

# A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme\*

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**Abstract.** We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to verify that their vote is accurately included in the count. The scheme provides a high degree of transparency whilst ensuring the secrecy of votes. Assurance is derived from close auditing of all the steps of the vote recording and counting process with minimal dependence on the system components. Thus, assurance arises from verification of the election rather than having to place trust in the correct behaviour of components of the voting system. The scheme also seeks to make the voter interface as familiar as possible.

## 1 Introduction

Since the dawn of democracy, it has been recognised that the process of recording and counting votes could be the target of attempts at corruption. The Ancient Greeks investigated the use of (primitive) technological devices to provide trustworthy voting systems and avoid the need to trust voting officials [1]. The challenge is to provide voters with complete confidence that their vote will be accurately recorded and counted whilst at the same time guaranteeing the secrecy of their vote.

Most traditional approaches to this problem involve placing significant trust in the technology, mechanisms or processes used to process votes. Thus, for the traditional paper ballot, the handling of the ballot boxes and counting process must be trusted, i.e., the boxes must not be lost or manipulated and that the counting process is accurate. Various observers are introduced to the process which helps to spread the dependence on the technology but does not eliminate it.

With many of the touch screen devices widely used in the recent US presidential elections, the voter at best gets some form of acknowledgement of the way she casts her vote. After that, she can only trust in the assurances of the manufacturers and certifiers that her vote will be accurately included in the final tally.

By contrast, in [3], Chaum presents a digital voting scheme that enables voter verification, i.e., provides each voter with a means to assure themselves that her vote has been accurately included in the vote tally. This scheme combines a number of cryptographic techniques and primitives to provide a high degree of transparency whilst at the same time preserving ballot secrecy. Rather than

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\* This work was partially funded by the EPSRC DIRC project, [www.dirc.org.uk](http://www.dirc.org.uk).

having to place trust in the components to perform correctly, steps of the vote recording and tallying process are closely monitored to detect any malfunction or corruption.

The key elements in voter-verification are:

- when a voter casts her vote in a booth, she gets a receipt showing her vote in encrypted form.
- a voter confirms in the booth that her intended vote is correctly encoded in the receipt. The vote cannot be read subsequently outside the booth.
- a number of tellers perform anonymising mixes and decryption on the batch of encrypted ballot receipts. The decrypted votes emerge at the end of this process, with all links between the original receipts and the final decrypted values lost in the multiple mixes. Intermediate steps of the tellers processing are posted to a bulletin board, which might be published via the web for example.
- random checks are performed on all steps of the process to ensure that, with high probability, any attempt to corrupt vote capture and counting will be detected.

The point of the encrypted receipt is to provide the voter with a means to check that her ballot is entered into the tallying process and, if her receipt has not been included, to prove this to a third party. The fact that her vote is in encrypted form ensures that there is no way for a third party to know which way she voted. A voter can visit the bulletin board and check that her (encrypted) ballot receipt has been correctly posted. The tellers process these posted receipts and there are mechanisms in place to ensure that all posted receipts are entered into the tallying process.

The anonymising mixes performed by the tellers ensure that there is no link between the encrypted ballot receipt and the decrypted version that is finally output by the tallying process.

The design philosophy is to minimise trust in components. The approach is to strive for maximal transparency of the whole vote casting, recording and counting process, consistent with maintaining ballot secrecy. Thus, the integrity of the ballot forms and the correctness of the tellers' transformations are closely audited. The encryption of the voter's choice on the receipt is performed in the booth, is transparent, and does not depend on the intercession of any hardware or software devices that might be susceptible to failure or corruption.

## 2 Prêt à Voter

The original scheme of [3] uses visual cryptography to encrypt the receipts and perform the decryption in the booth. The scheme presented here uses a more conventional representation of the vote, i.e., ballot forms with the candidates or voting options listed in one column, and the voter choices entered in an adjacent column. As a result, the scheme is easier to understand and implement.

An earlier paper, [7], introduced the idea of encoding the vote in terms of two aligned columns, one carrying the candidate or option list in randomised

order (independent for each ballot form) whilst the other strip carries the voter choice. In this version, the voter was invited to choose which of the left and right columns to retain as the receipt. This introduced a certain asymmetry with both cryptographic and psychological implications.

In this paper we introduce some further innovations: we use ballot forms that are generated and printed in advance. As before, these have two columns, one of which shows the candidate list in scrambled order. Now however, rather than choosing between columns as previously, the voter will always discard the left hand column containing the candidate list, and submit the right hand column containing the marked vote. This avoids the asymmetry in the choice between left and right columns of the previous scheme.

A further innovation is to use the tellers in an oracle mode to enable the checks on the well-formedness of the ballot forms. This is in addition to the previous use of the tellers to perform the anonymising mix during the tallying phase. Besides allowing independent auditing authorities to perform random checks, this also opens up the possibility of novel checking modes, including enabling the voters to cast a dummy vote and have the tellers return the decryption to them as a check on the construction of the ballot forms.

The scheme presented here provides a number of appealing innovations, notably:

- Voters should find the vote casting process entirely familiar.
- Cryptographic commitments are generated before voter choices are known.
- Voter checks on the correct construction of the ballot forms are supplemented by random audits. Thus, voters are able to contribute to the verification of the vote capture process but the assurance of the scheme is not dependent on the voters being sufficiently diligent.
- Checks on the correct construction of the ballot forms are performed before votes are cast, thus simplifying the recovery strategies.
- The vote recording devices in the voting booths do not learn the voters' choices. This neatly avoids any threats of such devices leaking the voters' choices.
- The scheme is conceptually much simpler than others that have been proposed, thus easing its implementation and increasing the chances of voter acceptance.
- The current scheme shows considerable flexibility, suggesting that it could readily be adapted to different electoral requirements.

### 3 The Election Setup

A number of tellers are appointed. Each is assigned or creates *two* secret/public key pairs. The use of two keys per teller is a technical convenience arising from the audit process that will become clear later. These public keys are publicised and certified.

An authority creates a large number of ballot forms, significantly more than required for the electorate. These will have a familiar appearance: a left hand

column listing the candidates or options and a right hand column into which the voter can insert her selection. This might just be an X in one cell for a single choice election or a ranking for a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. Thus, for a four candidate race, a typical ballot form might look like:

Nihilist	
Buddhist	
Anarchist	
Alchemist	
	<i>7rJ94K</i>

However, the order in which the candidates are listed will be randomised for each ballot form, that is, for any given ballot, the candidate order shown should be unpredictable. The random looking value at the bottom of the right hand column (which we call an ‘onion’ for reasons that will become apparent in Section 5) contains the information from which the candidate ordering can be reconstructed, buried cryptographically under the public keys of the tellers. The precise construction of the onions will be described in Section 5.2.

The exact details of the voting procedure can be varied according to the nature of the election and according to the perceived nature of threats to which the system is exposed. For simplicity of presentation we outline one simple procedure. Other procedures are possible and indeed one of the advantages of this scheme is that it appears to be significantly more flexible than previous variants.

## 4 An Example

The scheme is best introduced by way of a simple example. We will give a more formal and general description later. Suppose for simplicity that we are dealing with a simple election system in which each voter selects exactly one candidate and the winner will be the candidate who garners the most votes. This allows us to present the example using simple cyclic shifts of the candidate ordering. Generalisations to deal with options to select more than one candidate or to rank them, etc. are straightforward and discussed later. Clearly, a “none of the above” option could also be included.

### 4.1 Processing Votes

Suppose that there are four candidates and these are given a base ordering:

Anarchist  
 Alchemist  
 Nihilist  
 Buddhist

Since we are considering only cyclic shifts in this example, there are four possible candidate lists, corresponding to the four possible offsets, 0 to 3, from

the base candidate list. The generation of the random offsets and cryptographic values will be described in detail later.

For convenience of the mathematical manipulations, we also adopt a canonical numbering convention for the candidates from 0 to 3 as indicated. Thus a vote for Anarchist will be represented as 0, for Alchemist as 1 etc. This numerical representation is purely for the machine manipulations and need not trouble the voter.

Consider the following ballot form:

Buddhist	
Anarchist	
Alchemist	
Nihilist	
	<i>Qqkr3c</i>

This has an offset of 1. Thus the onion—*Qqkr3c*—encodes the value 1. Suppose the system is to process a vote for Nihilist. This would be represented by a mark in the Nihilist box:

Buddhist	
Anarchist	
Alchemist	
Nihilist	X
	<i>Qqkr3c</i>

Once the voter has marked her choice, the left hand column that shows the candidate ordering is detached and destroyed, to leave a ballot receipt of the form:

X
<i>Qqkr3c</i>

Such right hand strips showing the position of an *X* and an onion value constitute the ballot receipts.

This is now fed into the voting device, presumably an optical reader, which transmits the information on the strip, the position of the *X* (as a numerical value 0, 1, 2 or 3) and the value of the onion, to the tellers. The tellers use their secret keys to perform the decryption of the onion (see later), and generate the decrypted vote value corresponding to the vote in the base ordering. In this case the decryption process yields the offset 1, so the vote value is the position of the vote (3) with the appropriate offset removed, yielding candidate  $3 - 1 = 2$ :




Fig. 1. Processing a vote

Nihilist. This process is illustrated in Figure 1. A more detailed description will be provided later.

### 4.2 Casting the Vote

Our voter, Anne, first authenticates herself and registers at the polling station. She is invited to select, at random, a ballot form. She now enters a booth with her ballot form and marks her *X* in the usual way. Suppose that she decides to vote for the “Buddhist” candidate:

Nihilist	
Buddhist	X
Anarchist	
Alchemist	
	<i>e1rg38</i>

She now removes the left hand strip (for shredding), and feeds the right hand strip into the voting device. This checks that the ballot strip is unused and reads the position of Anne’s *X*, and the value of the onion. The device marks the strip as having been used to cast a vote and returns it to Anne for her to retain as the ballot receipt.

X
<i>e1rg38</i>

Note that the vote recording device does not learn which way Anne voted. Its role is merely to read the information on Anne’s receipt and relay it to the the tellors via the bulletin board. This is a significant advantage of this scheme over many other schemes where the voting device necessarily learns the voter’s choice, raising the possibility that the device could somehow leak this information.

The device transmits its digital record of the receipt to a central server for subsequent posting to the bulletin board once the election has closed. Anne will later be able to visit the bulletin board and confirm that her receipt is correctly posted and hence that it is correctly entered into the tallying process. The tallying process is deliberately constructed to hide the link between specific ballot receipts and the resulting decrypted votes, in order to provide voter anonymity. Thus Anne cannot directly link her input vote strip to any specific resulting vote, and so she cannot directly verify that her vote has been correctly decrypted. However, the fact that the votes are all correctly processed can be checked to a high degree of confidence, which provides Anne with the assurance that her vote will be decrypted correctly.

Observe that Anne's receipt alone does not reveal which way she voted. Unless the tellers are involved, this can only be determined if the left hand strip (now destroyed), that carries the candidate ordering, is aligned against it. Only the totality of the tellers, acting in consort, using their collection of secret keys are able to extract the seed information and so reconstruct the candidate ordering for that ballot form.

## 5 Construction of the Ballot Forms

The above description should have provided the reader with the key intuitions. We now give some of the mathematical details.

### 5.1 Construction of the Cryptographic Seeds and Offsets

For each ballot form, the authority will generate a unique, random seed. Suppose that there are  $k$  tellers (numbered 0 to  $k - 1$ ), then this seed will be made up of a sequence of  $2k$  values that we will call the germs:

$$seed := g_0, g_1, g_2 \dots g_{2k-1}$$

Each of these germs should be drawn from some modest size field, perhaps  $2^{32}$ . Thus, for  $k = 3$  say, the seed values will then range over  $2^{192}$ . These numbers can be adjusted to achieve whatever cryptographic strength is required.

The offset for the candidate list is now calculated from these germ values as follows. First a publicly known cryptographic hash function is applied to each of the germs and the result taken modulo  $v$ , where  $v$  is the size of the candidate list:

$$d_i := hash(g_i) \pmod{v} \quad i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 2k - 1$$

The cyclic offset  $\theta$  that will be applied to the candidate list on this form is now computed as the  $(\text{mod } v)$  sum of these values:

$$\theta := (\sum_{i=0}^{2k-1} d_i) \text{mod } v.$$




Fig. 2. An onion

### 5.2 Construction of the Onions

In order to facilitate auditing of the tellers whilst preserving anonymity of the voters (see [3] or [2] for more details), each teller performs two Chaum mixes and, accordingly, has two independent secret/public key pairs assigned to it. Teller  $i$  will have public keys  $PK_{T_{2i}}$  and  $PK_{T_{2i+1}}$ , and corresponding secret keys. The onion is formed by nested encryption of the germs under these public keys, and is given by:

$$\{g_{2k-1}, \{g_{2k-2}, \{\dots, \{g_1, \{g_0, D_0\}_{PK_{T_0}}\}_{PK_{T_1}} \dots\}_{PK_{T_{2k-3}}}\}_{PK_{T_{2k-2}}}\}_{PK_{T_{2k-1}}}$$

We introduce a little more notation to denote the intermediate layers of the onions.  $D_0$  is a random, nonce-like value, unique to each onion. The subsequent layers are defined as follows:

$$D_{i+1} := \{g_i, D_i\}_{PK_{T_i}}$$

$$Onion := D_{2k}$$

Where  $i$  ranges over  $\{0, 1, \dots, 2k - 1\}$ . The construction of an onion is pictured in Figure 2.

## 6 The Role of the Tellers

The primary role of the tellers is to perform an anonymising mix and decryption on the batch of encrypted ballot receipts posted to the bulletin board. This ensures that the decrypted votes that emerge at the end of mix cannot be linked back to the encrypted receipts that are input to the process. Aside from some minor differences, the role of the tellers and the auditors are essentially as in the Chaum original. For completeness we give a brief overview here. More detailed descriptions can be found in [3] or [2].

The first, left hand column, of the bulletin board shows the receipts in exactly the same form as the printed receipts held by the voters. A voter can check this



column to verify that her receipt has been accurately posted. An easy way to do this would be to search on the string representing the onion value and check that the  $X$  appears in the correct box, i.e., as shown on the voter's receipt.

The information in the first, left hand column of the bulletin board is then passed to the first teller,  $Teller_{k-1}$ , for processing. There is no shuffling of the information when it is passed to the teller. The position of the  $X$  on the voting slip is encoded as an integer  $r$ , and the correctness of this encoding can be simply and publicly verified.

The tellers will subsequently manipulate the numerical representations of the receipts, i.e., pairs of the form  $(r_i, D_i)$ , where  $r_i$  is between 0 and  $v - 1$ , and  $D_i$  is an  $i$ th level onion. The initial value of  $r_{2k}$  is the encoding of the position of the  $X$  as originally placed by Anne on her receipt.

Each column (apart from the first, which contains the actual receipts) shows only the simplified, digital representation: a pair  $(r_{2k}, D_{2k})$  consisting of a value  $r$  from  $Z_v$  and the value  $D$  of the onion layer.

Each teller accepts an input column of votes  $(r, D)$  from the previous teller, and then carries out two manipulations, to produce a middle column of votes and an output column of votes. The output column produced by the teller is then passed to the next teller in the chain.

Thus for each of the  $(r_{2i}, D_{2i})$  pairs in the batch in the input column,  $Teller_{i-1}$  will:

- apply its first secret key,  $SK_{T_{2i-1}}$  to strip off the outer layer of the onion  $D_{2i}$  to reveal the enclosed germ  $g_{2i-1}$  and the enclosed onion  $D_{2i-1}$ .

$$g_{2i-1}, D_{2i-1} = \{D_{2i}\}_{SK_{T_{2i-1}}}$$

- apply the hash function to the germ value and take the result (mod  $v$ ) to recover  $d_{2i-1}$ :

$$d_{2i-1} = \text{hash}(g_{2i-1}) \pmod{v}$$


- subtract  $d_{2i-1}$  from  $r_{2i} \pmod{v}$  to obtain a new  $r$  value  $r_{2i-1}$ :

$$r_{2i-1} = r_{2i} - d_{2i-1} \pmod{v}$$


- form the new pair  $(r_{2i-1}, D_{2i-1})$

Having completed these transformations on all the pairs in the initial batch as posted in its input column, the teller applies a secret shuffle to the resulting, transformed pairs and posts the resulting (transformed and shuffled) pairs to its middle column on the bulletin board.

$Teller_{i-1}$  now repeats this process on the contents of the middle column using its second secret key,  $SK_{T_{2i-2}}$  to obtain a new set of  $(r_{2i-2}, D_{2i-2})$  pairs. It will apply a second secret shuffle, independent of the previous one, to this batch of new pairs. The resulting transformed and shuffled  $(r_{2i-2}, D_{2i-2})$  pairs are now posted to the output column on the bulletin board, and passed on to the next teller,  $Teller_{i-2}$ . This process is illustrated in Figure 3.



**Fig. 3.** A teller



**Fig. 4.** Three tellers anonymising mix

This process is repeated by all the tellers in sequence, as illustrated in Figure 4 for a sequence of three tellers. The value of any of the intermediate  $r$  values is thus given by:

$$r_{2k-i} = r_{2k} - \sum_{j=1}^i d_{2k-i} \pmod{v}$$

When the last teller performs the final transformation it outputs a batch of pairs which comprise a final  $r$  value,  $r_0$ , and the inner onion value  $D_0$ . The final  $r_0$  values are the values of the original votes in the canonical, base ordering. Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the process on a single vote.

To see this, observe that the candidate list on each form is shifted by the  $(\text{mod } v)$  sum of the  $d$  values, i.e.,  $\theta$ . Thus the initial  $r$  value is the candidate value plus  $\theta$  modulo  $v$ . For each ballot pair, the tellers will have subtracted out the  $d$  values from the initial  $r$  value, thus cancelling the original shift of the candidate list and so recovering the original candidate value. Thus:

$$r_0 = r_{2k} - \sum_{j=1}^{2k} d_{2k-i} \pmod{v} = r_{2k} - \theta \pmod{v}$$

Consider the example of Anne’s vote again (illustrated in Figure 5). The form she used to cast her vote had an offset of 2 and her  $X$  was in the second box, value 1. Hence the initial value of  $r_{2k}$  was 1 in her case. The tellers will in effect compute:




Fig. 5. A vote processed by three tellers




Fig. 6. Information posted by the sequence of three tellers

$$r_0 = r_{2k} - \sum_{j=1}^{2k} d_j \pmod{4} = 1 - 2 \pmod{4} = 3$$

Thus the final  $r$  value  $r_0 = 3$  does indeed translate to a vote for “Buddhist” in the base ordering. The encryption of the vote can thus be thought of as a (co-variant) transformation of the frame of reference, decryption to the corresponding (contra-variant) transformation.

The overall effect then, is to have posted on the bulletin board, in the left hand column, the batch of initial receipts as posted by the voting devices. In the right hand column we will have the fully decrypted votes. In between there will be a set of columns with the intermediate, partially decrypted  $(r, D)$  pairs. Each column will be some secret permutation and decryption of the previous one, and the permutation will not be published. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Note that the decryptions at each mix stage prevent the permutation being reconstructed by simple matching of onions or  $r$  values.

The purpose of using the hash of the germ values buried in the onion layers to transform the  $r$  values is to foil guessing attacks on the mixes. Without these hashes it would be possible to guess links through the mixes and check the guess by performing the appropriate computations (with the knowledge of the tellers’ public keys). With the hash functions, these checks would require the computation of pre-images of the hashes, thus rendering such attacks intractable. We will see later that, for audited links the tellers are required to reveal not only the link but also the associated germ. The computations performed by the auditors are thus perfectly tractable.

Assuming that all the tellers perform their transformations correctly, there will be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of each column and

the next. The exact correspondence, namely which  $(r, D)$  pair in one column corresponds to which pair in the next column, will be hidden and known only to the teller who performed the transformation between those columns. Thus, the receipts will have undergone multiple, secret shuffles between the first column as posted by the voting devices and the final decrypted column. This ensures that no voter can be linked to her vote, so ensuring ballot secrecy.

The fact that several tellers are used gives several layers of defence with respect to voter privacy: even if several of the tellers, but not all, are compromised, the linkage of a voter with her vote will remain secret.

The decrypted votes are posted in the final column so the overall count can be verified by anyone.

## 7 Auditing the Process

The description so far has assumed that all the steps of the vote casting, recording and counting are performed correctly, to specification. In fact, we want to avoid having to place such trust in the components of the scheme: the authority that generates the ballot forms, the device that records and transmits the receipt values and the tellers that perform the mixes and decryptions. In this section we identify the failure modes and corresponding counter-measures.

We assume for the purposes of this paper that measures are taken to prevent failures of the surrounding system, for example, in the maintenance of the electoral role, voter authentication etc. Here we concentrate on the failure modes of the cryptographic core of the scheme. With respect to the accuracy requirement there are three failure modes of the technical core of the scheme:

- Incorrectly constructed ballot forms, i.e., forms for which the cryptographic seed information buried in the onion does not correspond to the candidate order printed on the form.
- Incorrect recording of the values on the receipts and/or transmission to the Bulletin Board for tabulation.
- Errors or corruption in the transformations by the tellers on the ballot pairs.

Any of the failure modes could lead to vote values being incorrectly decrypted, i.e., resulting in decrypted vote values different from those intended by the voters. We now detail the checking processes that are employed to detect, with high probability, any such failures. We start with role of the authority tasked with generating the ballot forms.

### 7.1 Checking on the Authority

Suppose that a suitable authority has generated and distributed a large number of printed ballot forms to the polling stations. Independent auditors will be appointed whose task is to subject a random sampling of these ballots to well-formedness checks. These checks are designed to establish that the seeds buried cryptographically in the onions correctly correspond to the candidate list that

appears on the form, given the declared public keys of the tellers. The auditors might also be tasked with checking the quality of the entropy used in the creation of the ballot forms.

Further random audits could also be performed during the election. Indeed, once the election has closed, left-over forms could also be routinely audited as well.

In addition to the checks performed by the auditors, mechanisms can also be provided to enable the voters to perform checks on the integrity of the ballot forms of their own, as detailed shortly. Thus, the voters are empowered to contribute to the verification of the election. First we describe the auditor checks, then we describe those that could be made available to the voters.

**Auditing the Ballot Forms.** A set of independent auditing authorities are appointed. These should be chosen in such a way as to minimise the chance of collusion. They might, for example, be drawn from civil liberties groups, the political parties etc. Each would be invited to make a random sampling of, say, 5% of the ballot forms generated by the authority.

To check the construction of the forms, some access to the cryptographic seeds is required. This could be achieved by requiring the authority to store the seeds along with their association with the onion values on the forms. However, the storing and selective release of such crypto material is potentially rather delicate and fragile. A novel and more elegant and robust approach is to use the tellers to strip off the layers of encryption for forms selected for audit and reveal the seed material.

Once the seed material for a ballot form selected for audit has been revealed, the form's integrity can be verified by recomputing the offset and onion value. If these match those printed on the form then it is safe to conclude that the form was indeed correctly constructed. Note that these calculations can be performed and verified by anyone, since the public keys of the tellers and the crypto hash functions are all public knowledge, More precisely, to check a ballot form, the following actions are performed:

- the auditor sends a digital copy of the onion on the form to the tellers.
- the tellers strip off the layers of encryption using their private keys to reveal the germs.
- the sequence of germ values are returned to the auditor.
- given the germ values, and knowing the public keys of the tellers, the auditors are able to reconstruct the value of the onion and can check that this agrees with the value printed on the form.
- they now recompute the offset value as the (*mod v*) sum of the hashes of the germs.
- they can now check that the offset applied to the candidate list shown on the form agrees with the value obtained above.

If these checks are successful, it is safe to conclude that the ballot form in question was correctly constructed. Checked ballot forms, for which the seed has been revealed, are then discarded. If a random sampling of a significant proportion of forms all pass the checks, then it is safe to conclude that all the forms are

correctly formed. The statistical calculations of the levels of confidence afforded by such random sampling are straightforward and, of course, the sampling rates can be adjusted to achieve whatever confidence levels are required.

Note further, that the algorithms for these checks are publicly known, so in principle, anyone could construct such a checker and make it freely available. Similarly anyone could examine such a checker to establish that it was performing correctly. Note also that any interested party could volunteer to perform some of the auditing. Thus, for example, the Electoral Reform Society could act as auditors. Representatives of the political parties could act as auditors. Furthermore, any results produced by an auditor can be double checked by independent parties.

**Voter Checks on Ballot Form Integrity.** In addition to the integrity checks performed by the auditors described above, the scheme also allows for checks on ballot form integrity to be performed by the voters themselves. This empowers the voters to contribute to the dependability of the election outcome, a sort of dependability for the people, by the people!.

The technique of using the tellers as an oracle during the voting phase suggests a number of alternative modes for checking the integrity of the ballot forms. These do not involve the revealing of the seed information.

1. Single dummy vote.
2. Multiple or ranked dummy vote.
3. Given the onion value, the tellers return the candidate ordering.

In the first, the voter would cast a dummy vote in exactly the same way that she will later cast her real vote in the booth, except that in this case the dummy vote would probably be cast in the presence of voting officials. Thus, she could put a cross against a random selection and send the receipt off to the tellers. They would decrypt the onion and return what they believe was the vote cast. If the onion was correctly constructed, this should of course agree with the dummy vote selected.

This has interesting psychological implications: assuming that the check succeeds, it should provide the voter with some assurance that when she comes to cast her real vote, it will also be correctly counted. On the other hand it might undermine her confidence that the secrecy of her vote will be assured.

Such a single dummy vote provides a rather weak check on the ballot form construction, probing only part of the construction. The second mode seeks to rectify this: by allowing the voter to cast several dummy votes, either in series or in parallel by making a ranking selection. In the latter case, given the receipt, the tellers should return what they believe to be the candidate ranking chosen by the voter. This provides a more complete check on the construction of the ballot form. Both of these suffer the drawback that the voter is expected to make random choices in the presence of officials.

The third mode is perhaps the most satisfactory. It provides a complete check on the ballot form but does not require the voter to make any random selections. Here, given only the onion value, the tellers should return what they believe to be the candidate ordering as shown on the ballot form.

We note that, in contrast to the auditor checking mode, these three modes are vulnerable to collusion attacks. If the authority that generated the forms is in collusion with one of the tellers there is the possibility of corrupting forms without detection by these modes. For example, the authority could flip a pair of candidates on the ballot forms. The colluding teller performs the corresponding flip during the checking phase, but not during the tallying phase.

The auditor checking mode is not vulnerable to such collusions and so is more rigorous. It therefore appears to be more suitable for the auditing authorities. It could also be made available to voters, but it seems less intuitive and so perhaps less reassuring to the voters. The psychological aspects of these checking modes from a voter perspective will be investigated in future work.

Thus, a possible voting procedure might be to allow a voter when she registers at the polling station to select a pair of ballot forms at random and nominate one for checking. This could then be checked in the presence of officials using, say, the third mode described above. Assuming that the check goes through okay, the checked form is discarded and the voter can proceed to the booth with her “real” ballot form. If any check fails, she should notify an official who should then investigate and diagnose the source of the error. We will discuss the error handling and recovery strategies later.

As noted earlier, care has to be taken in assessing the assurance provided by the voter checks as these are vulnerable to collusion attacks. Various countermeasures could be adopted to limit the likelihood of such collusions going undetected. One possibility is to use an  $l$  out of  $k$  threshold scheme for the onion encryptions. The  $l$  cardinality subsets of the  $k$  tellers could then be chosen randomly for each dummy voting request. If the colluding tellers were omitted when a corrupted dummy vote was decrypted, an error would be flagged. In any case, the random checks by the auditors would catch such manipulated ballot forms as these are not vulnerable to such collusion attacks.

The tellers might return incorrect germ values but this will of course throw up a mismatch between the recomputed onion value and the value on the form. It might be that a teller malfunctions, or is loaded with the wrong keys. In this case the checks serve a useful role in debugging such configuration errors.

Note that the encryptions are all bijective, hence the germ values are uniquely determined by the onion value. The tellers cannot therefore find alternative germ values that would give the same onion value but a different offset.

Together, these checks ensure that if a malicious or corrupted authority tried to corrupt votes by providing a candidate ordering that does not correspond to the seed information buried in the onion, they stand a high chance of being detected. The chance of corruption going undetected falls off exponentially with the number of ballots they try to corrupt.

We stress that all the checks detailed here serve purely to probe the well-formedness of the ballot forms, i.e., serve to detect any failure of the candidate orderings on the forms to correspond to the information buried in the onions. These checks do not provide any detection of corruption during the tallying phase. A form that is correctly constructed in this sense will correctly capture

the voter's intention. Of course, this does not of itself ensure that the vote will ultimately be correctly decrypted. For this we need additional mechanisms to ensure that all ballot receipts will be correctly recorded, transmitted and decrypted. These we address next.

## 8 Checking on the Vote Recording Devices

We need to ensure that ballot receipts are faithfully recorded, transmitted and entered into the tallying process. This is where the bulletin board comes into play. Once voting has closed, all ballot receipts are posted to the bulletin board. The material posted to the bulletin board will be publicly available in read-only mode. Thus any voter can visit the board and confirm that her receipt appears correctly in the input column.

If her receipt does not appear, or appears in corrupted form (in particular, if the position of the  $X$  is incorrect), this should be reported. The voter has her receipt to prove to an official that her receipt does not appear correctly. In practice all ballot forms would be printed with anti-counterfeiting measures and would have been stamped and digitally signed by the device in the booth when the vote was cast to prevent attempts to fake receipts.

Assuming that voters are reasonably diligent in performing these checks, any failures to faithfully post receipts to the bulletin board, and hence to enter them into the tallying, should be detected. Precautions would also be needed to prevent anyone inserting additional, invalid receipts. One simple precaution would be to ensure that the number of posted receipts matched the number of cast ballots. The digital signatures applied by the voting devices could also be used to help prevent fake ballots being introduced.

A further possible enhancement is for the device in the booth to produce a paper copy of the ballot receipt. This copy is posted into a locked and sealed audit box (perhaps after being viewed under glass and confirmed by the voter in the manner of the 'Mercuri method' [5]). Now, independent auditors can perform checks of the correspondence between published receipts and the paper audit trails stored in the audit boxes. This serves to supplement the checks performed by a voter on the appearance of her receipt in the published list. This last enhancement has similarities to the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT [5]) and has the advantage that the checks on ballot receipts on the bulletin board performed by the voters are supplemented by auditor checks. The assurance of the scheme is thus less dependent on the diligence of the voters in checking the appearance of their receipts in the published list.

## 9 Checking on the Tellers

The checks described above should ensure that voters' intentions are correctly encrypted in the ballot receipts and that all receipts are correctly entered in the tabulation process. Now we must ensure that all the receipts are accurately decrypted. For this, we must ensure that all the transformations performed on the receipts by the tellers during the anonymising mixes are correct.






Fig. 7. Auditing Teller<sub>i</sub>

As in the original Chaum scheme, the auditing of the tellers is based on the notion of partial random checking proposed in [4]. This takes place after the teller processing has finished, and is applied to the information committed to by the tellers on the bulletin board.

For each teller an auditing authority goes down the middle column and randomly assigns *R* or *L* to each  $(r, D)$  pair. For pairs assigned an *R*, the auditor requires the teller to reveal the outgoing link (to the right) to the corresponding pair in the next column along with the corresponding germ value. For all pairs assigned an *L*, the auditor requires the teller to reveal the incoming link (from the left) along with the germ value.

This way of selecting links ensures that, for any given teller, no complete route across the two shuffles performed by that teller are revealed by the audit process. Hence no ballot receipt can be traced across the two mixes performed by any given teller. Each ballot transformation has a 50/50 chance of being audited.

This is illustrated in Figure 7, with the selected links included. The remaining links are not revealed.

For each teller the auditor performs such a random audit. Given the property that there are no full links revealed across any teller’s mixes, the L/R selection can be made quite independently for each teller. This is the rationale for making each teller perform two mixes.

Suppose that, for a revealed link, the pair has been transformed thus:


$$r_i, D_i \longrightarrow r_{i-1}, D_{i-1}$$

Knowing this and the corresponding germ value  $g_{i-1}$  (which the teller is required to provide for each revealed link), it can be checked that the following hold:

$$D_i = \{g_{i-1}, D_{i-1}\}_{PK_{T_{i-1}}}$$

and

$$r_{i-1} = r_i - \text{hash}(g_{i-1})(\text{mod } v)$$



**Fig. 8.** Auditing the three tellers

If these equalities hold on a link we can conclude that the teller executed the correct transformation on this ballot pair. Some additional reasoning is required to show that it is not possible for a teller to perform a corrupted mix and be able to reveal false links in such a way as to pass any audit.

Figure 8 illustrates the audit across the sequence of three tellers.

## 10 Error Handling and Recovery Strategies

So far we have only described the checks that can be performed. A full description of the scheme requires detailing error handling and recovery modes. Due to lack of space we will not attempt to give an exhaustive description here.

Let us just consider the error handling strategy for a failed voter check. The first step for the official is to confirm that there is a real disagreement. Anne will have both parts of the dummy ballot form so she can prove which way she cast her dummy vote and she has the printout for the tellers. The official can thus establish that the problem is genuine and not just a case of voter error.

If the problem is real, the official should now run a further, auditor check: use the tellers as an oracle to extract the seed value and use this value to reconstruct the onion value and candidate list offset. If these values agree with those shown on the ballot, then it is fair to conclude that the form was correctly constructed by the authority. The error must then lie with the decryption of the vote performed by the tellers.

If this check fails, it can mean one of two things: the form was incorrectly constructed by the authority, or the form was perhaps actually correctly formed but the seed value returned by the tellers is incorrect.

Clearly, errors have to be diagnosed and collated. Strategies for dealing with patterns of errors must be specified. Thus, if a significant number of ballot forms were found to be malformed, doubt would be cast on the integrity of the authority charged with generating the forms. Note another pleasing feature of the scheme: any significant corruption on the part of the authority generating the ballot forms would almost certainly be detected by random audits before the election opens. Hence, this authority could be replaced before the election even starts.

A full description of error handling and recovery strategies is the topic of current research.

## 11 Generalising Ballots

This paper has so far considered ballots that allow a vote against a single candidate. More generally, elections may allow votes or preferences to be cast against a number of candidates. In this case a right hand strip may contain a number of  $X$ 's, or perhaps a list of numbers against candidates.

In this case, in order to avoid leaking information about votes, it is necessary to allow any permutation of the candidate list on the left hand strip, rather than just a cyclic permutation.

In order to achieve this, the germs could be used as keys for a cryptographic permutation function. The overall permutation applied to the candidate list as shown on the ballot form would then be a composition of the  $2k$  separate permutations obtained from the  $2k$  germs.

We use a publicly known hash function  $h$  that maps germs to permutations, so that  $p_i = h(g_i)$  is a permutation of names on ballots. The overall permutation is given by the composition of the permutations for all the germs:

$$\pi = p_{2k-1} \circ p_{2k-1} \circ \dots \circ p_0$$

(where  $f \circ g(x) = f(g(x))$ ). If the base candidate ordering is *base*, then the candidate list on the ballot is given by  $\pi(\textit{base})$ . Thus a corresponding vote  $r$  on the right hand strip corresponds to a vote of  $\pi^{-1}(r)$  against the base ordering.

The steps in the tellers take  $(r_{i+1}, D_{i+1})$  to  $(r_i, D_i)$ , where each step reverses one permutation comprising  $\pi$ . Here, the  $r$  values will encode either a ranking or an element of the power set of candidates as appropriate. The onion is unpeeled as previously to extract the associated seed  $g_i$  and the inner onion  $D_i$ . In this case the computation of  $r_i$  is given by:

$$r_i := (h(g_i))^{-1}(r_{i+1}) = p_i^{-1}(r_{i+1})$$

Given that the initial vote  $r$  provided to the tellers is  $r_{2k}$ , we obtain that

$$r_i = (p_i^{-1} \circ p_{i+1}^{-1} \circ \dots \circ p_{2k-1}^{-1})(r_{2k})$$

and thus the final vote  $r_0$  posted by  $Teller_0$  is  $\pi^{-1}(r)$ , which is indeed the vote cast.

## 12 Related Work and Conclusions

A large number of cryptographic voting schemes have been proposed over the past 20 years or so. These use a variety of cryptographic techniques, ranging from blind signatures to cryptographic homomorphisms etc. The idea of providing the voter with an encrypted receipt goes back to the original scheme proposed by Chaum. Another scheme, that also uses encrypted receipts and has similar goals, is the VoteHere scheme of Adler and Neff, [6]. The cryptographic primitives used there are quite different from those of this paper and appear to be significantly more complex.

We have presented a new voter-verifiable election scheme based on the original Chaum scheme. This variant preserves the essential features of the original whilst sidestepping the complexity of the visual cryptography of the original. The presentation of the encoding on the vote is quite intuitive and familiar. A pleasing spin-off is that the randomisation of the candidate order counters any tendency to bias the voter choice that might arise from a fixed order.

The new scheme provides some interesting advantages over previous variants:

- The format of the ballot forms and the process of casting a vote is quite familiar.
- The cryptographic commitments are generated before the voter choices are revealed, even before the election period starts.
- The vote recording devices do not learn the voter choices. This avoids the possibility of such devices leaking this information.
- Voters get to perform their own checks on the correct construction of their dummy ballot forms. This should help instil confidence that their real votes will ultimately be correctly decrypted during the tallying process.
- The checking performed by the voters is supplemented by audits performed by various auditing agencies.
- The problem of storing and selectively revealing seed information is solved by the novel use of the tellers during the voting period as oracles to reveal the seeds for ballot forms used for auditing.
- Voters get to run their checks before casting their vote. This avoids some of the messiness in the recovery mechanisms of earlier variants when a voter discovers a mal-formed receipt after casting their vote.
- The initial auditing phase performed on the ballot forms forms should serve to weed out any corrupt authority even before the election opens.

Precautions need to be taken to prevent double voting. In particular, care needs to be taken to ensure that ballot forms used for checking cannot be reused to cast real votes. These details of such mechanisms will be discussed in a future paper.

Similarly, precautions are need to clearly separate the two functions of the tellers: the on-demand ballot form integrity checking function and the anonymising mix function. In particular it is essential to ensure that no ballot form that has been used to cast a “real” vote can be subsequently used in a checking mode. Various procedures can be envisaged to prevent this: appropriately marking a receipt that has been used to cast a vote and ensuring that it cannot be reused for either dummy or real voting. It would be satisfying to develop cryptographic mechanisms to enforce this.

For the purposes of illustration we have described how the scheme can be used for a single vote system, i.e., in which voters get to choose just one of a set of options or candidates. Where a voter can rank the candidates in order of preference (or indeed where she can vote for more than one candidate), full permutations in place of the simple cyclic shifts presented here. In practice, full permutations would probably be used even for single selection elections.

## 13 Future Directions

The destruction of the left hand strips of the ballot forms is essential to prevent both coercion and vote buying. An issue that requires careful consideration then is how to best enforce the destruction and ensure that it is not possible for the voter to exit the booth with both parts of the ballot form. Mechanical devices that enforce the destruction when the vote is cast are a possibility. Another interesting possibility is to ensure that plenty of dummy left hand strips are available in the booth, rather than trying to enforce destruction of this strip. If a voter is threatened with coercion she can simply select an appropriate strip that will keep the coercer happy.

Another issue is that, as presented, the scheme entails the authority knowing the association of all onions and candidate lists. Thus, if the authority were compromised, it could jeopardise the secrecy of the election. Various measures can be envisaged to counter or at least minimise this risk. Ballot forms could be generated in some distributed fashion using various sources of entropy. Alternatively, ballot forms could be generated and printed on demand. An intriguing possibility is to use entropy derived from the paper used to print the forms, for example using optical fibres stirred into the paper during manufacture. Ballot forms could be supplied in sealed envelopes to prevent the information being garnered in transit. The problem remains that there is still a point at which the onion and candidate list must be presented to the voter.

For the three voter checking modes, the germ values do not have to be revealed. This suggests the possibility of reusing a “dummy” ballot form to cast a real vote. This has the advantage that the form used for the real vote will itself have been tested. Ballot forms could come equipped with two onion values, both of which should yield the candidate ordering shown. One could be used for checking, the other to cast the real vote. This possibility may however open up vulnerabilities and would need to be subjected to careful analysis. This is the subject of current research.

This scheme would appear to be readily adapted to remote voting. The simplest adaption is to distribute ballot forms by post. Votes could then be cast by providing the onion value along with suitable indicators of the voter selection in the right hand column. Alternatively, protocols could be used for on-line, authenticated distribution of the crypto material. Of course, the threat of coercion that plagues remote voting systems rears its head again, but there may be ways to offset this.

These avenues are the subject of current research.

## Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Ben Adida, Jeremy Bryans, Roberto Delicata, Jeroen van der Graaf, Michael Jackson, Cliff Jones, Steve Kremer, Aad van Moorsel, Thea Peacock, Rene Peralta, Brian Randell, Ron Rivest, Mark Ryan, Fred Schneider, Robert Stroud, and Poorvi Vora for many helpful discussions.

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