Abstract
Modern mathematical cryptography provides many protocols for designing social and economic institutions. This article deals with cryptographic protocols for auctions, bargaining and arbitration. The main contribution of the protocols is in the elimination of specific types of behaviour which otherwise might undermine the desirable properties of the institutions.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Nurmi, H. (1994). Cryptographic protocols for auctions and bargaining. In: Karhumäki, J., Maurer, H., Rozenberg, G. (eds) Results and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 812. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58131-6_56
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58131-6_56
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