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Formalizing Human Ignorance

Collision-Resistant Hashing Without the Keys

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Book cover Progress in Cryptology - VIETCRYPT 2006 (VIETCRYPT 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4341))

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Abstract

There is a rarely mentioned foundational problem involving collision-resistant hash-functions: common constructions are keyless, but formal definitions are keyed. The discrepancy stems from the fact that a function H : {0,1}* → {0,1}n always admits an efficient collision-finding algorithm, it’s just that us human beings might be unable to write the program down. We explain a simple way to sidestep this difficulty that avoids having to key our hash functions. The idea is to state theorems in a way that prescribes an explicitly-given reduction, normally a black-box one. We illustrate this approach using well-known examples involving digital signatures, pseudorandom functions, and the Merkle-Damgård construction.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, California, 95616, USA

    Phillip Rogaway

  2. Dept. of Computer Science, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, 50200, Thailand

    Phillip Rogaway

Authors
  1. Phillip Rogaway
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Département d’Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, 45 rue d’Ulm, 75230, Paris Cedex 05, France

    Phong Q. Nguyen

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Rogaway, P. (2006). Formalizing Human Ignorance. In: Nguyen, P.Q. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - VIETCRYPT 2006. VIETCRYPT 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4341. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11958239_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11958239_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68799-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68800-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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