Abstract
The examples discussed in the preceding pages demonstrate that the primary concern of U.S. decisionmakers in the 1990s who were faced with separatism was regional stability. Relationships with allied countries, which effectively bolstered the primary objective, came next, and fear of demonstration effects and lobbying by ethnic groups had marginal to no impact. Whether the decision is to support a secessionist group, to withhold support, or even to oppose it, in the first order U.S. policymakers will scrutinize the potential impact on geostrategic interests. Since allied states and expanding conflict have the most immediate potential negative or positive impact on U.S. interests, these factors are most significant. The ramifications of a potential demonstration effect or pressures exerted by lobby groups, are of less immediate or direct concern and are not generally decisive.
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Notes
This prototype stands in contrast to wars of attrition, such as our involvement in the Vietnamese civil war, and provides the philosophical basis for the Weinburger—Powell Doctrine, which argues for war as a last resort fought with unlimited means. As a sometimes idealized version of history, it ignores successes such as George Washington’s Revolutionary War strategy, which employed attrition. See Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
For more on the American “strategic style” based on “the confrontation and resolution of crises,” see Roger S. Whitcomb, The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 69–71.
In the words of one author, the Bush and Clinton administrations conducted foreign policy in “a muddle-through mode.” Karl von Vorys, American Foreign Policy: Consensus at Home, Leadership Abroad (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1997), 312.
William Shakespeare, “A Midsummer-Night’s Dream,” III, ii, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Volume I, Comedies (Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1965), 208.
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© 2003 Evelyn N. Farkas
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Farkas, E. (2003). Conclusions. In: Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982438_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403982438_6
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