Abstract
Social choice theory was intended to provide a rational framework for decisions that, for whatever reason, have to be made collectively. The paradigmatic example was election of officials, but this was intended only to exemplify the issue. Indeed, the real purpose was to analyze policy decisions. A candidate was thought of primarily as an embodiment of policies.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Black, D. (1963) The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Borda, J.-C. de (1781) ‘Mémoire sur les Elections au Scrutin’, Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, pp. 657–65.
English translation de Grazia, A. (1953) ‘Mathematical Derivation of an Election System’, Isis, vol. 44, pp. 42–51.
Condorcet, Marquis de (Caritat, J. A. N.) (1785) Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse à la Probabilité Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix (Paris).
Dupuit, J. (1844) ‘De la mesure de l’utilité des travaux publics’, Annales des Ponts et Chaussées, 2e Série, vol. 8.
English translation Barbach, R. H. (1952) ‘On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works’, International Economic Papers, vol. 2, pp. 83–110.
Easterbrook, F. (1982) ‘Ways of Criticizing the Court’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 95, pp. 802–32.
May, K. O. (1952) ‘A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision’, Econometrica, vol. 20, pp. 680–4.
Posner, R. (1981) The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
Riker, W. H. (1958) ‘The Paradox of Voting and the Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments’, American Political Science Review, vol. 52, pp. 349–66.
Scitovsky, T. (1941) ‘A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 9, pp. 77–88.
Stearns, M. L. (1994) ‘The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice’, Yale Law Review, vol. 103, pp. 1219–93.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1997 International Economic Association
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Arrow, K.J. (1997). The Functions of Social Choice Theory. In: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A., Suzumura, K. (eds) Social Choice Re-examined. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-25851-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-25849-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)