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Social Choice Re-examined pp 101–120Cite as

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Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems

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Abstract

Fair division is as old as mathematics. According to the Roman historian Proclus, the litigious division of land after the yearly flood of the Nile triggered the invention of geometry by the Egyptians, and the necessities of trade and commerce that of arithmetic by the Phoenicians (see Guilbaud, 1952). The modern literature on fair allocation is however very new. Its origin can be traced back to three seminal papers: on the one hand, Nash’s (1950) paper on the bargaining problem and Shapley’s (1953) paper on coalitional form games; on the other hand, Foley’s (1967) essay introducing the no-envy test for the distribution of unproduced resources.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Duke University, Durham, Nc, USA

    Hervé Moulin

  2. University of Rochester, New York, USA

    William Thomson

Authors
  1. Hervé Moulin
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  2. William Thomson
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Stanford University, California, USA

    Kenneth J. Arrow

  2. Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

    Amartya Sen

  3. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

    Kotaro Suzumura

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© 1997 International Economic Association

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Moulin, H., Thomson, W. (1997). Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems. In: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A., Suzumura, K. (eds) Social Choice Re-examined. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_9

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