued jump stochastic processes, stopping problems with a monotone logical rule are defined under the notion of the Nash equilibrium point. The existence of an equilibrium strategy and its characterization by integral equations are obtained. Illustrative examples are provided.

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Nakagami, Ji., Kurano, M., Yasuda, M. (2000). A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule. In: Filar, J.A., Gaitsgory, V., Mizukami, K. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 5. Birkhäuser, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_13

  • Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7100-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-1336-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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