War Waging and Reassessment: Vietnam

Abstract

The Vietnam War challenged the United States in unexpected ways.¹ Not only did the United States lose this war by withdrawing troops without securing a stable South Vietnam, it did so as television came into its own. The repercussions of the American failure in Vietnam are felt today, and continue to shape military strategy and media access to the battlefield. This chapter focuses on presidential explanations for waging war and asks whether or not these explanations changed when leaders reassessed the policy. The period for the baseline (war waging) is 1965, when Lyndon Johnson escalated and “Americanized” the ware and is marked by Johnson’s desire to downplay the war. His reticence was caused by the inherent contradictions of superpower identity and a limited war, and by the political struggle at home for his domestic policy agenda. For the most part (and especially in the early years), Johnson, the political elite, and the public shared the belief that America’s international reputation was at stake in Vietnam, and the broad explanations of American involvement fit neatly into the power politics lens of the post-World War II era. But, Johnson’s particular way of dealing with the media and his discomfort with television contributed to communication strategies that would later contribute significantly to a perceived credibility gap.