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The Political Economy of Growth: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead

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Explaining Growth

Part of the book series: International Economic Association ((IEA))

Abstract

This chapter examines the lessons of recent research on the political economy of growth in light of regional survey papers commissioned by the Global Research Project on Growth.1 We develop a relatively general framework that encompasses a variety of issues highlighted in those papers based on regional experiences. We then review the existing evidence and assess the hypotheses put forward in those papers. In the last section, we present conclusions and offer suggestions for further research on critical issues in the political economy of growth that are not yet well-understood. The purpose of this exercise is to assess current findings and identify the theoretical and empirical work needed at the country and cross-country levels in order for the political economy of growth analysis to provide a deeper perspective on the process of growth.

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Authors
  1. Micael Castanheira
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  2. Hadi Salehi Esfahani
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Global Development Network, USA

    Gary McMahon  & Lyn Squire  & 

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© 2003 International Economic Association

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Castanheira, M., Esfahani, H.S. (2003). The Political Economy of Growth: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead. In: McMahon, G., Squire, L. (eds) Explaining Growth. International Economic Association. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403990105_5

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