Skip to main content
  • 44 Accesses

Abstract

The examples discussed in the preceding pages demonstrate that the primary concern of U.S. decisionmakers in the 1990s who were faced with separatism was regional stability. Relationships with allied countries, which effectively bolstered the primary objective, came next, and fear of demonstration effects and lobbying by ethnic groups had marginal to no impact. Whether the decision is to support a secessionist group, to withhold support, or even to oppose it, in the first order U.S. policymakers will scrutinize the potential impact on geostrategic interests. Since allied states and expanding conflict have the most immediate potential negative or positive impact on U.S. interests, these factors are most significant. The ramifications of a potential demonstration effect or pressures exerted by lobby groups, are of less immediate or direct concern and are not generally decisive.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. This prototype stands in contrast to wars of attrition, such as our involvement in the Vietnamese civil war, and provides the philosophical basis for the Weinburger—Powell Doctrine, which argues for war as a last resort fought with unlimited means. As a sometimes idealized version of history, it ignores successes such as George Washington’s Revolutionary War strategy, which employed attrition. See Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

    Google Scholar 

  2. For more on the American “strategic style” based on “the confrontation and resolution of crises,” see Roger S. Whitcomb, The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 69–71.

    Google Scholar 

  3. In the words of one author, the Bush and Clinton administrations conducted foreign policy in “a muddle-through mode.” Karl von Vorys, American Foreign Policy: Consensus at Home, Leadership Abroad (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1997), 312.

    Google Scholar 

  4. William Shakespeare, “A Midsummer-Night’s Dream,” III, ii, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Volume I, Comedies (Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1965), 208.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 2003 Evelyn N. Farkas

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Farkas, E. (2003). Conclusions. In: Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982438_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics