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Who is Running the IMF: Crtical Shareholders or the Staff?

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Fratianni, M., Pattison, J. (2005). Who is Running the IMF: Crtical Shareholders or the Staff?. In: De Gijsel, P., Schenk, H. (eds) Multidisciplinary Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26259-8_25

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