Abstract
Comparisons of the two approaches reveal the width of the gap that separated the two sides. The underlying differences were fundamental. First among these was a basic disagreement over whether the United States and its NATO Allies had a legitimate right to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. The United States and its European Allies based their position on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defense accorded by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This inherent right underlies the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. It was buttressed by the precedent of earlier deployment of U.S. medium-range Thor and Jupiter nuclear missiles.
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Notes
Aleksandr’ G. Savel’Yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union ( Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995 ), 62
Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989 ), 374, 375.
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© 2006 Maynard W. Glitman
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Glitman, M.W. (2006). The End of the Beginning. In: The Last Battle of the Cold War. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983169_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983169_5
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