Abstract
Simulation may be a useful tool to address some basic problems concerning the choice of the electoral system. A case study is analyzed as an example. The utility of including power indices is discussed. A simulation program is illustrated.
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Fragnelli, V., Ortona, G. (2006). Comparison of Electoral Systems: Simulative and Game Theoretic Approaches. In: Simeone, B., Pukelsheim, F. (eds) Mathematics and Democracy. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-35605-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-35605-3_5
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